Defendant appeals his conviction for escape from prison contrary to MCLA § 750.193 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.390).

Defendant’s first allegation of error is that he was not arrested and arraigned promptly after being captured and returned to prison. After formal charges were brought, he was promptly arraigned, so there is no question of a violation of *302 MCLA § 764.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28:885). Defendant’s real contention .is that the prison authorities denied him due process of law by keeping him in detention for 36-Mays after his recapture before charging and arraigning him for the escape. “There is no constitutional right to be arrested.” Hoffa v. United States (1966), 385 US 293, 310 (87 S Ct 408, 417, 17 L Ed 2d 374), 1 Defendant was properly incarcerated under his original conviction; we fail to see how the delay in bringing the escape charge has prejudiced him. Cf. People v. Nawrocki (1967), 6 Mich App 46, 54.

Defendant’s second contention is that it was error to deny his motion for mistrial after the arresting officer testified that he placed defendant under arrest for “strong-armed robbery”. The trial judge :prbpe'rly warned the jury to disregard this reference to another crime not relevant to the escape. Defendant argues that this warning by the judge merely “reemphasized” the error. To follow this liné' of- reasoning, there would have to be a mistrial every time a witness misspoke, since no' error could ever be cured by instructions. Such is obviously not the law. An unresponsive answer by a witness can generally be 'cured by proper instructions. People v. Kelsey (1942), 303 Mich 715.

’ Deféndant next maintains that his record - of conviction was not properly introduced in evidence as a “business record”, so that the prosecution failed to prove that he was properly confined at the time of the 'escape: However, it is not necessary to introduce the certificate of confinement as a business record, since MCLA § 800.50 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev *303 § 28. 1419), provides that the certified copy of the sentence which is deposited with the prison warden “shall he evidence of the facts therein contained”. Defendant does not contend that the document admitted was not the proper one.

Finally, defendant protests that he only fled the prison work camp in desperation to avoid homosexual attacks by other prisoners. The problem of homosexuality in the prisons is serious and perplexing, and never more so than in a case such as this where such activity is forced upon a young man against his will. However, the answer to the problem is not the judicial sanctioning of escapes. While we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this defendant, it is easy to visualize a rash of escapes, all rationalized by unverifiable tales of sexual assault. The solution must rather come from some kind of penological reform.

Two legal theories are offered to support defendant’s claim that his departure from the prison work camp should not be punished as an escape. First, he argues that he did not have the specific intent to escape. A reading of the escape statute, MCLA § 750.193 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.390), 2 shows no indication that the legislature intended to make this a specific intent crime. The language is rather that of general prohibition. Defendant does not deny that he intended to leave the prison, and this is all the intent the law requires. Of. 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure, § 20. Second, defendant seeks to justify his escape as caused by an irresistible impulse. The trial court properly excluded the evidence proffered on this point, since defendant did not give the required *304 four-day notice of an insanity defense, MCLA §§ 768.20, 768.21 (Stat Ann 1954 Bev §§ 28.1043, 28-. 1044). The record does not support defendant’s claim that he did not have four days’ notice of the trial date; defendant’s counsel signed subpoenas on November 14 for appearance on the trial date of November 20.

Affirmed.