Defendant pleaded guilty on June 27, 1992, of one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, in violation of MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325. He was sentenced to two to five years in prison, fined $3,500, and ordered to pay $1,500 in court costs.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court had no authority to order him to pay court costs. While a trial court may not impose costs as part of a defendant’s sentence absent statutory authority to do so, People v Jones, 182 Mich App 125, 126; 451 NW2d 525 (1989), we hold that the statute in question authorized the imposition of costs.

At the time of defendant’s plea, subsection 4 of the statute provided for the imposition of costs, in addition to other penalties, upon a person guilty of violation of the provisions prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance. Subsection 5 of the statute increased the penalty of imprisonment and fine for a second-time offender. Subsection 6 of the statute provided that a third-time offender under the statute was guilty of a felony, thereby increasing the potential imprisonment and fine. See MCL 257.902; MSA 9.2602. Neither subsection 5 nor subsection 6 of the statute modified the provision of subsection 4 that costs may be imposed upon a person found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance.

When more than one interpretation of a statute is possible, we must assume that the Legislature had the most probable and reasonable intention. People v Schneider, 119 Mich App 480, 485; 326 NW2d 416 (1982). A statute must also be construed *717 to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id., 486. It would lead to an unreasonable result to interpret the statute as permitting the assessment of costs for a first-time offender, but not for repeat violators. 1

Affirmed._