Ranch Rheaume LLC v. Department of Agriculture

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

RANCH RHEAUME, LLC, UNPUBLISHED

March 17, 2015 Plaintiff-Appellant, v No. 317631

Court of Claims DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, LC No. 12-000121-MM DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, and STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: SAAD, P.J., and OWENS and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order that granted defendants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2008, defendant Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) notified the public that it had confirmed the first case of Chronic Wasting Disease (“CWD”) in Michigan at a deer- breeding facility in Kent County. CWD is a fatal and contagious neurological illness that affects deer and elk. The disease causes a spongy degeneration of the brain of an infected animal, which results in emaciation, abnormal behavior, loss of bodily functions, and death. There is no treatment or vaccine for the ailment. Though scientists do not believe that CWD can be transmitted to humans, hunters have been cautioned not to eat animals that appear to have CWD symptoms or have tested positive for the disease.

To halt the spread of CWD in the state, DNR and defendant Michigan Department of Agriculture (“MDA”) instituted a statewide quarantine of all deer- and elk-breeding facilities, and banned the movement of all privately owned deer, elk, and moose. This quarantine applied to plaintiff’s elk-breeding facility, and curtailed his operations. Defendants classified plaintiff’s facility as having a high risk of CWD infections because, among other things, it did not comply with certain provisions of MCL 287.951 et seq., which regulates the operation of privately owned elk-breeding facilities in Michigan. Defendants quarantined plaintiff’s facility in early September 2008, and released the quarantine on September 18, 2009.

According to plaintiff, the quarantine “decimated” his business and caused a number of his elk to die. He brought suit against defendants on September 17, 2012 in the Court of Claims, and alleged that defendants: (1) violated his right to due process and equal protection; and (2) committed an inverse condemnation or taking. Defendants asked the court to dismiss plaintiff’s suit under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10). Among other things, defendants argued that the statute of limitations under MCL 600.6452(1) barred plaintiff’s claims, because he failed to bring them within the applicable period.

In a series of written orders,1 the Court of Claims granted defendants’ motion, and held that plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations.2 On appeal, plaintiff raises the same claims described above, and also asserts, for the first time in this appeal, that defendants committed “constitutional torts” against him.3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a decision by the Court of Claims on a motion for summary disposition and issues requiring statutory interpretation.” Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 267 Mich App 682, 684; 706 NW2d 30 (2005). A motion for summary disposition is granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) when undisputed facts establish that an action is barred by the statute of limitations. Kincaid v Cardwell, 300 Mich App 513, 522; 834 NW2d 122 (2013). A party may support such a motion with affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other evidence. Id.

III. ANALYSIS A. THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT

Before we analyze the dispositive procedural requirement that plaintiff failed to follow, we note that we do not address the merits (or lack thereof) of plaintiff’s numerous claims against defendants. Instead, this case requires us to interpret the procedural mandates of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401, et seq., which governs proceedings in the Court of Claims. “When interpreting a statute, courts must ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. This requires courts to consider the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Fradco, Inc v Dept of Treasury, 495 Mich 104, 112; 845 NW2d 81 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).

“MCL 600.6419(1)(a) . . . indicates that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction ‘[t]o hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.’ ” Manuel v Gill, 481 Mich 637, 649; 753 NW2d 48 (2008).4 All suits brought before the Court of Claims are subject to the procedural rules specified in the broader Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401, et seq. If a person or entity intends to file a claim against the state, it must, “within 1 year after such claim has accrued”5: file[] in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place where such claim arose and in detail the nature of the same and of the items of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained, which claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths. [MCL 600.6431(1).]

Parties that wish to sue the state for “property damage or personal injuries” are subject to a separate notice requirement, which stipulates that the claimant must “file with the clerk of the court of claims a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.” MCL 600.6431(3).

In addition to these notice requirements, the Court of Claims Act also contains its own statute of limitations, which acts as an absolute procedural bar to any claims brought against the state after the specified limitation period has expired:

Every claim against the state, cognizable by the court of claims, shall be forever barred unless the claim is filed with the clerk of the court or suit instituted thereon in federal court as authorized in [MCL 600.6440] within 3 years after the claim first accrues. [MCL 600.6452(1).]

“[I]t is well established that the Legislature may impose reasonable procedural requirements, such as a limitations period, on a plaintiff’s available remedies even when those remedies pertain to alleged constitutional violations.” Rusha v Dept of Corrections, 307 Mich App 300, 307; ___ NW2d ___ (2014). The procedural rules and limitations period contained in the Court of Claims Act are such “reasonable procedural requirement[s].” Id. at 310. Accordingly, a plaintiff who makes a constitutional claim against the state must nonetheless comply with the procedural mandates of the Court of Claims Act—he is not excused from compliance by virtue of the fact that his action involves a constitutional issue. Id. at 311–312.

B. APPLICATION

Here, by his own admission, plaintiff failed to comply with any of the procedural rules described above—a failure that is fatal to his claims. Moreover, his suit is barred by the statute of limitations contained in MCL 600.6452(1). The “wrongs” of which plaintiff complains—i.e., “the happening of the event giving rise to [plaintiff’s] cause of action”6—took place either in September 2008, when defendants quarantined his elk ranch,7 or in February 2009, when defendants released a purportedly similar elk ranch from quarantine, but kept plaintiff’s ranch under quarantine.8 In other words, for purpose of the Court of Claims Act, plaintiff’s claims “accrued”9 in either September 2008 or February 2009.

Accordingly, to sustain his action in the Court of Claims, plaintiff was required to: (1) file notice with the court that he intended to file suit against defendants for “property damages” within 6 months of September 2008 and/or February 2009, pursuant to MCL 600.6431(3); and (2) actually file suit against defendants within 3 years of September 2008 and/or February 2009, pursuant to MCL 600.6452(1).

Plaintiff did neither of these things. At no time did he file notice of intent to bring suit against the state for property damages, as MCL 600.6431(3) required him to do. And he ultimately initiated this action in September 2012—well over 3 years after his claim accrued in either September 2008 or February 2009. His arguments to the contrary have no merit, and willfully ignore Michigan case law and the plain language of the Court of Claims Act.10 The trial court therefore correctly granted summary disposition to defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Affirmed.

/s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Donald S. Owens /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly