Defendants seek leave to appeal a pretrial ruling of the Wayne Circuit Court, declaring § 2169(1)(a) of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.2169(1)(a); MSA 27A.2169(1)(a), as amended in 19931 to be in conflict with MRE 702 and therefore violative of the Michigan Supreme Court’s exclusive rule-making power under Const 1963, art 6, § 5. In light of the importance of this issue, both to our jurisprudence and to our constitutional scheme of state government, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, in lieu of granting or denying leave we have opted to issue this peremptory opinion. Herron v Biggies Wolf Den, Inc, 201 Mich App 599, 600; 506 NW2d 906 (1993); Kerby v *222Judges’ Retirement Bd of Michigan, 166 Mich App 302, 303; 420 NW2d 195 (1988).2

In this medical malpractice action, defendant Baghdoian is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Notwithstanding the fact that this action concerns the care provided by an orthopedic surgeon, plaintiff proposes to use infectious-disease specialists, i.e., physicians who are not board-certified in orthopedic surgery, whom plaintiff advised the trial court would testify concerning the relevant standard of care.3 The *223statute at issue would preclude expert testimony concerning the standard of care by other than a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. See MCL 600.2169(1)(a); MSA 27A.2169(1)(a). The rule of evidence promulgated by the Supreme Court, however, allows the trial court to consider whether these witnesses could qualify as experts regarding defendant Baghdoian’s standard of care, if it finds that they were qualified on the basis of their “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” MRE 702.

Defendants brought a motion to strike plaintiffs proposed experts, arguing that they were unqualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care pursuant to RJA § 2169(1)(a). Plaintiff responded that the procedure for qualifying a witness under MRE 702 prevailed over the procedure contemplated by RJA § 2169 because the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority in matters of practice and procedure is superior to that of the Legislature, Const 1963, art 6, § 5. In a written opinion, the trial court agreed, holding that RJA § 2169 is unconstitutional. Defendants now challenge the court’s ruling concerning the constitutionality of RJA § 2169.

The same constitutional argument advanced by plaintiff and accepted by the trial court was recently addressed by this Court in McDougall v Eliuk, 218 Mich App 501; 554 NW2d 56 (1996).4 On the basis of *224McDougall, we affirm the decision of the trial court in the case at bar, but only by virtue of our obligation, under Administrative Order No. 1996-4, which continues in effect Administrative No. Order 1994-4, to follow a prior published decision of another panel of this Court issued after November 1, 1990.

Were we writing on a clean slate, we would adopt the reasoning of Judge Clifford Taylor, set forth in his dissent in McDougall, supra at 509-519. As noted in Judge Taylor’s dissent, the rule-making power conferred on the Michigan Supreme Court by Const 1963, art 6, § 5 properly trumps legislatively engendered rules of evidence only when “ ‘no clear legislative policy reflecting considerations other than judicial dispatch of litigation can be identified.’ ” Id. at 515, n 6; Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585, 598; 256 NW2d 400 (1977) (Williams, J., Kavanagh, C.J., and Levin J, concurring), quoting 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 404.5 Judge Taylor’s dissent identifies the sundry legislative policies underlying RJA § 2169, none of which involve judicial dispatch of litigation, but rather all of which reflect considerations of public policy peculiarly within the legislative sphere and the legislative competence, and equally outside the sphere and competence of the judicial authority. Indeed, the McDougall majority did not even attempt to respond to Judge Taylor’s argument that RJA § 2169 is a substantive rule of law, as opposed to a purely procedural piece of legislation. *225We conclude, as did Judge Taylor, that RJA § 2169 is an enactment of substantive law. McDougall, supra, at 516-519.

Failure to recognize the distinction between procedural rules of evidence and evidentiary rules of substantive law underlain by carefully balanced political considerations appertaining exclusively to the Legislature, Const 1963, art 4, § 1, has led the majority in McDougall to a contrary and incorrect conclusion concerning the allocation of authority between the judicial and legislative branches of our government.

But for Administrative Order No. 1996-4, we would reverse the decision of the trial court in this cause and remand with instructions that plaintiffs expert witnesses could not testify regarding the applicable standard of care.

Affirmed.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because I would deny leave to appeal, I write separately. First, I believe that McDougall v Eliuk, 218 Mich App 501; 554 NW2d 56 (1996), was correctly decided. See Cicola v Rosenthal, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 8, 1996 (Docket No. 185594). Second, I believe that the McDougall Court gave thorough consideration to the underlying constitutional issue. Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to issue a peremptory opinion in order to resolve this issue. With an application for leave to appeal in McDougall pending before the Supreme Court, I believe that a decision on the merits of this issue is properly before the Supreme Court.

*226In addition, when granting a motion for leave to appeal, I believe that it is preferable to grant the motion and allow the appeal to proceed. See MCR 7.205(D)(3). Although the issuing of a peremptory opinion appears to be permitted under MCR 7.205(D)(2), such a procedure prevents oral argument and hinders full development of the underlying issues.