Defendant was convicted by a jury on two counts. Count I was breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit larceny, MCLA §750.110 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.305), for which he was sentenced to a term of 2-1/2 to 15 years in prison. Count II was felonious assault, CL 1948, § 750.82 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.277), for which he was sentenced to a term of 2-1/2 to 4 years in prison. The sentences are to run concurrently.

On appeal defendant alleges (1) that the verdict on Count I was against the weight of the evidence; (2) that the prosecutor’s statement in final argument that fingerprints dould not be taken from a knife’s rough surface was prejudicial in that no testimony to support this statement appeared in the record; (3) that the prosecutor’s reference in final argument to defendant’s silence at the time of his arrest about his alibi witnesses thwarted defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent; (4) and that testimony regarding bloodstains, buttons, and a radio was inadmissible because it was the result of an illegal arrest, search and seizure.

Examination of the record reveals that during the trial no objection was made to the prosecutor’s final argument, nor was objection made to the admission of the buttons or radio. Indeed, the radio was defendant’s own exhibit number one, and de *203 fense counsel specifically stated lie bad no objection to tbe admission of tbe buttons. Defendant did object to testimony that certain stains were blood, and tbe trial court sustained this objection. Defendant is untimely in raising issues (2), (3), and (4), and we so bold. People v. David Smith (1969), 16 Mich App 198, Laughlin v. United States (CA 9, 1969), 411 F2d 1224, People v. Childers (1969) 20 Mich App 639.

Defendant’s contention that tbe verdict on Count I was against tbe weight of tbe evidence is without merit. There was an abundance of eyewitness testimony which together with tbe testimony of defendant’s several alibi witnesses clearly presented a question for tbe jury.

Affirmed.