Defendant, Melvin King, was charged with armed robbery in violation of MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. Defendant’s jury trial resulted in his being convicted, on November 10, 1976, of attempted armed robbery. MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287. On November 24, 1976, defendant was sentenced to 40 to 60 months in prison, and defendant appeals from his conviction as of right.

Defendant raises only one issue on this appeal. Defendant claims that the trial court did not properly exercise its discretion when it ruled that defendant’s prior conviction for armed robbery could be used by the prosecution in cross-examination if the defendant elected to testify. We disagree.

Upon review of the record it is found that the prosecution properly requested a ruling as to the *713admissibility of defendant’s prior conviction. This, together with the trial court’s response, indicated that the trial court recognized its discretion in the matter and thus the rule in People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), was not violated. It is true that in the exercise of this discretion various factors are to be balanced. See People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35; 268 NW2d 275 (1978). However, no Michigan case holds that this weighing process must be specifically placed on the record. In the recent case of People v Baldwin, 405 Mich 550; 275 NW2d 253 (1979), the Supreme Court could have imposed this specific requirement but chose not to do so.

The present case differs from Baldwin, supra, and Crawford, supra, wherein the trial court violated the proper standard in exercising its discretion. Since the record in the present case indicates that the trial court recognized its discretion and since there is no showing that improper factors were considered, we find no error.

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

(concurring). I concur in the result but not the reasoning set forth in Judge Brennan’s well-considered and well-written opinion in the instant case.

Reference to the record does not reveal any showing by the prosecution to justify the use of the conviction for impeachment purposes. People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35; 268 NW2d 275 (1978), requires such a showing on the record.

"The court below did not require the people to justify the use of these convictions for impeachment purposes. The defendant does not have the burden of persuading *714the court that his criminal record should be excluded. The people must justify admission.” (Emphasis added.) Crawford, supra, 38.

Here the record is barren of any showing by the prosecution to justify the use of prior convictions to impeach.

The error, in this instance, is not prejudicial. The trial of this case occurred before the decision in Crawford, supra, and followed the procedure approved by this Court in People v Pleasant, 69 Mich App 322; 244 NW2d 464 (1976). The failure of the trial court to anticipate the procedural methods set forth in Crawford, does not, per se, require reversal of the conviction.

The writer would hold that Crawford is only a method to assist the appellate court in checking to insure that defendant has received a fair trial and as such should be prospective in nature only.

It is further noted that the defendant used prior felony convictions to impeach the complaining witness.

It would be an interesting twist to the "good guy —bad guy” syndrome, which has lately so titillated the bench and bar, if the defendant were released because the impeached complaining witness appeared before the jury as the "bad guy” while, the convictions of the defendant having been suppressed by the court, the defendant appeared to the jury as the "good guy”.

I would hold that, whenever a defendant impeaches a prosecution witness by the use of prior convictions, the trial judge has a sufficient basis for permitting the prosecution to use prior convictions of defendant for impeachment purposes. Interestingly, this doctrine would bring us full circle *715to § l(f)(ii) of the English Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.

Under the above circumstances, defendant suffered no prejudice but, indeed, stood on even ground with his accusor.

The conviction is affirmed.