In this medical malpractice action arising out of the death of plaintiffs thirty-year-old wife from complications arising from undiagnosed diabetes, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s finding that MCL 600.2169(1); MSA 27A.2169(1) is constitutional and that plaintiff’s only expert, Dr. Mark Robia, did not meet the qualifications set forth in the statute to testify against defendant Reuben D. Eliuk, D.O.* 1 The trial court also held that, if the issue of competency was resolved solely under MRE 702, plaintiff’s expert would be qualified to testify. In this case of first impression, plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against Dr. Eliuk.

The parties agree that the Supreme Court’s rule-making power in matters of practice and procedure is superior to that of the Legislature. Const 1963, art 6, § 5. The rules of practice and procedure include the rules of evidence. Perin v Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich 531, 541; 130 NW2d 4 (1964); Mumaw v Mumaw, 124 Mich App 114, 120; 333 NW2d 599 (1983). The parties also agree that a statutory rule of evidence not in conflict with the Michigan Rules of Evidence remains effective until superseded by rule *504or decision of the Supreme Court. MRE 101. Despite their rhetoric, the parties also agree that MCL 600.2169(1); MSA 27A.2169(1) prevents, and was intended to prevent, some experts from testifying in malpractice cases who would have been able to testify if their qualifications had been tested solely under MRE 702. The narrow issue presented, therefore, is whether the Supreme Court’s adoption of MRE 702 precludes the Legislature from enacting a statute that imposes additional competency requirements beyond those listed in the court rule for qualification of an expert.

The general rule in Michigan regarding qualification of expert witnesses is MRE 702:

If the court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

In 1986, the Michigan Legislature passed a series of bills commonly referred to as the tort reform acts of 1986. One of the acts2 established new and more stringent standards for the qualification of expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions:

(1) In an action alleging medical malpractice, if the defendant is a specialist, a person shall not give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of care unless the person is or was a physician licensed to practice medicine or osteopathic medicine and surgery or a dentist licensed to practice dentistry in this or another state and meets both of the following criteria:

*505(a) Specializes, or specialized at the time of the occurrence which is the basis for the action, in the same specialty or a related, relevant area of medicine or osteopathic medicine and surgery or dentistry as the specialist who is the defendant in the medical malpractice action.

(b) Devotes, or devoted at the time of the occurrence which is the basis for the action, a substantial portion of his or her professional time to the active clinical practice of medicine or osteopathic medicine and surgery or the active clinical practice of dentistry, or to the instruction of students in an accredited medical school, osteopathic medical school, or dental school in the same specialty or a related, relevant area of health care as the specialist who is the defendant in the medical malpractice action. [MCL 600.2169; MSA 27A.2169.3]

In determining whether there is a real conflict between a statute and a court rule, both should be read according to their plain meaning, Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 481; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), and the common-sense meaning of the words should be given the effect most likely understood by those who adopted them. Id.

First, the conflict between § 2169 and MRE 702 is readily apparent. The plain language of MRE 702 grants the trial court discretion to qualify a witness as an expert if the expert possesses the requisite “knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.” By contrast, the trial court may not exercise discre*506tion under § 2169(2)4 unless the competency requirements of § 2169(1) are met.

Second, in giving effect to the common-sense meaning of each provision, the evidentiary rule clearly embodies the same determination made by the Michigan Legislature that expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care in a medical malpractice case. However, the evidentiary rule does not exclude experts who are qualified by their knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, from testifying against a specialist solely because the expert does not specialize in the same or a related area of medicine as the defendant and does not devote a substantial portion of professional time to the practice or instruction of the same or a related area of medicine as the defendant. While the statute barred the qualification of Dr. Robia as an expert in the present case, the trial court determined that Dr. Robia would have been qualified as an expert under the evidentiary rule.

Thus, it is evident that the two provisions are not redundant, but rather reflect two different approaches in determining the qualification of an expert as a witness. Inasmuch as the two provisions stand at odds, the evidentiary rule must be found to supersede § 2169(1). See, e.g., Mumaw, supra (this Court found a direct conflict between a statute that declared that a spouse was incompetent to testify on the issue of adultery in a divorce action and a court rule declaring that all persons are competent to testify), and Dahn v Sheets, 104 Mich App 584; 305 NW2d 547 (1981) (this Court found a conflict between the dead man’s stat*507ute and the court rule regarding competence to testify). Thus, to the extent that § 2169(1) conflicts with the procedural mandates of MRE 702, it is unconstitutional.

We disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that cases such as People v Adair, 452 Mich 473; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), have narrowed Perm's holding that the Supreme Court’s rule-making power in matters of practice and procedure is superior to that of the Legislature. In Adair, the Court was not confronted with a conflict between the rape-shield statute (which calls for exclusion of evidence of past sexual conduct not incident to the alleged sexual assault when the probative value is merely outweighed by prejudicial consideration) and MRE 403 (which calls for the exclusion of probative evidence when “substantially” outweighed by prejudicial considerations). Rather, in analyzing the statute as a backdrop to a determination of the meaning of the word “past” in the rape-shield statute, the Court noted that the Legislature determined that past sexual conduct is legally irrelevant and inadmissible as a matter of law. Id. at 482. The Court was not confronted with the issue that is presented in the instant case. Further, MRE 101 merely echoes Const 1963, art 6, § 5, which gives the Supreme Court rule-making power in matters of practice and procedure.

The dissent suggests that it is “antimajoritarian” in a republican form of government for the judiciary to declare unconstitutional an act of the Legislature. We vehemently disagree. Const 1963, art 3, § 2 provides: “The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise *508powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” The three branches of government are equal and independent. The constitution has given the Supreme Court rule-making power in matters of practice and procedure. Const 1963, art 6, § 5. Where the Legislature exercises powers belonging to the Supreme Court by enacting a statutory rule of evidence in conflict with an existing rule of evidence, it acts unconstitutionally. There is nothing antimajoritarian about the judiciary so declaring.

On cross appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Dr. Robia was qualified to testify as an expert under MRE 702. We disagree.

A party offering the testimony of an expert must demonstrate the witness’ knowledge of the applicable standard of care. Bahr v Harper-Grace Hosps, 448 Mich 135, 141; 528 NW2d 170 (1995). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his expert possesses the necessary learning, knowledge, skill, and experience to testify. Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 591; 248 NW2d 171 (1976). A trial court’s decision to qualify a witness as an expert is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bahr, supra at 141.

Dr. Robia testified to the trial court’s satisfaction regarding his qualifications and familiarity, based on education and training, with the standard of care applicable to an internist. The trial court noted that Dr. Robia is board-certified in internal medicine. Dr. Robia actively practiced as an internist until 1982 and currently spends a small percentage of his professional time in consultation. Dr. Robia regularly keeps abreast of the medical literature and testified that he *509is aware of the applicable standard of care for an internist. Given Dr. Robia’s knowledge, experience, education, and training, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Dr. Robia qualified to testify as an expert under MRE 702.

Affirmed in pari and reversed in pari.

(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint because I agree with the trial court’s conclusion that former MCL 600.2169(1); MSA 27A.2169(1) is constitutional.

This case presents the question whether the people of this state, speaking through their legislators and faced with what they perceive to be a crisis threatening the delivery of health care due to runaway medical malpractice litigation and insurance costs, can fashion a remedy as part of the 1986 tort reforms that limits those who can qualify as expert witnesses in cases against medical specialists.1 We are told by the *510majority that the people cannot do this because the reform the Legislature has chosen is in the nature of a rule of evidence that is not a mirror image of the Supreme Court’s Rule of Evidence 702 and, thus, unconstitutional. The majority concludes, implicitly, that any change in this area of the law must come from the nonpolitical branch of government: the judiciary. The crux of the majority’s holding is that the crucial step for a litigant who wishes to thwart the will of the people is to first get the statute that the people have enacted declared to be subsumed within the Rules of Evidence. That being done, the second step is the easy one of finding that the statute is not redundant with a court-enacted rule of evidence. The Legislature’s will is thus declared unconstitutional, and the judiciary, unanswerable to the people because judges cannot address political matters in their electoral campaigns,* 2 is in absolute control. The reform, conveniently for those who never wanted the matter addressed anyway, is off the table and indeed in the constitutional deep freeze. This is, I believe, deeply flawed constitutional theory. It is starkly antimajoritarian and runs head-on into the organizing concept of our constitution: self-government.3 See The *511Federalist Papers, No. 51, p 160 and No. 78, p 227, Fairfield edition (Anchor Books, 1961). I believe that the majority’s position misunderstands the authority the people allocated to the Legislature and the courts, and neither the language of the constitution nor case law in this state necessitates or justifies such a result.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that defendant committed medical malpractice. In order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following four factors: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a breach of that standard of care by the defendant; (3) an injury; and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury. Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich 216, 222; 521 NW2d 786 (1994). With limited exceptions, not relevant here, expert testimony is required in medical malpractice cases to establish the applicable standard of care and to demonstrate that the defendant in some way breached that standard. Id. at 230; Birmingham v Vance, 204 Mich App 418, 421; 516 NW2d 95 (1994).

As part of the tort reform legislation of 1986, the Legislature enacted former MCL 600.2169(1); MSA 27A.2169(1), which stated that expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases against specialists may not give testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care unless the person: (1) was or is licensed to practice medicine; (2) specializes or specialized at the time of the occurrence in the same or a related, relevant area of medicine as the defendant; and (3) *512devotes or devoted at the time of the occurrence a substantial portion of time to the active practice of the specialty or to the teaching of the specialty.

Section 2169 applies to defendant, because he is a specialist. Further, plaintiff conceded that his sole expert witness does not meet the qualifications of § 2169. The trial court rejected plaintiffs claim that § 2169 was unconstitutional and, given plaintiff’s lack of an expert witness, the court granted summary disposition of the complaint. Contrary to the decision of the majority, I believe that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

The general rules we are to consider in reviewing a claim that a statute is unconstitutional are well established. This Court must presume that the statute is constitutional and construe the statute as constitutional, unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent. People v McDonald, 201 Mich App 270, 273; 505 NW2d 903 (1993); Johnson v Harnischfeger, 414 Mich 102, 112; 323 NW2d 912 (1982). We must presume that the Legislature intended that the statute “not conflict with constitutional requirements.” People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 347, n 1; 365 NW2d 120 (1984). More specifically, this Court must not lightly presume that the Legislature intended a conflict between a statute and a rule of evidence. People v Dobben, 440 Mich 679, 697, n 22; 488 NW2d 726 (1992). A court will refuse to sustain the validity of a statute only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates a provision of the constitution. People v Piasecki, 333 Mich 122, 143-144; 52 NW2d 626 (1952). In sum, we should make every effort, and engage in every presumption, to find that the Legislature acted in accordance with the constitu*513tion. I believe these admonitions are crucial and that the majority has failed to heed them.

Const 1963, art 6, § 5 provides that the “supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state.” Similarly, MCL 600.223; MSA 27A.223 states that the Supreme Court has authority to promulgate and amend general rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of record.4 In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Perin v Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich 531, 541; 130 NW2d 4 (1964). Penn was decided long before the Supreme Court’s 1978 codification of the Rules of Evidence, when the rules of evidence were seen, as they had always been historically, as being based on the case law and, thus, bound by the disciplines of the common law. The Supreme Court stated as follows in Perin:

The function of enacting and amending judicial rules of practice and procedure has been committed exclusively to this Court (Const 1908, art 7, § 5; Const 1963, art 6, § 5); a function with which the legislature may not meddle or interfere save as the Court may acquiesce and adopt for retention at judicial will. . . ,[W]e advert to what was said above — that the rules of practice and procedure include the rules of evidence. [Id. at 541.]

*514This holding in Perin seems quite broad and, in fact, the majority has so construed it. Yet, I believe the Supreme Court itself subsequently narrowed and softened it.

In People v Daniels, 394 Mich 524; 232 NW2d 171 (1975), the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring a cash or surety bond for a defendant charged with a crime committed while released on a personal recognizance bond took precedence over a court rule requiring release on personal recognizance of a defendant incarcerated more than six months to answer for a felony charge. Three years later the Supreme Court enacted the Michigan Rules of Evidence and included the following provision in MRE 101: “A statutory rule of evidence not in conflict with these rules or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court is effective until superseded by rule or decision of the Supreme Court.” Most recently in People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 481; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), the Supreme Court, while clearly finding that the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520J; MSA 28.788(Í0), and MRE 403 allowed for the exclusion of evidence on different standards,5 decided the case as if the rape-shield statute were controlling. These cases and MRE 101 show that the broad reading of Perin, i.e., the statute must be identical to the rule of evidence or there is an unconstitutional conflict, is not sustainable and that a more sophisticated, nuanced analysis is required than Perin would initially suggest.

*515Certainly, it is not appropriate to say that the test is a simple mirror-image test as the majority does. Neither is it proper to say Perin has no viability. Rather, I believe the rule to be discerned is that, when the Legislature acts to make a rule of evidence or court rule more specific on the basis of public policy concerns, it will be upheld on judicial review, especially when such a statute addresses more than a purely evidentiary matter.6 Stated somewhat differently, when the Legislature enacts a statute implicating a matter of public policy concern, carried out through evidentiary means, the statute must be found constitutional.7 This test helps explain not only the interaction between Perin, Daniels, Adair, and MRE 101 but also the other cases that have found purely evidentiary statutory enactments to be superseded by Supreme Court promulgated rules of evidence.8

*516Further, this public-policy-sensitive test is in accord with our constitutional heritage because it is reflective of the bedrock constitutional value that, in matters of public policy, the Legislature, not the courts, is in control. Piasecki, supra at 145. Given the great latitude accorded to the Legislature by the Supreme Court when the Legislature dispositively addresses public policy matters in statutes that alter the Court’s general rules, we should afford § 2169 the same latitude here. Because the statute here at issue was clearly directed at a public policy concern, as discussed above, we should find it to be constitutionally permissible.

This effort to respond to the majority having been completed, it must be pointed out that this case should not, in any event, turn on the presence, or lack thereof, of a conflict between § 2169 and MRE 702. Rather, it should be disposed of on the basis that the Legislature, in enacting a measure that was more akin to a substantive law than a procedural rule, was doing that which it has express constitutional authority to do: amend or repeal the common law. Const 1963, art 3, § 7; Myers v Genesee Co Auditor, 375 Mich 1; 133 NW2d 190 (1965). Thus, MRE 702 must yield to § 2169.

The Legislature’s primacy in matters of substantive law was demonstrated in Smith v Smith, 433 Mich 606, 619-620; 447 NW2d 715 (1989). In Smith, the Supreme Court found that a then-existing court rule allowing a trial court to order postmajority child support payments in exceptional circumstances was con*517trary to legislation limiting support payments to the age of majority. The Court concluded that, because such legislation was substantive, it superseded a conflicting court rule. The Court obviously determined that the age at which an obligation to pay child support should end was a matter of public policy properly left to the Legislature. This was consistent with the idea that a rule is properly found to be substantive if it declares a general public policy. Comment, Rules of Evidence: An Exercise of Constitutional Power by the Michigan Supreme Court, 1980 Detroit C L R 1063, 1081.

The Legislature acted entirely within its constitutional power to amend or repeal the common law when it enacted § 2169. The Legislature may choose to change a common law cause of action, such as one for medical malpractice, or to abolish a cause of action altogether. O’Brien, v Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich 1, 15; 299 NW2d 336 (1980) (the Legislature’s constitutional power to change the common law authorizes it to extinguish common-law rights of action); Fennell v John J Nesbitt, Inc, 154 Mich App 644, 649; 398 NW2d 481 (1986) (the wide-reaching power of the Legislature permits it to entirely abrogate a common-law right). See also Bean v McFarland, 280 Mich 19; 273 NW 332 (1937) (constitutional retention of common law is expressly conditioned upon the right to abrogate the same or any part thereof).

Incontestably, the power of abolition must contain within it the lesser power to modify. Where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures that are employed in determining the right, a litigant such as plaintiff *518“must take the bitter with the sweet.” Arnett v Kennedy, 416 US 134, 153-154; 94 S Ct 1633; 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974). Accordingly, where, as here, the Legislature is addressing a statutory cause of action that originated from the common law, it must have the ability to change anything within it, including circumscribing those qualified to give the requisite proofs to establish the elements of the cause of action. Finkelstein v Dep’t of Revenue, 312 Mich 186; 20 NW2d 154 (1945). Thus, it is appropriate to see this situation as one in which the Legislature has opted to continue to recognize the tort of medical malpractice against specialists, but only on condition that proof of such malpractice emanate from sources of reliable character as defined by the Legislature. This statutory modification of our common-law jurisprudence reflects a careful legislative balancing of policy considerations about the importance of the medical profession to the people of Michigan, the economic viability of medical specialists, the social costs of “defensive medicine,” the availability and affordability of medical care and health insurance,9 the allocation of risks, the costs of malpractice insurance, and manifold other factors, including, no doubt, political factors — all matters well beyond the competence of the judiciary to reevaluate as justiciable issues. Clearly, it is for the Legislature, *519and not the courts, to change substantive laws affecting public policy.

Accordingly, because § 2169 constitutes a substantive change in a statutory cause of action that originated from the common law, which the Legislature is authorized to effect, it takes precedence over MRE 702. Smith, supra.

In summary, we need not embark upon this alarmingly antimajoritarian path if we merely thoughtfully review how our Supreme Court has applied the Perin doctrine. This will lead us to conclude that Perin need not be read so as to do violence to our most basic constitutional understandings. Further, this matter should be resolved on the basis that this statute is properly seen as an exercise in furtherance of the Legislature’s express constitutional authority to change or repeal the common law, such that it does not come within the reach of Perin.

For all these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the trial court and find the cross appeal moot.