The defendant, Leonard Ferguson, pleaded guilty to armed robbery1 and was sentenced *364to serve 30 to 50 years in State prison on June 30, 1958. He appeals, claiming the trial judge erred in failing to advise him before acceptance of his guilty plea of the minimum sentence the trial judge may have been obliged to impose and of the maximum sentence he might impose.2

Whether a trial judge should advise the defendant of the maximum number of years he may be sentenced to serve upon a plea of guilty has been the subject of many opinions of our Court. Recently in People v. Charles A. White (1967), 8 Mich App 220, it was held that “the phrase ‘consequence of his plea’ [GCR 1963, 785.3]3 bears no relation to advice by the trial judge to a defendant with respect to punishment” and that the consequence of pleading-guilty is “to waive the constitutional right to trial and all the incidents thereof.” In White, the Court dismissed as dictum the reference in People v. Atkins (1966), 2 Mich App 199, to “consequence of his plea” in support of Atkins’ holding that the trial judge in that case should have advised the defendant, who was just 16, of the maximum sentence for the crime there charged. However, the White Court went on to observe (p 223):

“The controlling- questions in Atkins, supra, were whether a youthful defendant understandingly waived his right to counsel and understandingly pleaded guilty.” (Emphasis supplied.)

*365Two of the 3 judges who signed the White opinion also signed People v. Taylor (1968), 9 Mich App 333 (leave to appeal granted [1968], 380 Mich 754), where the Court addressed itself to GCR 1963, 785.3 in general and the question presented in People v. White, supra, in particular (p 335):

“At no time did the trial judge advise defendant of the punishment which might follow his conviction by plea of guilty. Our recent decision in People v. White (1967), 8 Mich App 220, holds that such advice bears no relation to the phrase ‘consequence of his plea’ btit such advice is involved in the determination required by 785.3(2) supra, that the plea was ‘freely, under standingly and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion, or duress, and without promise of leniency.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)4

*366The obligation to determine whether a guilty plea “was freely, under standingly and voluntarily made” is imposed upon trial courts by GrCR 1963, 785.3(2) “regardless of whether he [the defendant] is represented by counsel.”5

The Supreme Court recently declared in People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693, that the previously mentioned court rule provision requiring that an accused person who has pled guilty be advised of the “consequence of his plea”, does not oblige the trial judge to inform him of the maximum sentence, favorably citing People v. White, supra. No issue was presented in Dunn as to whether Dunn’s plea was “understandingly” made. Dunn had a prior record of criminal conviction; he was charged with prison escape as a second felony, for which offense the maximum sentence was 4-1/2 years.6 "We do not read Dunn as relieving the trial judge of the court rule imposed obligation “regardless of whether he [the defendant] is represented by counsel * * * [to] ascertain that the plea was freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made.” (Emphasis supplied.) We find nothing in Dunn’s majority opinion inconsistent with the following pertinent observation in Mr. Justice Adams’ separate dissenting opinion in that case (p 702):

“No pat rule or formula can satisfy the constitutional requirement of intelligent and understanding *367waiver wliicli depends xipon the capacities of a defendant in a given case as well as the explanation by the trial judge.”

See, also, People v. Merhige (1920), 212 Mich 601, 612, where, prior to the adoption of Court Rule No 35A (1945) (the predecessor of present rule 785.1), in a case where the defendant had been sentenced to life imprisonment on his plea of guilty to armed robbery, our Supreme Court declared that among the factors to be considered in appraising the voluntariness of a guilty plea is whether the defendant lias been “advised of the extent or nature of the punishment that might bo inflicted.”

We conclude that, while the failure to inform an accused person of the maximum sentence will not necessarily invalidate his guilty plea, the failure of the record to show that the defendant was aware of any minimum and of the maximum sentence may still be considered in determining whether such a plea was “understandingly” made.

We are persuaded from our examination of the record in this case that the trial judge erred in failing to inquire of the defendant Ferguson whether he was aware of the fact that upon conviction of armed robbery he might be sentenced to State prison for life or for any term of years. There is nothing in the record indicating the defendant was aware he faced such a lengthy sentence upon acceptance of his plea of guilty. Although the defendant had a prior conviction record, each of his prior convictions was in a State other than Michigan and the sentences imposed were relatively short. We do not think the defendant’s prior criminal experience would necessarily have informed him that in Michigan the penalty for armed robbery is .life or any term of years. Indeed, the defendant’s prior experience may have led him to believe the penalty he *368faced was of a magnitude far less than in fact it was within the trial judge’s power to impose and which actually was imposed in this case.

When convicted, the defendant was 22 years old. The trial judge observed of the defendant and his codefendant: “Neither of these men have average intelligence nor scarcely any education.” That observation by the trial judge weighs heavily with us in our review.

We do not mean to be understood as challenging the wisdom of the heavy sentence imposed in this case, but rather as saying that under the circumstances the trial judge should have inquired of the defendant whether he was aware of the possible minimum and of the maximum possible sentence as part of the obligation imposed upon the judge by the rule “regardless of whether he [the defendant] is represented by counsel”, to determine that the plea was understanding^ made.

We are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.7

*369■ Tbe plea and conviction based tbereon are set aside and a new trial granted.

(dissenting). In order to place this case in its proper appellate posture, it should be noted that this appeal is from tbe trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw plea and vacate sentence. Such a motion is addressed to tbe *370discretion of the trial court. People v. Vasquez (1942), 303 Mich 340. What we review is the exercise of that discretion by the trial court, and the grant or denial of appellate relief is controlled by our determination of whether or not the discretion has been abused.

The standard by which we determine abuse of discretion is established by statute, CL 1948, § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28. 1096) and by rule, GrCE 1963, 529.1. A finding of abuse of discretion requires a finding of violation or denial of constitutional right or of miscarriage of justice. People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719.

Defendant makes no claim that a constitutional right was violated or denied nor that there has been a miscarriage of justice, probably because any such claim would not be supported by the record. His sole argument for relief is based on alleged technical noncompliance with Court Rule No 35A (1945), presently GCR 1963, 785.3.

On the authority of People v. White (1967), 8 Mich App 220, People v. Collins (1968), 380 Mich 131, and People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719, I vote to affirm.