Plaintiff appeals as a matter of right from a summary judgment granted to defendant. The relevant facts are largely undisputed. Stacy Belcher, plaintiff’s son, died in a single car accident on August 21, 1976. At the time of the accident, decedent was operating a vehicle owned and registered to himself. Subsequently, it was determined that the deceased’s certificate of insurance was a forgery. Plaintiff then filed a claim with the Assigned Claims Facility of the Michigan Secretary of State, pursuant to MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172. This claim was assigned to defendant. On March 23, 1977, defendant denied plaintiff’s claim. On April 15, 1977, plaintiff filed a complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that she was entitled to survivor’s benefits. On September 23, 1977, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim was derived from that of her son and that his claim was barred by MCL 500.3113(b); MSA 24.13113(b).

On appeal it is undisputed that plaintiff’s son, had he survived, would not have been entitled to receive personal protection insurance benefits. MCL 500.3113(b); MSA 24.13113(b). The only issue to be determined in this case is whether a surviving dependant of one barred from receiving such benefits is barred from receiving survivor’s bene*210fits. This issue has not. previously been addressed by this Court.

The purpose of Michigan’s so-called "No Fault Insurance Act” is to ensure the compensation of persons injured in an automobile accident. Hill v Aetna Life & Casualty Co, 79 Mich App 725, 728; 263 NW2d 27 (1977), Pollock v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 79 Mich App 218, 222; 261 NW2d 554 (1977), O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 70 Mich App 487, 495; 245 NW2d 801 (1976). Toward this end, the act requires the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle to maintain security, usually in the form of insurance, for payment of benefits of personal protection insurance, MCL 500.3101(1); MSA 24.13101(1). The operation of a vehicle which is not so insured constitutes a misdemeanor as to its owner, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2).

In addition to the possible criminal charge, the owner of a vehicle which is not insured is not entitled to recover personal protection insurance benefits. MCL 500.3113(b); MSA 24.13113(b). This statute reads in full:

"A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

"(a) The person was using a motor vehicle which he had taken unlawfully, unless he reasonably believed that he was entitled to take and use the vehicle.

"(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsection (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.

"(c) The person was not a resident of this state, was an occupant of a motor vehicle not registered in this state and was not insured by an insurer which has filed a certification in compliance with section 3163.”

*211It is this statute which would have prevented plaintiffs son from recovering personal protection insurance benefits, had he survived.

Plaintiff contends, however, that, as a surviving dependant, she is nonetheless entitled to benefits under the no-fault act. She notes that surviving dependants are not excluded from receiving personal protection insurance benefits under MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113 and relies upon MCL 500.3108; MSA 24.13108 and MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172 in support of her right to recovery. MCL 500.3108; MSA 24.13108 provides for the payment of personal protection insurance benefits for a surviving dependant’s loss in a situation where a person has died.1 MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172 permits one to obtain personal protection insurance benefits through an assigned claims plan, where no personal protection insurance is applicable to the injury.2

Although the statutory language is hardly clear, *212we hold that plaintiff is not entitled to recover personal protection insurance benefits. This is because her right to recover is dependant upon or derivative of her son’s rights to personal protection benefits.3 Since he could not have recovered such benefits, neither can she.

The language of various sections of the no-fault act is supportive of this conclusion. MCL 500.3112; MSA 24.13112 commences by stating:

"Personal protection insurance benefits are payable to or for the benefit of an injured person or, in case of his death, to or for the benefit of his dependants * * *."

This language indicates that the payment of such benefits to the surviving dependants where the injured person has died is a substitute for the payment of benefits directly to the injured party. Further support for this conclusion can be found by comparing the method of computing survivor’s benefits, MCL 500.3108; MSA 24.13108,4 with the *213method for computing the work loss portion of the personal protection benefits available to an injured person, MCL 500.3107; MSA 24.13107.5 Both are payable for up to three years and are subject to a $1000 maximum for any 30-day period. Both include the cost of expenses, up to $20 per day, incurred in obtaining services which would have been provided by the injured person. Both provide *214for the support of the injured person’s dependants. Survivor’s benefits do so directly, by paying the dependant survivor that amount which the deceased would have provided for support. In the case of work-loss benefits, the injured party is provided with benefits consisting of lost income and part of that amount is, presumably, used for the support of dependants. In addition, the express language of MCL 500.3107(b); MSA 24.13107(b) excludes from work loss any loss incurred after the date on which the injured person dies. Thus, there can be no simultaneous recovery for survivor’s benefits and work-loss benefits.

Since survivor’s benefits are intended as a substitute for the work-loss portion of personal protection benefits, a dependant survivor’s right to benefits must necessarily depend upon the right of the injured person to receive work-loss benefits had he survived. Here, however, the deceased would have been barred from claiming any personal protection benefits. Thus, his surviving dependant is also barred.

Such a conclusion makes good sense as well. There is no logical reason to provide benefits to the surviving dependants of an uninsured deceased when no such benefits are available to the dependants of an uninsured individual who survives. Indeed, due to continuing medical expenses, the dependant in the latter situation may have a greater need for such benefits. This Court will not construe a statutory scheme so as to provide an unreasonable and irrational result. Collins v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 656, 666; 187 NW2d 423 (1971). Thus, this Court is unwilling to interpret the provisions of the no-fault act in such a way as to grant plaintiff a benefit when she would not be entitled to benefits had her son survived.

*215Since plaintiffs right to survivor’s benefits is dependant upon her son’s rights to benefits had he survived, the language of MCL 500.3113(b); MSA 24.13113(b) that would have barred her son from recovery bars her as well. The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Valenti Homes Inc v City of Sterling Heights, 61 Mich App 537; 233 NW2d 72 (1975), is thus inapplicable, since plaintiffs action is, in effect, barred by the express language of the statute. It would have been repetitious to provide an additional subsection to MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113, barring the survivors of an uninsured deceased from recovery, when such persons are necessarily barred by the language of subsection (b).

Nor can plaintiff find support for her position in the language of MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172, which provides for claims against the Assigned Claims Facility. That statute is limited to persons "entitled to claim”. As noted above, plaintiff is not so entitled. Therefore, her argument must fail and summary judgment was properly granted in this case.

Affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.

(dissenting). I agree that the issue raised in this appeal is one of first impression, and that the statutory language is not as clear as it could have been. However, my reading of the entire statute convinces me that it was not the legislative intent to prevent persons such as plaintiff in this case from recovering and I, therefore, dissent.

*216Under § 31051 of the act, an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle "subject to the provisions of this chapter”. Section 3105(3) makes it clear that bodily injury includes death.

Because the injury resulted in death in this case, plaintiff is claiming survivor’s loss benefits under § 3108.2 Although the statutory measure of this loss is essentially the same as if the decedent had lived and was claiming benefits in his own name, I cannot conclude from that fact, as does the majority, that the survivor’s claim can be called derivative.3 The fact that the survivor’s loss is distinct is shown by § 3110(4)4 which provides that the survivor’s loss accrues when it is incurred, rather than at the time of the accident, and the language of § 3108 itself. Plaintiff is claiming a loss she incurred herself, she is not attempting to recover a loss her son incurred personally, and she seeks to recover only in a representative capacity.

Plaintiff made her claim for survivor’s loss to the assigned claims facility under § 31725 which provides in part:

"A person entitled to claim because of accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle in this state may obtain personal protection insurance benefits through an assigned claims plan if no personal protection insurance is applicable to the injury * * *

*217The real question, and the focus of the dispute between the parties, is whether plaintiff is a "person entitled to claim”. I would hold that she is.

Plaintiff is a dependent6 of a person who suffered accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, as those terms are defined in the act. This is all that must be shown to make plaintiff "a person entitled to claim”. If she is not a person entitled to claim, it must be because of a specific exclusion found in the statute. The exclusions and limitations of § 3105 to § 3116 apply to claims made to the assigned claims facility. MCL 500.3173; MSA 24.13173.

The defendant relies solely upon the exclusion contained in § 3113(b).7 This section provides in relevant part:

"A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

"(b) The person was the owner or. registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Although "person” is not defined in the no-fault chapter, it is defined in § 1148 of the Insurance Code and includes "an individual”. The majority *218has expanded the statutory definition to include not only the individual, but his dependents as well. If the act is applied as written, the exclusion applies only to the individual who was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and had not acquired the appropriate security.

The exclusions are personal and should not be expanded. Under MCL 500.3101; MSA 24.13101, it is only the owner or registrant who is required to maintain security for the payment of benefits. MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2) imposes criminal liability only on the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle who operates it without security, or someone who operates the vehicle with knowledge that there is no security in force. The whole tenor of the act shows that it applies to persons, i.e., individuals; not individuals and their dependents.

This interpretation, that only the person who violates the act should go without benefits, is further supported by § 3177.9 That section provides:

"An insurer obligated to pay personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury * * * to the spouse or relative resident in the household of the owner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle may recover such benefits paid and appropriate loss adjustment costs incurred from the owner or registrant of the uninsured motor vehicle or from his estate. Failure of such a person to make payment within 30 days is a ground for suspension or revocation of his motor vehicle registration and operator’s license. An uninsured motor vehicle for the purpose of. this section is a motor vehicle with respect to which security as required by sections 3101 and 3102 is not in effect at the time of the accident.”

*219Unless persons such as the plaintiff are persons "entitled to claim” under § 3172, the repayment provisions of § 3177 are meaningless. We should not presume that the Legislature created meaningless legislation.

There is no statutory exclusion which would bar plaintiff’s claim and the summary judgment should be reversed.