People of Michigan v. Justin Duane Howard

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, FOR PUBLICATION

February 27, 2018 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:10 a.m. v No. 336150

Calhoun Circuit Court JUSTIN DUANE HOWARD, LC No. 2012-003518-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Justin Duane Howard, appeals as of right the circuit court’s order stemming from a Crosby1 remand, which was ordered because defendant’s within-the-guidelines sentence was imposed prior to the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 870 NW2d 502 (2015).2 Because the sentencing judge was no longer available at the time of the remand, a newly assigned judge reviewed defendant’s case and ruled that he would not have imposed a materially different sentence. Therefore, he declined to resentence defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court failed to follow the proper procedure in a Crosby remand, and that because the sentencing judge was no longer available, he should either have received a full resentencing or at least an opportunity to appear before the court and be heard before the judge made his decision. We agree in part with defendant, and thus, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant’s convictions arise out of an October 2012 incident in which defendant and another man broke into Pearlie Parker’s home in Battle Creek, Michigan, stole money, and assaulted Parker with a firearm. A jury convicted defendant of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82. The trial court sentenced him as a habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison terms of 30 to 60 years for armed robbery, 10 to 30 years for first-degree home invasion, and three to six years for assault with a dangerous weapon.3

In his initial appeal, defendant challenged his convictions on grounds that he was denied a speedy trial and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a witness identification. This Court affirmed his convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion,4 and defendant subsequently applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. After our Supreme Court denied defendant’s application, defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing in part that he was entitled to a Crosby remand and resentencing pursuant to Lockridge, 498 Mich at 395-398. The Supreme Court vacated its prior order and, in lieu of granting leave, remanded defendant’s case to the trial court “to determine whether the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentencing procedure described in [Lockridge].” People v Howard, 500 Mich 852; 884 NW2d 284 (Mem) (2016). The Supreme Court further instructed, “On remand, the trial court shall follow the procedure described in Part IV of [Lockridge].” Id.

The original sentencing judge was unavailable to conduct the Crosby remand, having retired from the bench and subsequently passed away. The successor judge who replaced him on the bench had been the prosecutor in the instant case. She entered an order of disqualification and the case was assigned to a different judge. The newly assigned judge did not appoint an attorney to represent defendant for the Crosby remand or seek any input from defendant or defense counsel. In his order on remand, which he entered within days of being assigned the case, the judge noted that he had reviewed the presentence report, transcripts, and court file from defendant’s case, as well as the Lockridge opinion, and determined that he would not impose a materially different sentence. Defendant, acting in propria persona, moved for reconsideration, arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel and due process pursuant to Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and that the trial court erred by not obtaining the views of defense counsel before making his determination. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration, which led to this appeal as of right.

II. CROSBY REMAND REQUIREMENTS

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to comply with the required procedure for Crosby remands. We agree.

The Lockridge Court provided the following instructions for a trial court conducting a Crosby remand:

[O]n a Crosby remand, a trial court should first allow a defendant an opportunity to inform the court that he or she will not seek resentencing. If notification is not received in a timely manner, the court (1) should obtain the views of counsel in some form, (2) may but is not required to hold a hearing on the matter, and (3) need not have the defendant present when it decides whether to resentence the defendant, but (4) must have the defendant present, as required by law, if it decides to resentence the defendant. [Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398 (citation omitted).]

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not appointing and obtaining the views of defense counsel prior to determining whether resentencing was warranted. The prosecution does not dispute that trial courts must follow the steps outlined in Lockridge for Crosby remands, but restricts their applicability to situations in which a trial court determines that resentencing is warranted. In other words, once the trial court determines that it would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines, then the court should give the defendant an opportunity to decline resentencing and should seek the views of counsel. And if the trial court decides that resentencing is not warranted, none of the other steps are necessary.

The prosecution cites no authority for this strained interpretation of the Lockridge Court’s instructions. In our view, the procedure proposed by the prosecution contrasts with the Supreme Court’s statement, “a trial court considering a case on a Crosby remand should first and foremost include an opportunity for a defendant to avoid resentencing by promptly notifying the [trial] judge that resentencing will not be sought.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398 (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).5 It also ignores the Supreme Court’s next statement that “[i]f the defendant does not so notify the court, it ‘should obtain the views of counsel, at least in writing . . . in ‘reaching its decision . . . whether to resentence.’ ” Id., quoting Crosby 397 F3d at 120. Furthermore, having a trial court review the record and determine whether resentencing is warranted before providing a defendant the opportunity to avoid resentencing constitutes a waste of judicial resources in those cases where the defendant does not want to risk a harsher sentence. Thus, we reject the prosecution’s characterization of the order of steps in a Crosby remand and agree with defendant that before deciding whether to resentence, the trial court was required to obtain the views of defense counsel.

The record on remand contains no indication that defendant was given an opportunity to inform the court that he would not seek resentencing. The record is also devoid of any indication that the trial court complied with the requirement that it “should obtain the views of counsel.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398. In fact, it appears that defendant did not have an attorney at the time of the Crosby remand. In a procedure designed to address whether defendant’s sentence was affected by unconstitutional sentencing constraints and where soliciting input from defense counsel is specifically required of the trial court, defendant was entitled to representation at the time of the Crosby remand. See People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589, 595; 548 NW2d 595 (1996) (“[s]entencing is a critical stage at which defendant has a right to counsel”). And because the trial court failed to appoint counsel and obtain the views of that counsel, we conclude that defendant’s Crosby remand was improperly handled. Thus, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Because we are remanding this matter, it is necessary for us to consider defendant’s second argument on appeal regarding the impact of a remand to a judge other than the sentencing judge in a Crosby remand.

III. IMPACT OF CROSBY REMAND BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE Relying on federal caselaw, defendant contends that because his original sentencing judge is unavailable to conduct the Crosby remand, due process requires that he be entitled to a full resentencing. In the alternative, he argues that he should at least be entitled to appear before the judge and have an opportunity to be heard before the court determines whether it would resentence him under the now-advisory sentencing guidelines. Defendant raises an issue of first impression for Michigan.

Federal courts of appeal are divided on the issue of what is required when the sentencing judge is unavailable to conduct a Crosby remand or similar procedure. Defendant urges us to adopt the approach set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In United States v Paladino, 401 F3d 471, 483-484 (CA 7, 2005), the Seventh Circuit adopted a modified Crosby procedure.6 In those cases where the Seventh Circuit could not determine from the record whether a defendant’s pre-Booker7 sentence constituted prejudicial error, the court would “order a limited remand to permit the sentencing judge to determine whether he would (if required to resentence) reimpose his original sentence.” Paladino, 401 F3d at 484 (emphasis added). Later, in United States v Bonner, 440 F3d 414 (CA 7, 2006), the Seventh Circuit faced the issue of whether a judge other than the “sentencing judge” could conduct a Paladino remand. In concluding that it could not, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that, in order to be confident that the sentencing judge would have given the same sentence subsequent to Booker that it gave prior to Booker, analysis under Paladino had to be conducted by the “original ‘sentencing judge.’ ” Bonner, 440 F3d at 416. When the sentencing judge was unavailable, there was “no purpose in restricting the newly assigned judge to comparing the sentence he would impose post-Booker, armed with the knowledge that the guidelines are advisory, to the sentence initially imposed by a different judge operating under the assumption that the guidelines were mandatory.” Id. at 417. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit in Bonner held that where the original sentencing judge was unavailable to preside over a remand under Paladino, the appeals court would “vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for a complete resentencing hearing in order to permit the successor judge to sentence the defendant in conformity with the mandates of Booker.”8 Id. See also United States v Sanders, 421 F3d 1044, 1052 (CA 9, 2005) (“We hold that when the original sentencing judge is not available to conduct a limited remand . . . , the original sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a full resentencing hearing.”).

Unlike a Paladino remand, our Supreme Court in Lockridge did not describe a Crosby remand as going back to the sentencing judge, but rather, as going back to the “trial court.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398. However, cases on remand in Michigan are always sent back to the judge who entered the judgment or order, whenever possible, and Lockridge did not address or appear to contemplate a circumstance where the original sentencing judge is no longer available.

Assuming we do not agree with defendant’s claim of entitlement to a full resentencing— which would arguably give somewhat of a windfall to all defendants whose sentencing judges are no longer available—defendant alternatively urges this Court adopt the analysis set forth in United States v Garcia, 413 F3d 201 (CA 2, 2005). In Garcia, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly addressed the issue of how to handle Crosby remands where the original sentencing judge is no longer available. The Second Circuit acknowledged by allowing a court to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum on facts not submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 371, citing Booker, 542 US at 226. To remedy the constitutional violation, the High Court made the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. Id. at 371-372, citing Booker, 542 US at 245. the language in Crosby that called for review by the “sentencing judge,” but opined that such language “simply recognizes the practical reality that most Crosby remands . . . will likely be addressed by the original sentencing judge.” Garcia, 413 F3d at 226. But the Second Circuit also noted that due to his or her familiarity with the case, the original sentencing judge would be in the best position to conduct an efficient and reliable analysis under Crosby. Id. at 227. However, the appeals court determined that when the original sentencing judge is no longer available, the district court’s ability to provide a reliable response to a Crosby remand does not abruptly cease:

The judgment appealed from, after all, is that of the district court, not simply that of a particular judge. Thus, the comparative sentence inquiry might properly be viewed as between the court’s challenged sentence and the sentence the court would have imposed with a proper understanding of the law. Where the original sentencing judge is no longer available to speak for the district court on the second point, the responsibility for identifying the sentence that the court would have imposed under a correct view of the law may properly be reassigned to another district judge.

***

. . . [T]he fact that all district judges possess direct sentencing experience, considered together with their ability to develop factual records, necessarily means that such judges can reliably determine, even on reassignment, whether there is a nontrivial difference between a challenged original sentence and one that would have been imposed with a correct understanding of the law. [Id. at 227-228.]

Thus, whereas the Bonner Court stressed the subjectivity of individual judges in sentencing, the Garcia court stressed that, while district court judges are not fungible, they have direct sentencing experience and could determine from the record whether the original sentence was affected by unconstitutional sentencing restraints as identified in Booker. Further, the Garcia Court made clear that it did not expect a newly assigned judge to do the impossible, “i.e., determine what sentence the original judge would have imposed on behalf of the court with a correct understanding of the law and a fully developed record.” Id. at 228. Rather, the newly assigned judge was to determine “what sentence he or she would have imposed on behalf of the court with the benefit of Booker and a full record . . . and then determine whether that lawful sentence differs in more than a trivial manner from the one that was actually imposed.” Id.

Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Garcia did require something more of newly assigned judges that remained optional for the original sentencing judge under Crosby. When making its threshold determination regarding whether resentencing is warranted, a newly assigned judge must order the defendant to appear in court and afford the defendant an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 230. The Second Circuit gave two reasons for this requirement. First, because “human insights important to sentencing cannot be gleaned simply from a review of a cold record,” the Second Circuit deemed the defendant’s appearance and opportunity to be heard necessary to the district court’s achieving the level of familiarity with the case necessary for “a reliable sentencing comparison.” Id. Second, the Second Circuit considered production of the defendant to be important to the perceived integrity of the resentencing decision, explaining as follows:

[A]lthough the production of a defendant may not be essential to the perceived integrity of a Crosby remand handled by the original sentencing judge, see United States v Crosby, 397 F3d at 120 (holding that defendant’s presence in court is not required on remand to decide if sentencing is necessary), when a Crosby remand is reassigned to a judge who has never dealt with the defendant, both the parties’ and the public’s perception of the fairness of the process is enhanced by requiring that judge to have some direct contact with the defendant in a formal court proceeding before answering the remand inquiry . . . . [Id. at 230]

The Garcia court acknowledged that “a Crosby remand may operate less efficiently when the original sentencing judge is no longer available,” but it concluded that it would nevertheless operate “with sufficient reliability that, even in this limited category of cases, we remain committed to case-by-case review of plain error rather than wholesale assumptions that substantial rights were affected in no or all such cases.” Id. at 231. Thus, the Second Circuit upheld the propriety of a Crosby remand in the event of a newly assigned judge, but imposed additional requirements to ensure that the remand procedure was sufficiently fair and reliable under the circumstances.

We find the Second Circuit’s rationale in Garcia to be persuasive and its solution reasonable. When a newly assigned judge handles a Crosby remand without ever encountering the defendant, both the personal nature of sentencing, People v Heller, 316 Mich App 314, 319; 891 NW2d 541 (2016),9 and perceptions of the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceeding are called into question. We conclude that when the original sentencing judge is unavailable, in addition to following the other Crosby remand requirements10 the assigned judge must allow the defendant an opportunity to appear before the court and be heard before the judge can decide whether it would resentence the defendant. Because that opportunity was not given to defendant in this matter, and because he was deprived of counsel and the input of counsel at the time of the Crosby remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Jane M. Beckering