Defendant appeals, as of right, from her plea-based conviction of, and sentence for, operating a bawdy house or house or place *483 resorted to for the purpose of prostitution (MCLA 750.452; MSA 28.707).

At the preliminary examination, no showing was made by the people that the premises controlled by defendant had a reputation in the community as a house of ill-fame. On motion by defendant to quash the information, the trial court quashed that part which charged defendant with operating or maintaining a house of ill-fame. Defendant then pled guilty to the truncated information, reserving the right to appeal from the trial court’s partial quashing!

Defendant contends that an :~sential element of a charge under the statute, supra, is that the place in question was a house of ill-fame, and that such element requires a showing of bad reputation in the community. People v Pinkerton, 79 Mich 110 (1889), one of the cases on which defendant relies, is based on a prior version of this statute and is inapplicable here. In People v Lee, 307 Mich 743 (1943), also relied on by Ms. Mayes, the defendant was, unlike Ms. Mayes, charged with operating a house of ill-fame.

The present statute provides that:

"Any person who shall keep, maintain or operate, or aid and abet in keeping, maintaining or operating a house of ill-fame, bawdy house or any house or place resorted to for the purpose of prostitution * * * shall be guilty of a felony, * * * .”

We note that the disjunctive is used and therefore a violation of the statute occurs whenever a person operates or maintains (1) a house of ill-fame, or (2) a bawdy house, or (3) a house or place resorted to for the purpose of prostitution. The trial court correctly held that only where the operation or maintenance of a house of ill-fame is charged, is reputation of the premises an essential element.

Affirmed.