Defendant was convicted by a jury on October 21, 1971 of larceny by trick over $100, contrary to MCLA 750.356; MSA 28.588. He was sentenced to from three to five years in prison. He appeals as of right.

On appeal defendant raises two allegations of error. First he argues that the verdict of "guilty as *31charged” by a jury, to a charge of larceny by trick over $100, is reversible error for failure to determine whether the larceny was under or over $100. He cites People v Martin, 91 Mich 650 (1892), in which there was conflicting evidence as to the value of the property stolen. Here complainant testified that he gave defendant $312 in cash. There was no dispute as to the value of the property taken. In such a case the jury verdict is sufficiently clear without any specification of the value of the property.

Defendant’s second allegation of error is that the judge failed to instruct the jury that it must determine whether the larceny was over or under $100. Defendant made no request for instructions. The trial court did instruct the jury on this issue as follows:

"I should like to add this, you must find that the property stolen was over the value of $100. The possible verdicts in this matter is [sic] we find the defendants guilty or we find the defendants not guilty.”

This was sufficient instruction on this point.

While this writer normally does not respond to a dissenting opinion, he is obliged to do so in this instance as the ground for the dissent is raised sua sponte. The issue raised by the dissent regards the need for the court under the circumstances of this case to make a determination as to the competency of defendant to stand trial.

The colloquy upon which Judge Burns relies does not squarely raise the issue of competency to stand trial. Aside from the indicated remarks of the defendant, nothing concerning his actions is found in the record that should have caused the trial court to order a competency hearing; none was requested; none was ordered.

*32This writer would not raise the issue sua sponte as the record does not indicate that there was a miscarriage of justice in this case.

Affirmed.

(dissenting). Although not raised on appeal but apparent on the face of the record is the question of whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. A defendant’s competency to stand trial is so essential to due process that I am compelled to raise the issue sua sponte.

Prior to trial, the following colloquy took place between the defendant and the trial judge:

"Mr. Sims [the defendant]: Your Honor, last week, I think it was, I went before the psychiatrist and I don’t know the results but due to this fact, because I’m not in the right frame of mind, I would like to get some information on my behavior before I carry on with this trial.

"The Court: Well, the court is going to deny any postponement. I think, we’re going to go ahead at this time. I hope such treatment as you’re getting will be to your benefit, but this trial has been set up for some time and I see no further reason to delay. I’m interested in your comment.”

The foregoing was not a routine request for a continuance, but rather defendant was putting the trial court on notice of his possible incompetency to stand trial.

Admittedly, defendant did not specifically request diagnostic commitment to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, MCLA 767.27a(3); MSA 28.966(H)(3); GCR 1963, 786. The defendant did, however, raise the issue of his competency; and even though defendant’s request was not in writ*33ing pursuant to GCR 1963, 786, he was nonetheless entitled at that point to a hearing to determine whether he should have been committed to a diagnostic facility for a determination of his competency to stand trial. People v Gomolak, 386 Mich 540 (1972).

Inasmuch as the trial court failed to conduct such a hearing, I vote to reverse and remand for a new trial so that the issue can be properly adjudicated.