456 Mich 875 (1997).

Although the present proceeding is unusual because it derives from the substance of an attorney’s argument to this Court, contempt proceedings in this Court, involving both attorneys and court reporters, are fairly routinely conducted on a regular basis (a fact that we hope is as disturbing to the bar and the public as it is to this Court). Equally routinely, referrals in such cases are made to the Attorney Grievance Administrator or Court Reporting and Recording Board of Review, MCR 8.108(G)(2)(a). Adjudications of contempt prima facie constitute conclusive proof of the commission of a criminal offense, MCR 9.120(B)(2), and thus would appear to implicate the provisions of MCR 9.104(5), which declares that it is professional misconduct to engage in conduct violative of a criminal law of a state or of the United States. Grievance Administrator v Deutch, 455 Mich 149, 160 ff; 565 NW2d 369 (1977). For the attorneys, resulting disciplinary sanctions are regularly reported in the relevant section of the Michigan Bar Journal.

As amended, the order denying the motion to disqualify said:

The motion to disqualify is denied.

First, the motion is untimely. Respondent Thurston was notified with the release of this Court’s June 24, 1997 opinion that the time to show cause, if she so opted, was August 5, 1997. The asserted grounds for disqualification are internal to that opinion, and therefore a motion to disqualify had to be filed not later than 14 days after receipt of the opinion. MCR 2.003(C)(1); People v Bettistea, 173 Mich App 106; 434 NW2d 138 (1988); Wayne County Jail Inmates v Wayne County Chief Executive Officer, 178 Mich App 634; 444 NW2d 549 (1989). The motion was not presented to the Clerk of this Court until July 31, 1997, and the motion was not perfected and filed until August 1, 1997 when the filing fees were paid as required by MCR 7.211(A)(3).

Substantively, the asserted grounds for disqualification are without merit. Counsel for Ms. Thurston, citing Mayberry v Pennsylvania, 400 US 455, 466; 91 S Ct 499; 27 L Ed 2d 532, 540 (1971) and People v Kurz, 35 Mich App 643, 660; 192 NW2d 594 (1971), luges that the original panel members must all recuse themselves in the name of due process because of apparent bias. In criminal contempt, the constitution does not compel the judges who have initiated the contempt charges to disqualify themselves from presiding over the contempt proceedings, unless they have become so *209personally embroiled with the alleged contemnor as to bias them to an unacceptable degree. Ungar v Sarafite, 376 US 575; 84 S Ct 841; 11 L Ed 2d 921 (1964). Unless an individual panel member, upon self-reflection, finds an inability to objectively consider on its merits any legal or factual defense Ms. Thurston may present, there is no need for disqualification, which of course foists the onerous task of calling a member of the bar to account for possible misdeeds onto one or more colleagues. None of the members of this panel is so disposed.

In clarifying the so-called “extrajudicial source doctrine” of disqualifying judicial bias, usually traced to United States v Grinnell, 384 US 563; 86 S Ct 1678; 16 L Ed 2d 978 (1966), the United States Supreme Court recently observed:

“Not all unfavorable disposition towards an individual (or his case) is properly described by those terms [‘bias or prejudice’]. One would not say, for example, that world opinion is biased or prejudiced against Adolf Hitler. The words connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess (for example, a criminal juror who has been biased or prejudiced by receipt of inadmissible evidence concerning the defendant’s prior criminal activities) or because it is excessive in degree (for example, a criminal juror who is so inflamed by properly admitted evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal activities that he will vote guilty regardless of the facts). The ‘extrajudicial source’ doctrine is one application of this pejorativeness requirement....

“The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge’s task.”

Liteky v United States, 510 US 540; 114 S Ct 1147; 127 L Ed 2d 474, 488 (1994). Michigan jurisprudence expressly accords with these principles. Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 494-497; 548 NW2d 210 (1996).

While a panel of this Court, in People v Kurz, supra, suggested that whenever a judge proposes, after the fact, to hold a litigant or attorney in contempt, the judge should automatically disqualify him- or herself, that was dictum. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has opted not to include such a requirement in MCR 2.003. Kurz has never been cited or applied for this proposition, and even if this were a holding rather than obiter dictum, it would not be binding on the present panel. Admin Order 1996-4; In re Bay Prosecu*210tor, 102 Mich App 543, 549; 302 NW2d 225 (1980). It is noteworthy that the Kurz panel neither cited nor considered Ungar v Sarafite, supra, and obviously the Court in 1971 could not have taken into account Liteky, supra, or Cain, supra.

Respondent’s reliance on Mayberry v Pennsylvania, supra, is likewise misplaced and ill-fated. That case involved a judge who was “personally embroiled” in the controversy underlying the contempt proceedings, in stark contrast to the present case.

Counsel relies on an assertion in the opinion reflecting that this Court was “deeply upset” that an attorney would misrepresent the facts to the Court as evidencing predisposing bias. Presumably, all jurists sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws, Const 1963, art 11, § 1, would be “ill disposed” toward those who flout the law, be they murderers, thieves, rapists, or officers of the court who make false representations to the tribunal, designed and intended to mislead the adjudicators in fulfilling their judicial functions. The Court has recognized throughout that Ms. Thurston may somehow be able to justify her actions; that is why it provided her the opportunity to show cause in lieu of making the imposition of a fine absolute. Hence, the Court has done no more than make a preliminary assessment and evaluation which, being subject to revision in light of new or additional evidence or explanation, constitutes no more than a finding of probable cause, and fails to rise to the level of disqualifying bias’or prejudice. Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 54 ff; 95 S Ct 1456; 443 L Ed 2d 712 (1975). [Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 8, 1997 (Docket No. 184811).]

To like effect, see also In re Albert, 383 Mich 722, 724-725; 179 NW2d 20 (1970), where the Supreme Court said:

The Court of Appeals is a court of record and if the order requiring affirmative action by the attorney is a valid order in a particular case, the attorney’s neglect or refusal to obey it is contempt of that Court. The statute grants the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to make that determination and punish such actions by appropriate procedure.

* * *

Respondent’s assertion that a contempt procedure must include a show-cause order based on an affidavit supporting the charged facts is not correct. A court’s judicial notice of its own records is a wholly satisfactory “other method” of establishing the failure or the fact of filing in a particular period — the gravamen of the charge here.

Equally untenable is the respondent’s assertion that the Court could not institute these proceedings on its own motion without becoming so personally interested as to be disqualified. The inter*211est a court has in its relationship with the attorneys practicing before it not only does not disqualify it from assaying their conduct in such practice, but on the contrary obliges the court to scrutinize the conduct of attorneys as officers of that court in sharing the awesome responsibility of effectively administering justice.

A second panel of this Court, invoked pursuant to MCR 2.003(C)(3)(b) at the insistence of respondent’s counsel, also denied the motion for disqualification in an unpublished order, entered August 5, 1997 (Docket No. 184811).

The original date and time scheduled for respondent to show cause was August 5, 1997, at 3:00 p.m. At that time, respondent’s counsel requested additional time, indicating that a week would be sufficient. Scheduling difficulties arising from the demands on each panel member’s time resulted in the next convenient and mutually available date being identified as September 8, 1997, at 9:00 am. Respondent, however, then sought a further delay, which resulted in the entry of the following order, which reflects the practical difficulties that beset an appellate court that sits in panels of three or more judges, MCR 7.201(D), in attempting to deal with such a situation:

The motion for stay of proceedings is denied. The Court notes that, at the original proceeding on August 5, respondent’s counsel requested an additional week of preparation time, notwithstanding the six weeks already allowed before respondent had been scheduled to show cause. When this Court granted that request and rescheduled the matter, counsel pleaded for a different date because of a family obligation. In response, this Court recessed the matter for four weeks and six days, and in doing so had great difficulty in finding a date on and a time at which all three panel members were available, a fact of which respondent and her counsel were well aware. Ample time has been afforded respondent to pursue appellate remedies or to object to this Court’s scheduling order, and this case will now proceed on the date and at the time and place previously fixed. [Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 28, 1997 (Docket No. 184811).]

In pertinent part, the scheduling provisions of the order were:

Pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(9), on or before August 22, 1997, counsel for both sides shall exchange and file with the court witness lists[.] Any dispositive motions and supporting briefs shall be filed and served not later than August 25, 1997; any other motions and supporting briefs, including those relating to evidentiary mat*212ters, shall be filed and served not later than September 2, 1997. [Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 8, 1997 (Docket No. 184811).]

This order stated:

On the Court’s own motion pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(7), and pursuant to the Court’s inherent power to operate efficiently and fairly, Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32; 111 S Ct 2123; 115 L Ed 2d 27 [1991]; People v Brown, 238 Mich 298; 212 NW 968 [1927]; Gray v Clerk of Common Pleas Court, [366] Mich 588, 594; 115 NW2d 411 (1962); Const 1963, art 6, § 1, Joel M. Boyden (P11073) is hereby appointed to function as presenter of evidence and argument at the hearing on the order to show cause and any related proceedings, including appeals or collateral review proceedings. The Court notes that Mr. Boyden has assented to function in this capacity pro bono publico. [Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 8, 1997 (Docket No. 184811).]

Several issues relating to the scheduling order deserve brief mention. Respondent moved for an extension of time to file a witness list, asserting in conclusory fashion that more time was needed, in contrast to the representation on August 5 by respondent’s counsel that he was prepared to proceed and had his witnesses present and available, except for not having had time to review the tape recordings of the complainant’s interviews. At the hearing on September 8, respondent sought to amend her witness list by adding an expert on the subject of advocacy. Respondent’s counsel proposed to adduce the witness’ testimony on a separate record, which under the circumstances would have been tantamount to presenting the evidence to the trier of fact. Better practice would have been for counsel to summarize the salient points of the proposed testimony. MRE *213103(a)(2). In any event, we believe that what constitutes proper advocacy is a question of law and therefore not a proper subject of expert testimony. People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 464; 421 NW2d 200 (1988); People v Drossart, 99 Mich App 66, 75-77; 297 NW2d 863 (1980).

Respondent also argued that Dr. Frank Ochberg could not be qualified as an expert because he was not listed as such on the presenter’s witness list. The presenter had listed “Dr. Frank Ochberg or other qualified psychologist or psychiatrist.” We think this ample reasonable notice of Dr. Ochberg’s status as an expert witness. No claim was made by respondent that she sought and was denied a summary of the subject matter of the expert’s proposed testimony; to the contrary, copies of Dr. Ochberg’s report to the presenter, as soon as it became available, and of his curriculum vitae were furnished to respondent’s counsel before the hearing. MCR 6.201(A)(3). Thus, as a practical matter, respondent was fully aware of the expert capacity of the proposed witness, even if the listing was somehow deficient — as graphically demonstrated by the fact that respondent’s co-counsel was thoroughly prepared to cross-examine Dr. Ochberg as an expert and to raise objections to his testimony. Indeed, co-counsel examined no other witnesses and took no other on-the-record part in the show cause hearing.

The election of respondent’s counsel not to file a hearing brief must be contrasted with the numerous ad hoc arguments, demands, and assertions, all without citation of supporting authority, that counsel sought to foist upon this Court at the show cause hearing. For example, counsel demanded that the Court identify what it believed to be the elements of a charge of contempt of court. However, it is our view that the onus of first stating what counsel contend are those elements, with pertinent authorities, lies with the attorneys at the bar, following which the Court responds with a ruling. The sentiments voiced in Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (“It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position. The appellant himself must first adequately prime the pump; only then does the appellate well begin to flow.”), applies with equal vigor to trial-type presentations. MRE 103(a)(1). Many other legal claims were advocated in similar fashion, promoted as “obvious” or otherwise well known, none with precedential support being contemporaneously (in default of having been covered in a hearing brief) proffered. These tactics greatly complicated the Court’s task of doing justice to the. respondent’s cause. Of necessity, we have had to rely on the joint brief of amici curiae as a substitute for any brief on respondent’s own behalf.

Our analysis herein of this issue is buttressed by the Michigan Supreme Court’s order, denying Ms. Thurston’s application for leave to appeal from our order denying disqualification, and also denying Ms. Thurston’s motion for waiver of fees in the Supreme Court. 456 Mich 875 (1997).

In any event, these facts were subject to judicial notice based on the record, which both the presenter and respondent’s counsel asked this Court to take of its own records as well as those of the trial court. We agree that such judicial notice is proper. People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 591; 194 NW2d 314 (1972); MRE 201(b).

Actually, the evidence was not technically character evidence at all, because it focused only on some elements of good character, such as professional integrity. More accurately, as presented, the evidence focused on respondent’s community reputation for truthfulness, MRE 608. However, in lieu of proper character evidence, this Court recognized that respondent’s license to practice law is a continuing proclamation by the Michigan Supreme Court of her good character. MCR 9.103(A). It is not insignificant that none of these “character” witnesses, all but one of whom are attorneys in good standing actively practicing law, offered any assertion that, on the basis of a review of the record and of respondent’s conduct, they would have considered it proper in respondent’s position to make the statements at issue during oral argument.

It should be noted that while the inaccuracy of the “no sex” statement was determinable by examination of the record, the claim of laughter concerned a matter not of record, made in the context of a motion to remand, MCR 7.211(C)(1) . As a consequence, at least in part, of this false representation, this Court had to consider the claim as true for purposes of adjudicating the motion to remand itself, and this then caused further unnecessary proceedings in the trial court and subsequent review of the trial court’s ruling in this Court once again, a threefold wasteful expenditure of judicial resources.

It was additionally contended that respondent would not have done so because, when the misrepresentation was eventually exposed, the attempted fraud would have redounded to the detriment of her client. Of course, if not discovered, the misrepresentation would presumably assist the client’s cause, so the claim of lack of motive is not probative. We respond to this argument only to make pellucidly clear that, as occurred in this very case, perceived misconduct by counsel, unless shown to be sanctioned by the client with an understanding of its wrongful character, affects only the Court’s future dealings with the attorney, and in no way adversely effects the client’s cause before the Court in adjudicating issues of law presented for appellate resolution. This Court does not ordinarily resolve factual questions in the first instance, but where the client directly or through connivance with counsel attempts to perpetrate a fraud on the trier of fact, adverse inferences may properly arise when the impropriety comes to light. Wright v West, 505 US 277, 296; 112 S Ct 2482; 120 L Ed 2d 225 (1992) (plurality opinion).

MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10).

At the show cause hearing, respondent insisted, through counsel, that this “context” would manifest itself upon examination of the prosecutor’s oral argument. By stipulation, respondent’s oral argument having been previously transcribed by Judge (now Justice) Taylor’s secretary, respondent’s co-counsel accepted the responsibility of transcribing the prosecutor’s portion of that oral argument. We have now received and reviewed a complete transcript of oral argument and find nothing whatsoever in the prosecutor’s remarks that references or intimates a bifurcation of events as between the living room and the bedroom.

We do not mean to suggest that “mere presence” would be enough to prosecute on an aiding and abetting theory. People v Jones, 106 Mich App 429, 434; 308 NW2d 243 (1981). Rather, the “five against one” circumstances of the entire incident might be viewed by a trier of fact as constituting implicit aid and encouragement by Shier toward other perpetrators, and as notification to the complainant that she was alone, helpless, and could expect no succor from any of the other dramatis personae. Any advice, aid, or encouragement, however slight, if otherwise effectual, suf-*221flees to establish guilt as an aider and abettor. People v Washburn, 285 Mich 119, 126; 280 NW 132; 123 ALR 311 (1938), cert den 305 US 577 (1939).

Nor was there any such dichotomy in the defense theory of the case at trial. After both sides rested, the jury was excused and the trial court discussed jury instructions with both counsel. The prosecutor explicitly stated, in direct contradiction of a suggestion made by the trial court, that the people’s theory of the case was that there was a single event for the jury to consider. Defense counsel appeared to acquiesce in this resolution, but in any event never suggested, whether in argument to the court or the jury, that the events in the bedroom were somehow separate and apart from those in the living room.

Although never directly stated in so many words, apparently respondent is of the view that if, a relatively few days after so traumatic an .incident, the complainant could resume normal social activities and her sense of humor was by then apparently restored, this suggests that the incident was not as the complainant represented. No empirical analysis or evidence to suggest such a constancy of human behavior across the infinite spectrum of emotions and psychological response was presented to validate this notion, although we recognize that a zealous advocate might regard this as evidence to be exploited in support of such an argument to a jury.

These salient facts must be contrasted with the representation at oral argument that laughter could be heard “through” the “statements.”

If certain extraneous sounds could be interpreted as laughter (which we do not think reasonably plausible even for a zealous advocate), even so they appear only in an isolated portion of the recording of the first interview, not “through” the interviews, and crying is indeed audible dur*223ing the second interview in direct contradiction of respondent’s representations to the Court. Notably, respondent during the show cause proceedings made no attempt to adduce evidence of actual laughter being audible on either tape recording, or to contradict the assertion that crying was clearly audible on the recording of the second interview.

It was suggested on respondent’s behalf that Mr. Edwards’ continuing relationship with Judge Taylor is an additional ground for disqualification of Judge Taylor. In a case of this nature, however, assistance will normally have been provided to the judges of this Court by its staff, most of whom are both personally familiar to most or all of the judges and, by the nature of their positions, highly trusted — were the situation otherwise, their employment would naturally be terminated. When pro forma testimony is necessary to establish some apparently disputed point, if recusal of employing judges were required this Court would be unable to fulfill its judicial functions. United States v Will, 449 US 200, 213-216; 101 S Ct 471; 66 L Ed 2d 392 (1980). Analogously, trial judges may see the same police officers or other official functionaries, as well, unfortunately, as the same criminal defendants, on numerous occasions, but they are not thereby disqualified from assessing their credibility anew as the situation requires, merely because of such prior familiarity. People v White, 411 Mich 366, 386; 308 NW2d 128 (1981). The other panel members therefore supported Judge Taylor’s action in continuing to participate as an adjudicator in this case. Further, the factual issues to which Mr. Edwards testified were not actually controverted; no argument has been made that. anything like laughter can be heard by any reasonable person on either tape recording, or that reasonable persons would not agree that crying is heard on the recording of the complainant’s second police interview. And Mr. Edwards’ testimony was wholly corroborated in all significant particulars by Dr. Ochberg.

Again, these observations must be juxtaposed with respondent’s “no crying” representation at oral argument. See footnote 19, supra. Overall, therefore, respondent’s characterization at oral argument of the complainant’s affect as evidenced by the recordings was outrageously false.

Factual representations are generally subject to the requirement that they be the product of a “reasonable inquiry.” MCR 2.114(D)(2). This concept dovetails with one of the principles governing attorneys in fulfilling their representational responsibilities, which is that counsels’ actions are to be based on a modicum of objectivity, a threshold requirement that would not necessarily be expected of a party proceeding inops consilii. Watkins v Manchester, 220 Mich App 337, 343-344; 559 NW2d 81 (1996), citing Kay v Ehrler, 499 US 432, 437-438; 111 S Ct 1435; 113 L Ed 2d 486 (1991).

It was argued by respondent’s counsel that “laughter,” the terminology used during oral argument, should be broadly construed for purposes *225of the show cause proceedings to refer to the complainant’s demeanor generally. While we are skeptical whether such an elastic use of language to rationalize what would otherwise be serious misconduct might ever be proper, People v Mallory, 378 Mich 538, 573-574, n 5; 147 NW2d 66 (1967) (Souris, J., concurring), here, there were no verbal clues to put the Court as listener on notice that such unparalleled inexactitude was within the parameters of comprehension intended by the speaker. When a party to a colloquy desires to speak in code, whereby “black” means “white,” a prerequisite is that there be some basis for surmising that the other party shares that nonstandard interpretation. 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 544, cited in Beason v Beason (After Remand), 204 Mich App 178, 185-186; 514 NW2d 231 (1994) (Taylor, J., dissenting), rev’d 447 Mich 1023 (1994).

Significantly, a similar assertion was made by respondent in her affidavit in support of the motion to remand, filed before oral argument in the principal appeal. See footnote 12, supra. In pertinent part, the affidavit asserted, under oath:

Jane M. Thurston, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:

1. I have reviewed the public defender’s file, the police reports, and listened to the four taped statements of Bobby Shier and [the complainant].

* * *

3. [The complainant] was interviewed on November 23, 1993, and January 5, 1994. There is no audible crying on either taped statement, but laughter is heard. She said ....

We have considered the affidavit only as evidencing that the statement at oral argument was not the product of inadvertence or confusion, but have not considered the affidavit as a possible further instance of contempt or, being made under oath, as perjury, and that issue remains open for double jeopardy purposes. United States v Dixon, 509 US 688; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993).

We recognize that a portion of this part of the In re Henry opinion, where it is asserted that a “ ‘[criminal] defendant is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act,’ ” In re Henry, supra at 55, quoting 48 Mich L R 860, 865, 866 (1950), is constitutionally inaccurate. Sandstrom v Montana, 442 US 510; 99 S Ct 2450; 61 L Ed 2d 39 (1979); People v Gaydosh, 203 Mich App 235, 238; 512 NW2d 65 (1994). However, interpolating instead the notion that such an inference of intent is permissible — exactly what the Court, in context, said in In re Henry, supra at 55, quoting 48 Mich L R 860, 865, 866 (1950) (“ ‘[I]t is generally held that intent may be inferred from the act — defendant is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act.’ ”), the Henry decision remains valid in the respects relied upon in this opinion.

It should also be noted that there is a significant difference in the manner in which trials and appeals are conducted. In a trial court, it is the norm for any misstatement or distortion of fact or law to be immediately contested, by objection or other interruption. In an appellate court, such interjections are not encouraged, and counsel must accordingly not assume that an opposing attorney will efface any significant misrepresentation that is uttered. Nonetheless, although the offending remarks came during Ms. Thurston’s rebuttal, that is not license to misrepresent, and the prosecutor should have promptly but politely requested a brief surrebuttal or filed a postargument motion addressing these false statements.

United States v Agurs, 427 US 97; 96 S Ct 2392; 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976).

In his opening statement to the jury, the trial prosecutor said, “According to him [Shier, Jr.], which is uncontroverted, he puts on a con*228dom, and he has sexual intercourse with her.” Hence, it would not be expected that Shier, Jr.’s semen would have been found on or in the complainant, and its absence adds nothing quantifiable to the claim that the sexual act was consensual.

Respondent has argued that in order to generate a sufficient evidentiary basis for a finding of contempt, wilfulness or other equivalent culpable mental state must be shown. However, under MCL 600.1701(c); MSA 27A.1701(c), “wilfulness” is not necessarily an element of a charge of contempt of court, and therefore it is not such an element here, where an attorney is charged with “any misbehavior in [her] office or trust” as contrasted with “willful neglect or violation of duty . . . .” In re Henry, supra at 55. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that wilfulness must be shown, this is not a rigorous burden; it need only be proved that “ ‘a thing [was] done without ground for believing it is lawful or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act.’ ” Detroit v Pillon, 18 Mich App 373, 377; 171 NW2d 484 (1969), quoting United States v Murdock, 290 US 389, 394; 54 S Ct 223; 78 L Ed 381 (1933). PiUon is particularly on point because the issue was raised on behalf of an attorney, who asserted that his actions, though other than accidental and undertaken with knowledge that their propriety would be contested, was for the purpose of challenging the legality of a tax and thus lacked prerequisite “evil intent” or “bad purpose.” This court rejected that contention and upheld a criminal conviction for tax evasion. When a person knows that a situation exists requiring the use of ordinary care, and has the capacity, means, and ability to exercise such ordinary care, but fails to do so, that person’s actions are “wilful.” People v Giddings, 169 Mich App 631, 635; 426 NW2d 732 (1988); People v Sealy, 136 Mich App 168, 172-173; 356 NW2d 614 (1984). At the show cause hearing, respondent admitted she had a duty to exercise at least ordinary care to apprise herself of the facts of the case by familiarizing herself with the lower court record and related materials, see Administrative Order No. 1981-7, Standards 6, 9; MRPQ 1.1(b), and indeed claimed to have obtained and studied that record before the filing of the brief on appeal and oral argument. We have concluded that at least the level of “wilfulness” described in Pillon, Giddings, and Sealy has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under the statute, in lieu of or in addition to a fine, the contemnor may be sentenced to up to thirty days in jail. MCL 600.1715(1); MSA 27A.1715(1). While in this respect the statute speaks of a fine “or” imprisonment, such statutory language permits the Court to combine such penalties. MCL 769.5; MSA 28.1077.

Accordingly, we do not address the issue whether the language of MCL 600.1721; MSA 27A.1721 can be invoked to also authorize such civil sanctions payable to the Court.

Currently, this amount is $200. MCL 600.321(l)(a); MSA 27A.321(1) (a).

The total of fines and costs assessed against respondent is therefore $700.

This statute is similar in language and function to the federal All Writs Act, 28 USC 651(a), which also parallels the inherent powers of the federal judiciary. Texaco, Inc v Chandler, 354 F2d 655, 657 (CA 10, 1965), cert den 383 US 936 (1966).