Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1).

In November, 1977, plaintiff was hired by defendant and satisfactorily performed the duties of her job as a security officer. In August, 1979, plaintiff married William Lowry, who was also employed by defendant as a security officer. After her marriage, plaintiff was reminded that hospital personnel policy1 prohibited spouses from working in the same department at the same time, and she or her *728husband was required to terminate employment or transfer to another department. In December, 1979, plaintiff transferred to a lesser-paying job in another department. Because she could not receive merit increases or be promoted from that position, plaintiff left defendant’s employment in August, 1980. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed this employment discrimination action under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act,2 alleging that she had been constructively discharged for reasons related to her marital status.

The issue is whether defendant’s antinepotism policy, as applied to plaintiff, constitutes "marital status” discrimination within the meaning of MCL 37.2202; MSA 3.548(202), which provides:

"An employer shall not:

"(a) Fail or refuse to hire, or recruit, or discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.

"(b) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way which deprives or tends to deprive the employee or applicant of an employment opportunity, or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.”

We hold that it does not.

*729Since the term "marital status” is not defined in the act, it is the Court’s responsibility to interpret the statute and, in doing so, the object is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. City of Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 648; 97 NW2d 804 (1959); Smith v Elliard, 110 Mich App 25, 29; 312 NW2d 161 (1981), lv den 413 Mich 944 (1982). To ascertain intent, the Court will review the specific language of the provision, giving all terms their plain and ordinary meaning absent a contrary legislative intent. Lamphere Schools v Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich 104, 110; 252 NW2d 818 (1977); Smith v Elliard, supra.

In ordinary usage, the term "status” refers to one’s standing or position.3 "Marital status”, then, refers to one’s position of being single, married, separated, divorced or widowed. In Klanseck v Prudential Ins Co of America, 509 F Supp 13, 18 (ED Mich, 1980), Judge Thornton found that an employer’s policy of prohibiting two persons who are married to each other from both being district agents did not violate the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The court found a clear distinction between marital status and marital relationship:

"This Court believes there is merit to the argument that the company policy herein at issue is not one of discrimination because of 'marital status.’ The policy does not come into play by virute of a person getting married and assuming the status of a married person. It only comes into play if the marriage is between two District Agents. That who you are married to rather than if you are married is a significant distinction in evaluating discrimination because of marital status is well supported by respectable case law. [Citations omitted.] The identity and occupation of a spouse is a far cry from the fact of his/her existence. The statute herein *730prohibits discrimination on the basis of the existence or nonexistence of a spouse. It says nothing about discrimination because of a spouse having the same employer as the employee. It appears to this Court that defendant’s nonspousal policy is not violative of the Michigan statute at issue herein.”

Accord: Thompson v Sanborn’s Motor Express, Inc, 154 NJ Super 555; 382 A2d 53 (1977); Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc v New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 51 NY2d 506; 434 NYS2d 961; 415 NE2d 950 (1980).

Defendant’s antinepotism policy focuses not on the marital status of an employee or prospective employee but, rather, on his or her familial relationship to other employees within the same unit or department.

As the statute is written, we can discern no legislative intent to prohibit the type of antinepotism regulation here involved.

The judges of the Court of Appeals have unanimously agreed to a procedure to secure and maintain uniformity of decisions. Pursuant to such procedure,4 the judges have agreed to follow Miller *731v C A Muer Corp, 124 Mich App 780; 336 NW2d 215 (1983) as precedent as opposed to the views expressed in the instant opinion. Accordingly, we follow Miller v C A Muer Corp.

Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

(concurring). I concur in reversal of the instant case for the reasons stated in Miller v C A Muer Corp, 124 Mich App 780; 336 NW2d 215 (1983).