Appellee, a sixteen-year-old minor, allegedly assaulted and battered her mother in the kitchen of their home. The prosecutor filed a petition charging appellee under MCL 750.81(2); MSA 28.276(2) with assault and battery. The referee hearing the case refused to issue the petition, concluding that the particular subsection under which appellee was charged did not apply to the facts of the present case. The prosecutor filed a “Request for Review of Referee Recommendation” in the probate court, which affirmed. The prosecutor appealed to the circuit court, which also affirmed. The prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal to this Court was granted. We reverse.

MCL 750.81; MSA 28.276, the assault and battery statute, was amended by 1994 PA 641 to provide increasing penalties for what is generally referred to as “domestic violence” or “domestic assault,” depending upon the number of prior convictions.2 Appellee was charged under subsection 2, which provides in *86pertinent part that “an individual who assaults or assaults and batters his or her spouse or former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has had a child in common, or a resident or former resident of his or her household, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . The parties effectively agree for purposes of this appeal that appellee’s alleged act, if proved, would constitute an assault and battery. In addition, there is no dispute that appellee and her mother lived together at the time of the events in question. The parties, of course, also agree that appellee is not the spouse or former spouse of the complainant, and equally obviously, there is no suggestion that appellee and the complainant somehow share parentage of a child. The issue in the present appeal concerns whether the phrase “a resident ... of his or her household” can encompass the type of relationship involved in this case, the parent-child relationship.

The prosecutor suggests that the three categories set forth in the statute — spouses and former spouses, common parents, and residents of the offender’s household — each represent a distinct classification of individuals to whom the statute applies. To paraphrase the prosecutor’s argument, if any one of these classifications encompasses the alleged victim, the statute applies. We agree with the prosecutor’s analysis and conclude that, as its clear language states, the statute applies to “an individual who assaults or *87assaults and batters ... a resident or former resident of his or her household . . . .” When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is precluded. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Courts may not speculate regarding the probable intent of the Legislature beyond the words expressed in the statute. In re Schnell, 214 Mich App 304, 310; 543 NW2d 11 (1995). Thus, we must reject our dissenting colleague’s creative efforts at divining some different legislative intent behind the statute; the words of the statute speak for themselves.3

The three categories of victims set forth in the statute are discrete classifications, and if a victim falls within one of these classifications, the statute applies. Coverage extends, in the first category, to offenders who presently or previously were married to the victim or, in the second category, to offenders who biologically parented a child with the victim. Either of these categories may apply regardless of whether the offender and victim ever resided together in the same household. The third category applies to offenders who resided in a household with the victim at or before the time of the assault (or assault and battery) regardless of the victim’s relationship with the *88offender. The statute thus applies to “domestic” offenders broadly defined as including persons joined by marriage, common parenting, or common household residence with the victim.4

We reverse.

(dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the domestic assault statute applies to offenders who resided with the victim at or before the time of the alleged assault regardless of the victim’s relationship with the offender. I am in agreement with the three prior tribunals that heard appellant’s arguments that the domestic assault provisions of the assault and battery statute do not apply to the facts of this case.

The domestic assault provisions of the assault and battery statute, MCL 750.81(2); MSA 28.276(2), were enacted to provide increasing penalties for domestic violence. Subsection 81(2) sets forth three classifications of offenders to which the statute will apply: (1) those who presently or previously were married to the victim, (2) those who biologically parented a child with the victim, and (3) those who resided with the victim at or before the time of the assault. There is no question that the first two classifications of offenders involve persons who are or were involved in a romantic relationship with the victim, nor is there any question that a romantic relationship constitutes a domestic relationship. Because the statute specifically *89targets “domestic” offenders, however, it is not clear whether the Legislature intended the third classification of offenders to encompass all offenders who resided with the victim at or before the time of the assault regardless of the relationship between the offender and the victim. Under the reasoning of the majority, unrelated persons who reside together solely as college roommates could be charged with domestic assault. In my opinion, this would be an absurd result. In light of the purpose of the statute, as well as the fact that the common thread uniting the first two classifications of offenders is romantic involvement, I believe that the Legislature intended the term “resident of his or her household” to take on the same significance.1 Offspring do not belong in this class. That this interpretation furthers the legislative intent underlying the statute, People v Burton, 219 Mich App 278, 286; 556 NW2d 201 (1996), is bolstered by the fact that subsection 1 of the same statute criminalizes assaults and assaults and batteries generally, imposing no limitation on the type of individual to which the subsection applies. Appellee could easily have been charged under this subsection.