*483 Defendants appeal by right and by leave from three separate rulings of the trial court. First, defendants claim that the trial court erred when it declared unconstitutional an exclusion prohibiting individuals who are serving a sentence of imprisonment from bringing actions under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq . Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred when it ruled that the exclusion does not apply to trainees under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq ., because those individuals are not serving a sentence of imprisonment. Finally, defendants maintain that the trial court erred when it concluded that governmental immunity does not apply to these civil-rights actions.

As explained more fully in this opinion, we hold that the 1999 amendment to the ELCRA, specifically MCL 37.2301(b), as amended by 1999 PA 202 , does not pass constitutional muster. Because we conclude that the exclusion is unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the prohibition applies to individuals assigned to youthful-trainee status under HYTA. We further hold that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims. Therefore, *733 finding no error warranting reversal, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case was originally brought on behalf of seven unidentified male prisoners who sought relief under the ELCRA. They alleged that while they were under the age of 18, they were housed with adult prisoners who *484 took advantage of their youth to commit sexual and physical abuse and harassment. Plaintiffs further asserted that defendants knew or should have known of the risk to plaintiffs but failed to prevent the abuse and harassment, or aided and abetted it.

This case has been heavily litigated in the circuit court and in this Court. Since the case was originally filed on December 9, 2013, there have been multiple applications for leave to appeal in this Court as well as some proceedings in the Court of Claims, and applications for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court. Throughout the course of this litigation, various plaintiffs, claims, and defendants have been added and others have been dismissed. It is a procedural quagmire. Still, the issues on appeal are relatively straightforward and are purely legal. We are first tasked with determining whether the ELCRA, which excludes individuals who are serving a sentence of imprisonment from bringing suit, is constitutional. We conclude that it is not. We must then consider whether defendants can assert governmental immunity.

II. ELCRA

The Michigan Constitution provides:

No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation. [ Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2.]

To that end, MCL 37.2302(a) of the ELCRA provides:

Except where permitted by law, a person shall not:

(a) Deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or *485 accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status.

In its current form, the ELCRA defines the term "public service" as

a public facility, department, agency, board, or commission, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the state, a political subdivision, or an agency thereof or a tax exempt private agency established to provide service to the public, except that public service does not include a state or county correctional facility with respect to actions and decisions regarding an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment . [ MCL 37.2301(b) (emphasis added).]

The highlighted language was added in 1999 after this Court's decision in Neal v. Dep't of Corrections (On Rehearing) , 232 Mich. App. 730 , 734-737, 592 N.W.2d 370 (1998), which concluded that prisons were not excluded from the definition of "public service." The enacting section of the amendment that added this language provides:

This amendatory act is curative and intended to correct any misinterpretation of legislative intent in the court of appeals decision Neal v. Department of Corrections , 232 Mich. App. 730 [ 592 N.W.2d 370 ] (1998). This legislation further expresses the original intent of the legislature that an individual serving a *734 sentence of imprisonment in a state or county correctional facility is not within the purview of this act. [ 1999 PA 202 , enacting § 1.]

At the heart of this appeal is whether the ELCRA, in its postamendment form, is constitutional. "We review de novo constitutional questions such as whether a party was denied due process and equal protection under the law." Lima Twp. v. Bateson , 302 Mich. App. 483 , 503, 838 N.W.2d 898 (2013). An issue *486 involving statutory construction is likewise reviewed de novo. Saffian v. Simmons , 477 Mich. 8 , 12, 727 N.W.2d 132 (2007).

The role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute. The focus of our analysis must be the statute's express language, which offers the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted and the statute is enforced as written. A court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. [ Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 500 Mich. 191 , 199, 895 N.W.2d 490 (2017) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted).]

As previously stated, this case has a long and protracted history. In 2014, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary disposition, citing the same equal-protection concerns that it later articulated in the order on appeal here. That ruling, along with a ruling regarding the prison litigation reform act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq ., was the subject of leave applications filed in this Court in Docket Nos. 321013 and 321756. This Court denied leave in both applications, but our Supreme Court remanded for consideration as on leave granted. Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 497 Mich. 882 , 854 N.W.2d 718 (2014). That remand resulted in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 312 Mich. App. 97 , 878 N.W.2d 293 (2015), in which this Court held that the trial court erred by not granting summary disposition for failure to comply with the disclosure requirement of the PLRA and that plaintiffs could not amend their complaint to cure the defect. Id . at 112-114, 138, 878 N.W.2d 293 . This Court also concluded that the challenged ELCRA provisions did not violate defendants' right to equal protection. Id . at 136-139, 878 N.W.2d 293 . However, on March 30, 2016, our Supreme *487 Court vacated the equal-protection ruling in this Court's Doe decision because "[i]n light of the Court of Appeals ruling that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, MCL 600.5501 et seq., it was unnecessary to resolve the remaining issues." Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 499 Mich. 886 , 876 N.W.2d 570 (2016).

In Doe , 312 Mich. App. 97 , 878 N.W.2d 293 , both Judge RIORDAN and Judge BECKERING (concurring in part and dissenting in part) provided extensive and lengthy analysis on the constitutionality (or lack thereof) of the ELCRA amendment. Writing for the majority, Judge RIORDAN concluded that prisoners were not similarly situated to nonprisoners and that the Legislature's action in excluding prisoners from the ELCRA was rationally related to its interest in deterring frivolous lawsuits and preserving scarce public resources. Id. at 127-138, 878 N.W.2d 293 . Judge BECKERING had a different approach to the case. She emphasized the following terms in Michigan's Equal Protection Clause:

No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his *735 civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation. [ Id. at 145, 878 N.W.2d 293 ( BECKERING , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2.]

Judge BECKERING noted that the use of the singular within the clause demonstrated that it was "unquestionably the intent of the ratifiers that civil rights protections be extended to any and all persons." Id . Under the second sentence, the Legislature was constitutionally mandated to implement protection to any and all persons and lacked authority to exclude anyone.

*488 Id . at 146-147, 878 N.W.2d 293 . In response to that mandate, the Legislature enacted the ELCRA, which also contains the singular: "a person shall not ... 'deny an individual ....' " Id . at 147, 878 N.W.2d 293 (citation omitted; formatting altered). Judge BECKERING noted that following Neal , 232 Mich. App. 730 , the Legislature amended the statute and, in so doing, violated its constitutional mandate. Doe , 312 Mich. App. at 148-149 , 878 N.W.2d 293 (BECKERING , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge BECKERING explained:

The parties and the majority frame the issue at hand as one calling for a determination of whether the 1999 amendment to the ELCRA violates equal protection by denying prisoners, as a class, protections under the ELCRA. In my opinion, this focus is directed at the wrong section of Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. I believe that the analysis misses a more significant and dispositive issue. That is, whether the Legislature has authority, given the constitutional directive in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 pertaining to all citizens, to carve out a particular class of individuals and exclude them from the protections of the ELCRA.

I would hold that the Legislature acted outside of its constitutional authority by removing prisoners from the scope of the ELCRA and thereby denying protection to all. Where the analysis in this case should start, and end, in my opinion, is with the idea that Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 contains more than just the guarantee of equal protection of the laws; it contains a directive to the Legislature to implement legislation that protects the rights of all citizens.

* * *

... [T]he Legislature is not permitted, pursuant to the implementation language contained in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2, to define the persons to whom civil rights are guaranteed. The Constitution already answers that question, unequivocally guaranteeing that legislation to protect *489 civil rights must be extended to all, without reservation or limitation. Any implementation language contained in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 should not be construed as giving the Legislature "the authority to circumvent the protections that the section guarantees." See Midland Cogeneration [ Venture Ltd. Partnership v. Naftaly , 489 Mich. 83 , 95, 803 N.W.2d 674 (2011) ]. If it did, just as the Court cautioned in Midland Cogeneration, the protection of "any person" would "lose [its] strength" and the Legislature would render such protection meaningless. See id. Consequently, I would hold that the 1999 amendment, by eradicating a constitutional guarantee, violates Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. [ Doe , 312 Mich. App. at 149-150, 153-154 , 878 N.W.2d 293 ( BECKERING , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (second alteration in original).]

Judge BECKERING did not believe that the Legislature was endowed with the discretion to define the meaning of the constitutional mandate by narrowing the scope of *736 protected individuals. Id . at 154, 878 N.W.2d 293 . Because the amendment infringed on a constitutional directive, it could not stand. Id . at 151-152, 878 N.W.2d 293 . Judge BECKERING surmised that "there is no need to evaluate the exclusion of prisoners from the scope of the ELCRA on equal protection grounds. The analysis of the constitutionality of the 1999 amendment should begin with the directive given to the Legislature in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 and end with the conclusion that the 1999 amendment is constitutionally infirm because it is contrary to the directive contained in article 1, § 2." Id. at 156.

We conclude that the amendment is unconstitutional for the reasons stated by Judge BECKERING in her dissenting opinion and, therefore, we specifically adopt this analysis as our own. The Legislature's amendment of the ELCRA to effectively bar correctional-facility prisoners from bringing ELCRA suits is in direct violation of Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution, which makes clear that the mandatory legislation *490 must protect all persons. The amendment violates the constitutional mandate that the Legislature craft laws for the protection of its individual citizens.

III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO ELCRA CLAIMS

Defendants argue that the trial court erred when it failed to grant their motion for summary disposition. "A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the ground that a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law." McLean v. McElhaney , 289 Mich. App. 592 , 597, 798 N.W.2d 29 (2010). Such a decision is reviewed de novo on appeal. Id. at 596, 798 N.W.2d 29 .

Contrary to defendants' assertions, the law is clear that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims. In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367 , 393 n. 60, 835 N.W.2d 545 (2013) ("Compare MCL 600.1721 and MCL 600.1701 with other statutes expressly waiving governmental immunity, including the Elliot[t]-Larsen Civil Rights Act ...."); Mack v. Detroit , 467 Mich. 186 , 195, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002) ("[T]here are other areas outside the [governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq.,] where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act."); Diamond v. Witherspoon , 265 Mich. App. 673 , 691, 696 N.W.2d 770 (2005) ("The Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as one under the CRA."); Manning v. Hazel Park , 202 Mich. App. 685 , 509 N.W.2d 874 (1993) ("Governmental immunity is not a defense to a claim brought under the Civil Rights Act."). Defendants cite Jones v. Bitner , 300 Mich. App. 65 , 832 N.W.2d 426 (2013), in support of their position that immunity supersedes and replaces preexisting *491 statutory waivers of immunity. However, the Jones case involved an interplay between the GTLA and the Child Protection Law, MCL 722.621 et seq ., and does not support defendants' argument. Jones simply cannot and does not overrule the established binding precedent that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims.

Affirmed.

MURPHY, J., concurred with K. F. KELLY, J.

O'CONNELL, P.J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

Plaintiffs' artfully drafted complaint seeks to hold these state defendants vicariously liable for the criminal actions of third parties while plaintiffs were incarcerated *737 in the state prison system. Plaintiffs' complaint seeks to avoid governmental immunity, seeks to declare 1999 PA 202 unconstitutional, and seeks to wrest money damages from these state defendants.

Plaintiffs' primary complaint is that if these state officials had instituted better policies with regard to youthful prisoners, these plaintiffs may not have been victims of crimes by unnamed third parties while incarcerated in the prison system. The basket that plaintiffs place all of their eggs into is Article 3 of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq . But Article 3, MCL 37.2301 et seq., does not place any affirmative duties on these state defendants. No Michigan ELCRA case involving Article 3 has ever recognized a cause of action based on an allegation of a failure to discriminate . Allowing plaintiffs to use the ELCRA in this innovative manner places an impossible burden on public-service providers and is antagonistic to current state law. In addition, plaintiffs have numerous other remedies for the relief they are seeking.

*492 For the reasons stated in this opinion, I would reverse the summary disposition orders of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND NATURE OF CASE

As a result of being convicted of serious criminal offenses, plaintiffs are incarcerated in the state prison system. Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that defendants' former policy of housing youthful offenders with nonyouthful offenders resulted in plaintiffs' abuse, harassment, or other unlawful treatment by other prisoners or correctional staff. Plaintiffs claim that the state's policies, customs, and practices discriminate against youthful offenders by failing to separate youthful offenders from adult offenders. Plaintiffs seek to hold state officials, such as the Governor, wardens, former wardens, directors, former deputy and chief directors, and all state officials associated with the prison system, accountable for failing to institute better policies that may have better protected youthful offenders while serving sentences in the state prison system. Plaintiffs assert that their civil rights were violated; as a result, plaintiffs speculate, or are at least hopeful, that they may be entitled to monetary damages from these state defendants.

Plaintiffs have alleged violations of Article 3 of the ELCRA, which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation or in the delivery of public services, MCL 37.2302(a). Plaintiffs allege four separate violations of Article 3: (1) creating a sexually hostile prison environment, (2) failing to prevent and remedy a sexually hostile prison environment, (3) aiding and abetting violations of the ELCRA, and (4) age discrimination.

*493 In three separate orders, the trial court denied the state defendants' request to dismiss this lawsuit. This case presents three significant issues: (1) whether governmental immunity applies to a claim brought under Article 3 of the ELCRA, (2) whether 1999 PA 202 is constitutional, and (3) whether plaintiffs have stated a cognizable cause of action under Article 3.

II. THE MAJORITY'S ERRONEOUS AND HISTORICALLY INACCURATE CONCLUSION THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE

Plaintiffs and the majority theorize that Article 3 of the ELCRA operates as a waiver of governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq . I respectfully disagree. Nothing in the language of Article 3 provides for a waiver of governmental immunity for state officials acting in their *738 official capacity . Hence, state officials acting in their official capacity retain governmental immunity.

The GTLA grants absolute immunity from tort liability to "the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government ... if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her ... executive authority." MCL 691.1407(5) ; Beaudrie v. Henderson , 465 Mich. 124 , 139 n. 11, 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001). Other state officials have immunity from tort liability when all of the following conditions are met:

(a) The officer [or] employee ... is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.

(c) The officer's [or] employee's ... conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [ MCL 691.1407(2).]

*494 To survive a motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity, a plaintiff must plead in avoidance of governmental immunity and "allege facts warranting the application of an exception to governmental immunity." Plunkett v. Dep't of Transp. , 286 Mich. App. 168 , 180, 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009). Plaintiffs' complaint hypothesizes that defendants' policies or lack of policies caused the maltreatment of these plaintiffs. Remarkably, plaintiffs do not claim that the named defendants perpetrated any of the alleged abuse or harassment. Rather, the alleged criminal acts were committed by other prisoners or other nonparties. Even taking all of plaintiffs' allegations as true, see McLean v. Dearborn , 302 Mich. App. 68 , 72-73, 836 N.W.2d 916 (2013), plaintiffs failed to plead any facts in their complaint that Article 3 of the ELCRA waives immunity for state officials acting in their official capacity when making policy decisions for the state of Michigan. No such waiver exists in the ELCRA or the GTLA. The GTLA provides immunity for the state defendants acting in their official capacity with regard to policy decisions. 1 That should be the end of this issue.

Moreover, these state actors cannot be held vicariously liable for the criminal acts of third parties, or in a few instances, criminal acts of unnamed correctional officers who were clearly acting outside the scope of their authority. In Hamed v. Wayne Co. , 490 Mich. 1 , 5, 803 N.W.2d 237 (2011), the Supreme Court addressed "whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department may be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under MCL 37.2103(i) based on a criminal act of a *495 deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment." The Supreme Court rejected liability for these state actors, explaining that "permitting liability against defendants under these circumstances would impose too great a burden on public-service providers and on society in general, which is clearly contrary to the Legislature's intent." Id . at 30, 803 N.W.2d 237 .

In furtherance of preventing the burdensome consequences of holding state actors vicariously liable for the acts of their employees, the Supreme Court warned against artfully pleading a civil rights claim to bypass the GTLA:

Artful pleading would also allow a plaintiff to avoid governmental immunity under the [GTLA]. A school district, for example, could not be vicariously liable in tort for a teacher's sexual molestation of a student because the GTLA would *739 bar the claim. However, if the plaintiff styled its claim as [an ELCRA] action, the school district could be vicariously liable under a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services. Plaintiff's preferred approach, under which public-service providers would be strictly liable for precisely the same conduct as that for which they would typically be immune, is inherently inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. If the Legislature had intended such a result, it should have clearly abrogated the common-law rule for purposes of [the ELCRA]. [ Id . at 29 n. 74, 803 N.W.2d 237 .]

Hamed clearly holds that plaintiffs cannot avoid the GTLA by simply alleging a violation of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs, to their innovative credit, have artfully pleaded a cause of action exactly as the Hamed Court cautioned should not be done.

I would also note that the GTLA, which grants immunity to state officials acting in their official capacity , MCL 691.1407, as amended by 1986 PA 175 , is the *496 later statutory enactment. See Jones v. Bitner , 300 Mich. App. 65 , 76, 832 N.W.2d 426 (2013). "It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws." Walen v. Dep't of Corrections , 443 Mich. 240 , 248, 505 N.W.2d 519 (1993). "Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there." Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc. , 442 Mich. 201 , 210, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). If the Legislature intended to waive the historical grant of immunity to state officials acting in their official capacity, it is incumbent on the Legislature to expressly state that such a waiver exists. No such waiver is found in the ELCRA or the GTLA. This Court cannot by dicta infer such a waiver. We are required to follow the GTLA, as the later and the more specific act.

If the aforementioned law is not sufficient, I would additionally note that the majority opinion cites three employment cases 2 involving Article 2 of the ELCRA, MCL 37.2201 et seq., for the alleged proposition that governmental immunity is not a defense to a civil rights action. Surprisingly, I concur with this singular, isolated, and irrelevant statement of the law-the GTLA is not an affirmative defense to any cause of action. See Mack v. Detroit , 467 Mich. 186 , 200-203, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002). Accordingly, plaintiffs must plead in avoidance of the GTLA.

I find disturbing the majority's short and incomplete analysis of the law in regards to governmental immunity.

*497 The majority opinion makes no attempt to determine whether plaintiffs have pleaded their case in avoidance of governmental immunity, to consider which statute is the latest in time, or to cite any Article 3 cases that have held that governmental immunity is a defense to a civil rights action under Article 3. Plaintiffs have not pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity. Therefore, the state actors acting in their official capacity retain governmental immunity as set forth in the GTLA.

III. THE MAJORITY'S MISGUIDED CONCLUSION THAT 1999 PA 202 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The majority opinion, without any discernable statutory analysis and without any accepted constitutional analysis, declares that the Legislature acted outside the scope of its constitutional authority *740 when it enacted 1999 PA 202 (the amendment). I humbly suggest that it is the majority opinion that has acted outside the scope of its authority, not the Legislature.

A. HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION

In the words of George Santayana, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Santayana, The Life of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p 284.

This case and its predecessors, including Neal v. Dep't of Corrections , 230 Mich. App. 202 , 583 N.W.2d 249 (1998) ( Neal I ), and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections (On Rehearing) , 232 Mich. App. 730 , 592 N.W.2d 370 (1998) ( Neal II ), have a 20-year history. In 1998, this Court decided Neal I , 230 Mich. App. at 209-215 , 583 N.W.2d 249 , in which a majority held that prisons were not a place of public accommodation or a place of public service as defined by the ELCRA, MCL 37.2301(b). On rehearing, one judge *498 reversed her position, and the majority concluded that prisons are places of public service on the basis of the statutory definition of "public service," MCL 37.2301(b). Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 735-736 , 592 N.W.2d 370 . 3 In response to a statement in Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 740 , 592 N.W.2d 370 , that the Legislature did not explicitly exclude prisoners from the ELCRA, the Legislature passed the 1999 amendment to do just that. 1999 PA 202 , enacting § 1. If that were not sufficient precedent to uphold the amendment, I note that a 2000 conflict panel of this Court gave the same advice to the Legislature in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 240 Mich. App. 199 , 201, 611 N.W.2d 1 (2000), stating that the Legislature should draft the statute to reflect its intent that the statute not apply to prisoners and prisons.

When viewed in its correct context, it is obvious that 1999 PA 202 clarified the definition of "public service" found in MCL 37.2301(b). The amendment was not meant to deprive any person of any rights guaranteed under our Constitution; it simply amended the definition of the term "public service."

In sum, the Legislature did exactly as two panels of this Court advised it to do. Today, the majority opinion rebukes the Legislature for heeding this Court's advice and declares 1999 PA 202 unconstitutional. Such an action by a panel of this Court is unprecedented in the *499 history of this Court, especially when prisons do not provide a public service as that term is defined in Article 3 of the ELCRA.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The majority opinion has set forth a constitutional barrier to the 1999 amendment and, unsurprisingly, determined that the legislation cannot surmount that barrier. The majority opinion fails to set forth a standard of review for its analysis of the 1999 amendment. Appellate courts cannot strike down a legislative enactment on the basis of a nonexistent standard of review.

A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one of two ways, by either a facial challenge or an as-applied *741 challenge. "The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proving the law's invalidity." Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v. Dep't of Treasury , 312 Mich. App. 394 , 414-415, 878 N.W.2d 891 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The challenging party must overcome a heavy burden because "[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional, and we have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent." Mayor of Cadillac v. Blackburn , 306 Mich. App. 512 , 516, 857 N.W.2d 529 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiffs do not address which type of challenge they bring to the 1999 amendment. At best, plaintiffs' allegation could be considered an as-applied challenge, meaning that the claimant has alleged " 'a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution' of government action."

*500 Bonner v. City of Brighton , 495 Mich. 209 , 223 n. 27, 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014), quoting Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365 , 395, 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). "The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional 'as applied' is to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative." Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011 , 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633 , 121 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1992) ( SCALIA , J., dissenting).

C. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

"The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law." Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Flint Twp. , 253 Mich. App. 538 , 551, 656 N.W.2d 215 (2002), citing U.S. Const., Am. XIV ; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. "To comply with the Equal Protection Clause ..., defendant is required to exercise equal treatment of similarly situated" individuals. Lear Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 299 Mich. App. 533 , 538, 831 N.W.2d 255 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the state has a "rational basis" for treating similarly situated individuals differently, the state action will survive a constitutional equal-protection challenge. See Id. at 538-539, 831 N.W.2d 255 . The rational-basis test applies only when the equal-protection challenge does not allege a claim based on a suspect classification, or a fundamental right, or an intermediate classification, such as gender. Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. , 470 Mich. 415 , 432, 685 N.W.2d 174 (2004).

The majority declares that 1999 PA 202 must be struck down because Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 contains a mandate. The constitutional provision upon which the majority relies to strike down the amendment states that the "legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation." Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 (emphasis *501 added.) The majority opinion states that "the Legislature was constitutionally mandated to implement protection to any and all persons and lacked authority to exclude anyone," ante at 735, meaning that if any legislation treats any person differently than any other person, that legislation must be struck down as unconstitutional. Putting aside the question of what, if any, law would pass such a contrived test, I would simply state that the law provides that a party challenging the facial constitutionality of an act "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid . The fact that the [act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid ...." United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed. 2d 697 (1987) (emphasis added).

The primary error of the majority opinion is its adoption of plaintiffs' assertion *742 that prisoners and nonprisoners are similarly situated in all aspects of this case. "Resident inmates are obviously members of the public in a general sense," but "[t]he rights of ... inmates are severely restricted while they are incarcerated." Martin v. Dep't of Corrections , 424 Mich. 553 , 565, 384 N.W.2d 392 (1986) ( CAVANAGH , J., dissenting). Prisoners and nonprisoners have never been similarly situated, are not currently similarly situated, and hopefully will never be similarly situated. That a rational basis exists for treating prisoners differently from free citizens is obvious.

I conclude that 1999 amendment has a rational basis for its existence. In this regard, I concur with Judge RIORDAN 's analysis in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 312 Mich. App. 97 , 134, 878 N.W.2d 293 (2015), vacated in part 499 Mich. 886 , 876 N.W.2d 570 (2016), that "the deterrence of *502 meritless lawsuits and the preservation of scarce resources through the reduction of costs associated with resolving those lawsuits" reflects a legitimate governmental interest. See id. at 134-136. Prisoners file a disproportionate number of lawsuits, and the cost to the state has skyrocketed. In one instance, a prisoner has filed 5,813 lawsuits and counting. 4 The Legislature recognized that including prisons in the definition of "public service," MCL 37.2301(b), is problematic. Prisoners could sue for the loss of their right to vote or for the loss of their Second Amendment right to carry a gun in prison. Therefore, a rational basis exists for excluding prisons from the definition of "public service" in Article 3 of the ELCRA. 5

Even assuming prisoners are in some respects similarly situated to nonprisoners, the Legislature can make special provisions for prisoners based on their circumstances. In this case, plaintiffs make no allegations that certain prisoners were treated differently than other prisoners. As long as the Legislature does not discriminate within the unique class of individuals known as prisoners, no equal-protection violation occurs.

*503 Equal protection is not premised on an underlying independent right to a service or privilege; it prohibits invidious discrimination among potential recipients of benefits or rights after the decision has been made to establish the right. See Arnett v. Kennedy , 416 U.S. 134 , 163, 94 S.Ct. 1633 , 40 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1974). Even if we were to assume that the definition of "public service" in Article 3 of the ELCRA applies to prisons and prisoners, plaintiffs' complaint does not allege any invidious discrimination among potential recipients of any prison services. More importantly, it does not discriminate based upon a prisoner's status as a prisoner, but treats all prisoners the same and has a rational basis for its realistic goal.

D. LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE

Our Constitution provides that "[n]o person exercising powers of one branch [of *743 government] shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch ...." Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. As I stated in my dissent in Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. AboutParochiaid v. Governor , 216 Mich. App. 126 , 135, 548 N.W.2d 909 (1996) ( O'CONNELL , J., dissenting), "the judiciary has no legislative powers, and, thus, it cannot act as a 'super legislature' to sit in review of the policy choices made by coordinate branches of government acting within their respective spheres of authority." It is the Legislature that makes the laws. The Court's job is to interpret the law. In my opinion, the majority has encroached on the sphere of authority reserved to our Legislature, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

The scope or purview of a legislative act is reserved to the Legislature. This case is similar to *504 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58 , 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1989), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under [ 42 U.S.C.] 1983." In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the state and state officers were persons for the purpose of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil-rights action, the Supreme Court explained that the language of § 1983 did not signal clear congressional intent to subject the states to liability. Id . at 64-65, 109 S.Ct. 2304 .

In the present case, the Legislature is simply defining the scope of its own legislative enactment. I simply repeat what the Legislature has stated in the enabling act to the 1999 amendment that prisons are not within the purview of "public service" as defined by Article 3 of the ELCRA. See 1999 PA 202 , enacting § 1. The 1999 amendment's purpose was to define the scope of the term "public service," MCL 37.2301(b), consistently with the Legislature's task to define what "appropriate legislation" is, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. Article 3 of the ELCRA only applies to establishments that are "open to the public[.]" See MCL 37.2303. Furthermore, MCL 37.2302 includes the phrase "[e]xcept where permitted by law," thereby providing discretion to the Legislature to decide the scope of Article 3. When read in context, there is nothing unconstitutional in the language of 1999 PA 202 .

The Legislature's intent was to state that those parts of prisons that do not deal with the public do not fall within the purview of Article 3 of the ELCRA's definition of "public service." The reason is simple-that part of prisons that houses prisoners does not provide a public service as defined in the act. Prisoners do not perform a public service; they do not deal with the public. Additionally, that part of prisons that houses prisoners was not intended to interact with the *505 public. In fact, it is just the opposite; prisoners by their own behaviors are a tremendous burden on society. Hence, prisoners do not fall within the purview of Article 3 of the ELCRA.

Plaintiffs claim that they are being denied the right of access to the courts. Plaintiffs cite Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238 , 290, 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972) ( BRENNAN , J., concurring), for the proposition that prisoners retain a fundamental "right of access to the courts." There is no doubt that access to the courts is a fundamental right, but the 1999 amendment's purpose was to define the scope of the term "public service," not to deny anyone access to the courts. This lawsuit is Exhibit One that plaintiffs have not been denied access to the courts.

Because the Legislature drafted the ELCRA, it can and should clearly define the scope of its own statutory enactment. Despite this, the majority not only usurps the prerogative that our Constitution grants the Legislature in this context of defining *744 the scope of the amendment but then proceeds to strike down the Legislature's definition of the scope of "public service" in Article 3.

IV. PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO SET FORTH A COGNIZABLE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE ELCRA

This case does not require this Court to declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional. Courts must avoid constitutional issues if a case can be resolved on the basis of statutory interpretation. See English v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich. , 263 Mich. App. 449 , 455, 688 N.W.2d 523 (2004). I believe this case can be resolved on statutory grounds. There is no need to interfere with the responsibilities of another branch of government.

*506 A. WHAT THIS CASE IS NOT ABOUT

Before addressing the substance of plaintiffs' allegations, this Court has the responsibility of deciding whether plaintiffs' cause of action is cognizable under Article 3 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs' sophisticated complaint is similar to a Gordian knot that must be unwound to fully understand the gravity of the allegations. Before engaging in an analysis of plaintiffs' allegations, for clarification purposes, it may be easier to state what principles are not involved in the present case.

First: Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a constitutional tort. Our Supreme Court has defined a constitutional tort as an allegation "that the state, by virtue of custom or policy, has violated a right conferred by the Michigan Constitution ...." Smith v. Dep't of Public Health , 428 Mich. 540 , 544, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987), aff'd sub nom Will , 491 U.S. 58 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 . Plaintiffs do not allege a cause of action under Michigan's Equal Protection Clause, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. It should also be noted that had plaintiffs filed an action under Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2, plaintiffs would not be entitled to money damages. See Sharp v. Lansing , 464 Mich. 792 , 800 n. 9, 629 N.W.2d 873 (2001). Our Supreme Court has declined to infer a damages remedy from the Equal Protection Clause because the authority to allow money damages for an equal-protection violation belongs to the Legislature. Lewis v. Michigan , 464 Mich. 781 , 786-789, 629 N.W.2d 868 (2001).

Second: Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a cause of action under the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., Am. XIV. Nor do plaintiffs allege a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Carlton v. Dep't of Corrections , 215 Mich. App. 490 , 502-504, 546 N.W.2d 671 (1996). Furthermore, the state and state *507 officials acting in their official capacity cannot be sued for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Will , 491 U.S. at 71 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 . Also, states are immune "from suit in state and federal courts." Ernst v. Rising , 427 F.3d 351 , 358 (C.A. 6, 2005). 6 *745 Third: Plaintiffs do not allege that the state defendants committed any traditional torts. To impose tort liability on a state official, the official must be "the proximate cause" of the injury, "meaning the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury." Robinson v. Detroit , 462 Mich. 439 , 458-459, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). Plaintiffs do not allege in their complaint that the named defendants, in their official capacity or in their individual capacity, committed any traditional torts.

Fourth: Plaintiffs do not allege that this case is an employment action under Article 2 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs' complaint does a nice job of attempting to conflate an Article 2 employment cause of action with an Article 3 public service cause of action, but, suffice it to say, no Michigan cases have recognized such a conflated cause of action. The fact that prisons are a hostile environment, or as plaintiffs state, a sexually hostile *508 prison environment, has never been recognized in a published case as an Article 3 cause of action.

Fifth: Plaintiffs do not allege that the ELCRA is coextensive with Michigan's equal-protection clause. The ELCRA is best described, in part, as a codification of the equal-protection clause but "broadened to include categories not covered under the constitution, such as age, sex, and marital status." Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 739 , 592 N.W.2d 370 . 7 For this reason, the trial court's and plaintiffs' citation of Mason v. Granholm , unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued January 23, 2007 (Case No. 05-73943), 2007 WL 201008 , is misguided. Mason 's conclusion that the 1999 amendment was not curative is also wrong. The amendment's enacting section explicitly provides, in plain English, that the 1999 amendment "is curative and intended to correct any misinterpretation of legislative intent in the court of appeals decision [ Neal II ]." 1999 PA 202 , enacting § 1. The enacting section stated that the Legislature's "original intent ... that an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state or county correctional facility is not within the purview of this act." Id . Ironically, if they were co-extensive, plaintiffs would not be entitled to monetary damages.

But, if plaintiffs can artfully allege a valid public-service claim under Article 3 of the ELCRA, they would be entitled to monetary damages. See Hamed, 490 Mich. at 29 n. 74, 803 N.W.2d 237 . At issue in this case is whether such a cause of action exists under Michigan law and whether *509 plaintiffs' complaint has set forth such a cause of action. 8 *746 B. SEXUALLY HOSTILE PRISON ENVIRONMENT

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants' "acts and omissions constitute sexual harassment and violate Plaintiffs' rights under the ELCRA...." The ELCRA's definition of sexual harassment underscores a fatal flaw in plaintiffs' case. The ELCRA defines sexual harassment as follows:

Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions:

( i ) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.

( ii ) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions *510 affecting the individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.

( iii ) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment. [ MCL 37.2103(i).]

Nothing in plaintiffs' complaint alleges, either explicitly or implicitly, that a term or condition of plaintiffs' obtaining public services was contingent on them submitting to conduct or communication of a sexual nature. In addition, plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege that these state defendants committed any "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature," MCL 37.2103(i), in the provision of public services.

Moreover, the vast majority of hostile-environment civil-rights-act cases involve employment cases under Article 2 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs have not cited a published hostile-environment case that involves a prison setting as it relates to the term "public services" as found in Article 3 of the ELCRA. No such case exists. I conclude that no reason exists to extend hostile-environment cases beyond employment cases. For that reason alone, plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a hostile-environment cause of action under Article 3 of the ELCRA.

If plaintiffs are correct, then every single prisoner in the State of Michigan can sue the state for being placed in a sexually hostile-prison environment. I, for one, will not be the first judge to extend the hostile environment line of cases to state prisons. That is a public policy question best left to the Legislature or to the Supreme Court.

*511 C. AGE DISCRIMINATION

Plaintiffs allege that the state's customs and policies discriminated against youthful offenders, but, when read in context, plaintiffs' actual complaint is that the state defendants should have treated youthful offenders differently from nonyouthful offenders. The difficulty with such a cause of action is that Article 3 of the ELCRA does not impose any affirmative duties on these state defendants to draft new policies. The only duty imposed by Article 3 is that the state shall not discriminate when delivering public services. Plaintiffs' complaint is devoid of any allegations that the state or its officials affirmatively discriminated against these youthful offenders when delivering a public service. In short, plaintiffs want this Court to recognize an Article 3 cause of action for failing to treat prisoners differently.

*747 Defendants cannot be liable under Article 3 of the ELCRA just because there may be a better way to achieve a goal or a better way to run a prison. No Michigan caselaw and no statutory language supports the concept that failure to institute different policies, customs, or practices can provide a basis for imposing liability on a governmental agency. See Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm. , 463 Mich. 143 , 184, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000) (holding that the "highway exception" to governmental immunity does not impose a duty on the state or county road commissions "to install additional traffic signs or signals that might conceivably have made the intersection safer"). While, as in this case, a decision to adopt new policies, customs, or practices may be prudent and advisable, those decisions are best left to the executive or legislative branch. Article 3 of the ELCRA does not provide a cause of action for such a claim. The state defendants did not deny these plaintiffs *512 a public service on the basis of plaintiffs' age or other suspect classification or as a term or condition of getting a specific public service.

D. OTHER REMEDIES

It is important to note that plaintiffs would not be left without a remedy if this Court determined that their claims did not fall within the scope of Article 3 of the ELCRA. Youthful offenders and other prisoners have remedies under statutory enactments and other provisions of the Michigan Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. The Equal Protection Clause does not carry a damages remedy, however, because the authority to allow money damages for an equal-protection violation belongs to the Legislature.

To be candid, the hidden issue in this case is monetary damages. Plaintiffs have filed a claim in federal court, in part, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs' attorney admits that "monetary damages" are not available in federal court because "federal rules bar the collection of damages from the state or state agencies." 9 Hence, plaintiffs filed a duplicate action in state court, alleging a violation of Article 3 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs' only avenue to collect monetary damages against the state or state agencies is to awkwardly attempt to fit their claim into an ELCRA action, but plaintiffs' cause of action does not fit into the strictures of an Article 3 civil-rights violation.

*513 Plaintiffs allege egregious acts perpetrated against them by third parties that, if true, are significant and deserve remediation under the law. However, the remedy is not for this Court, based upon a visceral response, to reengineer the law to discard governmental immunity for state actors or to conclude that prisoners and nonprisoners are similarly situated for purposes of an equal-protection argument.

V. CONCLUSION

In essence, plaintiffs seek money damages against the state for failing to institute better safeguards in prison. But plaintiffs have not pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity. Furthermore, this case can be decided on statutory grounds. There is no need to declare 1999 PA 202 unconstitutional. Even if I were to decide this case on constitutional grounds, plaintiffs make no claim that they were treated differently than a similarly situated class of prisoners. Prisoners and nonprisoners are not members of the same class for purposes of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs'

*748 actual claim is that the state should have discriminated in favor of youthful offenders. That claim is a policy decision for the executive branch or the legislative branch to resolve. Because of the separation-of-powers doctrine, courts should not be involved in the day-to-day operation of the duties or responsibilities of other branches of government. 10

*514 The truth of the matter is that prisons are a dangerous place. No matter what rules, customs, practices, or policies are instituted in state prisons, the state cannot prevent all misdeeds by perpetrators of criminal behavior. The majority's desire to cure all wrongs by eviscerating the doctrine of governmental immunity, while well-intentioned, is fraught with the law of unintended consequences. Depriving governmental officials of governmental immunity when making policy decisions, when making sentencing decisions, and when running the government would certainly cause most of us to rethink the traditional notion of public service.

For the reasons stated in this opinion, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.