Michael Railsbach, age 18, was found with a stab wound in the chest March 30, 1965 at about 7:40 p.m. near Dueweke Park. He was taken to a nearby flat where he collapsed. In response to a radio call, police officers rushed Railsbach to Receiving Hospital where he arrived at 8:08 p.m. He died on the operating table at 9:25 p.m.

*645At the hospital Railsbach regained consciousness long enough to answer certain questions asked of him by officer Leon Studzinski.

At the trial of the defendant, officer Studzinski testified as follows:

“We received the call at 7:45 p.m., and approximately five minutes later we were there, about 7:50 p.m. We went to that address, 4739 Field Avenue and we went upstairs and—to an upstairs fiat and saw—we saw the deceased lying on the floor; his shirt was open and he had a chest wound and-1 made conversation with him; asked him first of all his name and he was able to get out and I was able to understand, ‘Michael,’ and the rest was incoherent. I asked for an address, which was furnished to me on paper by the occupants of the house. I asked him then what happened and he stated he was stabbed and I asked him if he knew by whom and he said he did not. This is information I received at the scene as the deceased was rolling from side to side clutching his chest, and then became, unconscious. We hurriedly rushed.him to Receiving Hospital where, at the hospital, he regained consciousness and we again asked him what happened and he said he was stabbed. I said, Was that the result of a fight or a robbery or what,’ and he said he had been robbed and I asked him of what and he says his wallet was taken containing $6.00. I said, ‘What did the man look like,’ and he described the man as colored, approximately 17 years of age, 5 feet 10 inches tall, medium build and wearing a green jacket. He related that the assailant had asked him for a cigarette and as he was pulling the cigarette out he was stabbed. That was all.”

At the trial this testimony was allowed in evidence over the objection of defense counsel, either as dying declarations or as res gestae utterances. On appeal the admission of this testimony is sought to *646be upheld • solely on the basis that it comes under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

The defense contends that the statements attributed to the deceased, Railsbaeh, were not spontaneous and were the result of leading questions put to him by officer Studzinski.

In Rice v. Jackson (1965), 1 Mich App 105, 111, the admissibility of res gestae statements was reviewed exhaustively by this Court. Under the standards of Rice, supra, which have applicability in this criminal action, statements are admissible in evidence under the following conditions:

“(1) that there is a startling occasion, startling enough to produce nervous excitement, and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) that th'e statement must have been made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent; and (3:) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding it.”

Testing the facts of this case against these standards, we find the objected-to testimony properly admissible in evidence.

The occurrence involving the deceased, beyond a question, was such as would give rise to spontaneous and unreflecting answers. The lapse of time between the stabbing and the making of the statement did not exceed 40 minutes.1 Of this time the deceased was unconscious part of the time and at others in great pain.2 The statement related directly to circumstances surrounding the stabbing.

The most serious challenge to the admissibility of the contested testimony is made on the basis that the reason for the stabbing was established by the *647following question asked of the deceased by officer Studzinski:

“Was that the result of a fight or a robbery or what!”

The deceased responded that he had been robbed and in response to “of what” he said his wallet containing $6.

The testimony which also related to the deceased’s description of his assailant and some of the circumstances of the attack upon him were very damaging to the defense as it tied in other circumstantial evidence which was introduced in the trial.

The testimony is challenged on the basis that the questions suggested the answer. Under the circumstances of this case we do not find this objection valid. The answer to the question “Was that the result of a fight or a robbery or what” requires an answer beyond that of a simple “yes” or “no,” or the election between alternatives. The response to this question had to originate in the mind of the deceased. The question then is, was the response spontaneous and unreflecting, and made before there was time to contrive and misrepresent. In passing upon the answer to this question, the trial judge is given considerable discretion. See White v. City of Marquette (1905), 140 Mich 310.

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in allowing the testimony into evidence.

The credibility of the officer giving this testimony and the weight to be given it is within the province of the trier of fact.

Affirmed.

(concurring). On this appeal from his conviction by a jury of the crime of first-degree *648murder the defendant asserts that a police office]' should not have been allowed to repeat at the trial certain statements alleged to have been made by the victim before he died.

On March 30, 1965, at about 7:40 p.m., Michael Railsbach, 18 years of age, staggered out of Dueweke Park in the City of Detroit with a stab wound in the chest, calling for help. He was taken to the flat of a nearby resident, where he collapsed on the floor. He was able to give his name and address and say that he was stabbed. Two police officers responded to a radio call and rushed Michael to Receiving Hospital, arriving at 8:08 p.m., where, according to the police officer whose testimony is in issue, he regained consciousness and was able to answer certain questions put to him by the officer. He was then taken into surgery, and died on the operating table at 9:25 p.m.

The testimony in issue was that of police officer Leon Studzinski:

“We received the call at 7:45 p.m., and approximately five minutes later we were there, about 7 -.50 p.m. We went to that address, 4739 Field Avenue and we went upstairs and—to an upstairs flat and saw—we saw the deceased lying on the floor; his shirt was open and he had a chest wound and I made conversation with him; asked him first of all his name and he was able to get out and I was able to understand, ‘Michael’, and the rest was incoherent. I asked for an address, which was furnished to me on paper by the occupants of the house. I asked him then what happened and he stated he was stabbed and I asked him if he knew by whom and he said he did not. This is information I received at the scene as the deceased was rolling from side to side clutching his chest, and then became unconscious. We hurriedly rushed him to Receiving Hospital where, at the hospital, he regained *649consciousness and we again asked him what happened and he said he was stabbed. I said, ‘Was that the result of a fight or a robbery or what,’ and he said he had been robbed and I asked him of what and he says his wallet was taken containing $6.00. I said, ‘"What did the man look like,’ and he described the man as colored, approximately 17 years of age, 5 feet 10 inches tall, medium build and wearing a green jacket. He related that the assailant had asked him for a cigarette and as he was pulling the cigarette out he was stabbed. That was all.”

The people contend that Michael’s alleged statements were spontaneous, res gestae utterances and no longer defend the admission of officer Studzinski’s testimony under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. "Without officer Studzinski’s testimony showing robbery, the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder might not have been justified by the evidence.

“Spontaneous exclamation” as a specific exception to the hearsay rule was identified and differentiated by Professor "Wigmore from the general res gestae exception from which it grew. The essential validating element for Wigmore was the emotional impact of a startling event, “which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.” 6 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed), § 1747, p 135. (Emphasis supplied.) Psychological research generally tends to bear out this belief that shock inhibits the ability to falsify,1 and the Wigmorean principle has been widely accepted by the courts.2

*650The emotional impact, said Wigmore, tends to create a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness (Wigmore, supra, § 1749, p 139) when 3 conditions are met:

(1) the utterance relates to a startling occurrence,.

(2) -the occurrence is startling enough to produce nervous excitement which would render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting, and

(3) the utterance was made before there has been time-to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., “while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance.” Wigmore, supra, § 1750, pp 142, 155. (Emphasis supplied.)

' Of the 3' criteria just enumerated, the requirement that the statement relate to the startling occurrence is virtually always satisfied, as is the requirement that the principal event be startling enough to produce nervous excitement. The majority of cases are concerned with whether the statement was made “while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance,” Wigmore, supra, § 1750, p 142,—“before the declarant has had time or opportunity to reflect or contrive.” McCormick on Evidence, § 272, p 578.

The courts have struggled-in innumerable cases to make these criteria more definite, with small success.3 There is, however, a clear trend in favor of *651admissibility and more generous interpretation of the “spontaneous exclamation” exception.4

There can be no doubt that Michael Eailsbacb received a severe shock when a knife was plunged 4 inches into his chest and through his heart', or that the shock continued until his death. There was testimony that as he lay on the floor at the flat to which he was first taken he rolled from side to side, apparently in great pain, and that at the hospital he looked “critical.” After staggering from the park and collapsing, he was able to state only his name and address and that he had been stabbed before lapsing into unconsciousness. In view of the severity of the wound and the fact that he was unconscious part of the time, we think entirely justified a conclusion that Michael Eailsbach had no opportunity to reflect or fabricate even though there was a time lapse of approximately 30 to 40 minutes between the stabbing and his statement at the hospital.

The amount of time elapsed between the startling-occurrence and the utterance is an important factor *652(People v. Johnson [1915], 186 Mich 516; White v. City of Marquette [1905], 140 Mich 310, 313),5 but so, too, is the severity of any injury suffered by the declarant (Stone v. Sinclair Refining Co. [1923], 225 Mich 344)6 and whether the declarant was unconscious or incoherent all or part of the intervening time. White v. City of Marquette, supra, pp 314-315; compare Bristol v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association (1943), 305 Mich 145; Rogers v. Saginaw-Bay City R. Co. (1915), 187 Mich 490, 494. McCormick sums up (§ 272, p 581):

,. ' “When the statement follows the event, the length of the interval between the startling’ event and the declaration is often crucial. Whether this period affords opportunity for contrivance will he much affected hy the declarant’s physical condition during the 'interval, and shock, pain, unconsciousness and like stresses will tend to postpone that opportunity.” (Emphasis supplied-.)

The difficult aspect of this case is that Michael Kailsbach’s statements were made in response to a *653series of questions, some of which, would .-bé called “leading” if asked by an attorney in court) sincé they tend to suggest possible answers. The defendant contends that officer Studzinski’s- testimony repeating Michael Railsbacb’s alleged statements at the hospital whs not -within the exception for “spontaneous exclamations” because the statements, if made at all, were not spontaneous, but rather were answers given in response to leading questions put to Michael by officer Studzinski.

It appears settled, in Michigan as in the country as a whole, that while a statement is not necessarily to be excluded because made in answer to a question, the injection of a question is a factor which should weigh against admissibility. Holtz v. L. J. Beal & Son, Inc. (1954), 339 Mich 235.7 That the question was leading rather than a simple open-ended query such as “what happened” or “who did it,” must make it weigh even more heavily against admissibility, since it to some extent may provide the declarant with material for fabrication or direct his statement in ways it would.not have gone “spontaneously.”

*654But there is no reason to draw a hard line between “question” and “leading’ question” so as to make the latter automatically inadmissible. It is simply another factor to be considered in deciding whether there is a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness in the situation as a whole, whether the reflective powers had been triggered or were still in abeyance, whether the statement was the product of reflection and deliberation.8 It will necessarily be a weighty factor, but it is not a conclusive one.

“No hard and fast rule can be laid down which will apply to every case, but each case must be considered in connection with the circumstances surrounding it.” White v. City of Marquette, supra, p 314.

In the case-by-case application of this exception the term “spontaneous,” taken at its literal meaning of completely self-generated, can be the source of almost as much difficulty as the term res gestae. See Rice v. Jackson (1965), 1 Mich App 105, 110.9 A more neutral, and for that reason more accurate, rubric than either “res gestae” or “spontaneous exclamation” is the one adopted by Professor MeCor*655mick—“excited utterance.” McCormick on Evidence, § 272, p 578. Since courts generally hold admissible under tbis exception tbe statements of an excited person made in response to questions, tbis definitional refinement is a welcome advance toward clarity.

Freed of tbe difficulty tbat can be caused by use of tbe terms “res gestae” and “spontaneous,” tbis exception, tbe “excited utterance” exception, stands clear as the simple principle wbicb Wigmore originally enunciated, i.e., when a person participates in a startling or shocking experience, tbe emotional excitement generated in him may render him unable or unlikely to fabricate concerning bis experience. Like so much else wbicb seeks to explain human conduct, tbis cannot be stated as a certainty, but it can create a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. Wigmore, supra § 1749, p 139.

Tbe critical question asked of Michael Railsbach on tbe issue of the degree of guilt, if guilty at all, was stated in the alternative (“Was it a fight or robbery or what?”), which does not make it any less suggestive; one of the two suggested answers was false. But that question and its answer do not stand alone. “Of what” assumes tbat something was taken, but does not suggest what was taken, so that it is only slightly leading; tbe response that his wallet had been taken with $6.00 was not suggested by tbe question. Tbe question “what did he look like” does not suggest its answer. Michael Bailsbach’s statement that he was stabbed as he was pulling out a cigarette was apparently volunteered. There were thus statements by Michael, not in response to questions that suggested their answers, which bear out tbe statement attributed to him that he had been robbed.

*656On the facts of this case one' would he entirely warranted in concluding that, without the stimulus of the questions, Michael would not have spoken at alL Considering the stress of the moment, ydth Michael apparently and in fact near death, it would not be reasonable now to make the entire matter turn on the form of the question.

In summary, it seems clear that the declarantes serious and painful condition, which was uninterrupted and probably growing worse with loss of blood, negatives any likelihood that Ms responses to officer Studzinski were the product of reflection and fabrication even though somewhat leading questions were asked, including an important one that suggested its answer. Such questions might well invalidate statements by a less seriously injured person, but on these facts we do not think we would be warranted in reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the trial judge.

Officer Studzinski’s credibility, although slightly impaired by certain inconsistencies between his testimony at the preliminary examination and at the trial, was for the trial judge to consider in the first instance as a factor to lie weighed together with the other known facts, and circumstances in reaching his decision on admissibility and, then, for the jury to consider in reaching its verdict. Compare People v. Walker (1965), 374 Mich 331, 337, 338.

Affirmed.