*261 *291 In these consolidated cases, plaintiff, Tomra of North America Inc., appeals as of right the *292 orders of the Court of Claims granting summary disposition to defendant, the Department of Treasury. In its opinion, the Court of Claims concluded that plaintiff's beverage-container-recycling machines did not qualify for the industrial-processing exemption to tax liability as set forth in the General Sales Tax Act (GSTA), MCL 205.51 et seq ., and the Use Tax Act (UTA), MCL 205.91 et seq . We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS

The facts relevant to this appeal are largely undisputed. Plaintiff sells and leases the container-recycling machines commonly found in grocery stores and also sells repair parts for those machines. These machines accept aluminum cans, glass bottles, and plastic bottles for recycling. When a can or bottle is placed in the machine, the machine reads the universal product code (UPC) and then sorts the accepted cans and bottles. Aluminum cans are crushed; plastic bottles are sorted by color, punctured, and compacted; and glass bottles are sorted by color. All containers are then moved to collection bins and thereafter transported to a recycling facility. At the recycling facility, the containers are dumped onto conveyor belts. Glass bottles are stored, while aluminum cans and plastic bottles are compacted into bales. The recycling facility sells the cans and bottles to manufacturers who remanufacture the materials into other products.

In this case, the parties dispute plaintiff's obligation to pay sales and use tax with respect to the container-recycling machines for the period of March 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011. During that tax period, plaintiff collected sales tax from customers to whom they sold or leased container-recycling machines, and plaintiff paid the sales tax collected to defendant. Similarly, *293 during that tax period, plaintiff paid use tax to defendant related to parts used in repairing the container-recycling machines sold or leased by plaintiff. 1

Plaintiff thereafter sought a refund of these amounts on the basis that its sales of recycling machines and repair parts were exempt from taxation under the GSTA and UTA. After defendant failed to respond to the refund request, plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Claims. Plaintiff thereafter moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), seeking a ruling on the question whether plaintiff's container-recycling machines and repair parts perform, or are used in, an industrial-processing activity under the GSTA and UTA. The Court of Claims denied plaintiff's motion, and pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2), instead granted defendant summary disposition, holding that plaintiff's container-recycling machines and repair parts are not used in an industrial-processing activity under the GSTA and the UTA and that plaintiff therefore is not entitled to exemption from sales and use tax for the sale and lease of the machines and their repair parts. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the Court of Claims erred by holding that plaintiff's container-recycling machines and repair parts are not used in an industrial-processing activity under the GSTA and the UTA, *262 and therefore erred by granting summary disposition to defendant. We agree.

We review de novo a trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition.

*294 Hoffner v. Lanctoe , 492 Mich. 450 , 459, 821 N.W.2d 88 (2012). In reviewing a decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we review the record in the same manner as the trial court, considering the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109 , 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim and is appropriately granted when, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200 , 206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). We also review de novo the proper interpretation of statutes such as the GSTA and the UTA. See Fradco, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 495 Mich. 104 , 112, 845 N.W.2d 81 (2014) ; see also Granger Land Dev. Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 286 Mich. App. 601 , 608, 780 N.W.2d 611 (2009).

Section 4t of the GSTA, MCL 205.54t, sets forth the industrial-processing exemption from the sales tax. 2 The statute provides, in relevant part:

(1) The sale of tangible personal property to the following ... is exempt from the tax under this act:

(a) An industrial processor for use or consumption in industrial processing.

(b) A person, whether or not the person is an industrial processor, if the tangible personal property is intended for ultimate use in and is used in industrial processing by an industrial processor.

*295 (c) A person, whether or not the person is an industrial processor, if the tangible personal property is used by that person to perform an industrial processing activity for or on behalf of an industrial processor.

* * *

(3) Industrial processing includes the following activities:

* * *

(d) Inspection, quality control, or testing to determine whether particular units of materials or products or processes conform to specified parameters at any time before materials or products first come to rest in finished goods inventory storage.

* * *

(g) Remanufacturing.

* * *

(i) Recycling of used materials for ultimate sale at retail or reuse.

(j) Production material handling.

(k) Storage of in-process materials.

(4) Property that is eligible for an industrial processing exemption includes the following:

* * *

(b) Machinery, equipment, tools, dies, patterns, foundations for machinery or equipment, or other processing equipment used in an industrial processing activity and in their repair and maintenance.

* * *

*296 (6) Industrial processing does not include the following activities:

*263 (a) Purchasing, receiving, or storage of raw materials.

(b) Sales, distribution, warehousing, shipping, or advertising activities.

* * *

(7) As used in this section:

(a) "Industrial processing" means the activity of converting or conditioning tangible personal property by changing the form, composition, quality, combination, or character of the property for ultimate sale at retail or for use in the manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at retail. Industrial processing begins when tangible personal property begins movement from raw materials storage to begin industrial processing and ends when finished goods first come to rest in finished goods inventory storage.

(b) "Industrial processor" means a person who performs the activity of converting or conditioning tangible personal property for ultimate sale at retail or use in the manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at retail.

Entitlement to an exemption under the GSTA is determined by what use the customer makes of the product sold by the taxpayer. Elias Bros. Restaurants, Inc. v. Treasury Dep't , 452 Mich. 144 , 154, 156, 549 N.W.2d 837 (1996) ; accord Detroit Edison Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 498 Mich. 28 , 37, 869 N.W.2d 810 (2015). Tax exemptions are disfavored, and the burden of proving entitlement to a tax exemption is upon the party asserting the right to the exemption. Elias Bros. , 452 Mich. at 150 , 549 N.W.2d 837 . Further, tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing unit. Ladies Literary Club v. Grand Rapids , 409 Mich. 748 , 753, 298 N.W.2d 422 (1980) (citation omitted).

*297 As set forth under MCL 205.54t(1)(c), the sale of tangible personal property is exempt from sales tax if the tangible personal property is used by the buyer to perform an industrial-processing activity for or on behalf of an industrial processor. Under MCL 205.54t(4)(b), property that is eligible for an industrial-processing exemption includes "[m]achinery, equipment, tools, dies, patterns, foundations for machinery or equipment, or other processing equipment used in an industrial processing activity and in their repair and maintenance." In this appeal, the question is whether the container-recycling machines plaintiff sells and leases are machinery used by plaintiff's customers in an "industrial processing activity" within the meaning of the statute.

An "industrial processing activity" is not defined by the statute, but the statute does define "industrial processing" as "the activity of converting or conditioning tangible personal property by changing the form, composition, quality, combination, or character of the property for ultimate sale at retail or for use in the manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at retail." MCL 205.54t(7)(a). MCL 205.54t also specifies activities that are considered to be industrial processing, including, under Subsection (3)(d), the "[i]nspection, quality control, or testing to determine whether particular units of materials or products or processes conform to specified parameters at any time before materials or products first come to rest in finished goods inventory storage"; under Subsection (3)(g), remanufacturing; under Subsection (3)(i), recycling of used materials for ultimate sale at retail or reuse; under Subsection (3)(j), production material handling; and under Subsection (3)(k), storage of in-process materials. The statute also specifies activities that are not included in industrial processing, including, under *298 Subsection (6)(a), the purchasing, receiving, or storage of raw materials, and under Subsection (6)(b), *264 sales, distribution, warehousing, shipping, or advertising activities.

Subsection (7)(a), in addition to defining industrial processing, also provides that "[i]ndustrial processing begins when tangible personal property begins movement from raw materials storage to begin industrial processing and ends when finished goods first come to rest in finished goods inventory storage." In light of this provision, the Court of Claims in this case concluded that plaintiff's container-recycling machines could not be engaged in an industrial-processing activity because the machines do not perform their task after tangible personal property begins movement from raw-materials storage to begin industrial processing. That is, the tangible personal property in this case that is to be converted or conditioned through industrial processing is the cans and bottles that consumers commonly return to a grocery store. Generally, these cans and bottles are not first placed in "raw materials storage" before the consumer places them in the machines. 3 The Court of Claims concluded that because the cans and bottles were not first placed in raw-material storage before being placed in the machines, whatever function the machines performed could never be considered an industrial-processing activity. The Court of Claims stated:

[R]egardless of whether Plaintiff's recycling machines perform tasks that might fit within any specific provision of MCL 205.54t(3) or MCL 205.94o(3), because those *299 activities occur before the industrial process begins, the exemptions found in MCL 205.54t and MCL 205.94o do not apply.

The Court of Claims construed this provision as meaning precisely what it says-that industrial processing begins when tangible personal property begins movement from raw-materials storage to begin industrial processing. We agree. However, the Court of Claims also construed this sentence to mean that industrial processing can never occur unless, first, tangible personal property begins movement from raw-materials storage. 4 The statute does not so provide, and we think it unlikely that the Legislature intended that interpretation.

A court's primary task when interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 496 Mich. 382 , 389, 852 N.W.2d 786 (2014). In doing so, we first consider the statutory language itself; if the language is unambiguous, we conclude that the Legislature must have intended the clearly expressed meaning and we enforce the statute as written. Id . A statute is not ambiguous merely because a term is undefined or has more than one definition, but ambiguity exists when statutory language ''is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning." Klida v. Braman , 278 Mich. App. 60 , 65, 748 N.W.2d 244 (2008) ; see also Marcelle v. Taubman , 224 Mich. App. 215 , 219, 568 N.W.2d 393 (1997).

Moreover, "what is plain and unambiguous often depends on one's frame of reference,"

*300 *265 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n (On Rehearing) , 484 Mich. 1 , 13, 795 N.W.2d 101 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted); to determine that frame of reference, one must consider the context of the passage by reading it "in relation to the statute as a whole and [to] work in mutual agreement" with the remainder of the statute. Id . We therefore read a statute " 'as a whole and in its grammatical context, giving each and every word its plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined.' " Book-Gilbert v. Greenleaf , 302 Mich. App. 538 , 541, 840 N.W.2d 743 (2013), quoting In re Receivership of 11910 South Francis Rd. , 492 Mich. 208 , 222, 821 N.W.2d 503 (2012). In so doing, we "avoid a construction that would render any part of a statute surplusage or nugatory, and '[w]e must consider both the plain meaning of the critical words or phrases as well as their placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.' " People v. Redden , 290 Mich. App. 65 , 76-77, 799 N.W.2d 184 (2010) (citation omitted). We also note that, although tax exemptions are construed strictly against the taxpayer, Ladies Literary Club , 409 Mich. at 753 , 298 N.W.2d 422 , any ambiguity found in a tax statute is construed in favor of the taxpayer, Signature Villas, LLC v. Ann Arbor , 269 Mich. App. 694 , 702, 714 N.W.2d 392 (2006).

As noted, MCL 205.54t provides for an industrial-processing exemption for the tax imposed by the GSTA. The statute therefore focuses, of necessity, on which activities fall within the purview of "industrial processing." Indeed, the statute is devoted almost entirely to describing the activities that constitute, or do not constitute, industrial processing.

Among the activities that are specified by the statute as falling within the definition of industrial processing are activities that are unlikely to begin with *301 "tangible personal property begin[ning] movement from raw materials storage to begin industrial processing...." MCL 205.54t(7)(a). Subsection (3)(e) provides that industrial processing includes "[p]lanning, scheduling, supervision, or control of production or other exempt activities." Subsection (3)(f) provides that industrial processing includes "[d]esign, construction, or maintenance of production or other exempt machinery, equipment, and tooling." Clearly, the activities of planning, scheduling, and designing are likely to predate tangible personal property beginning movement from raw-materials storage to begin industrial processing. Nonetheless, our Legislature clearly intended, as evidenced by the language of these statutory provisions, to include these activities within the definition of industrial processing. We will not, therefore, read the language of Subsection (7)(a)-that "[i]ndustrial processing begins when tangible personal property begins movement from raw materials storage to begin industrial processing"-as a temporal requirement that would render these portions of the statute meaningless. That is, we will not read into the plain language of the statute the stricture that no activity qualifies as industrial processing unless it is predated by tangible personal property leaving raw-material storage. The statute does not state that industrial processing must begin this way but rather states that when tangible personal property begins movement from raw-materials storage to begin industrial processing, one can rest assured that industrial processing has begun.

To discern the intention of the Legislature, statutory provisions should not be read in isolation, which can lead to a distortion of legislative intent. Robinson v. Lansing , 486 Mich. 1 , 15, 782 N.W.2d 171 (2010). "A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation often is clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme."

*302 *266 MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 308 Mich. App. 362 , 370, 863 N.W.2d 387 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this case, we observe that Subsection (6) of the statute specifies activities that are not considered industrial processing. Among the activities not considered to be industrial processing is the "storage of raw materials." MCL 205.54t(6)(a). Having made clear that the storage of raw materials is not industrial processing, Subsection (7)(a) then makes clear that once "tangible personal property begins movement from raw materials storage to begin industrial processing," the activity does qualify as industrial processing. Our Legislature thus articulated exactly which activities related to the storage of raw materials are and are not included in industrial processing, thereby providing guidance for determining exactly when in the continuum tangible personal property makes the transition from storage (not exempt) to activities of industrial processing (exempt). This provision does not attempt to foreclose the possibility that industrial processing could occur without the initial step of moving raw materials from storage, 5 or when *303 tangible items are never in raw-materials storage, and we decline to so expand the provision.

In construing the statute, and in keeping with the statute's intent, our Supreme Court has emphasized that entitlement to an exemption under the GSTA is determined by what use the customer makes of the product sold by the taxpayer. Elias Bros. , 452 Mich. at 154, 156 , 549 N.W.2d 837 . In reaching its conclusion in this case, the Court of Claims found determinative not the use to which the container-recycling machines were put, but rather when, and perhaps where, 6 the equipment was used in relation to raw-materials storage. In light of our Supreme Court's directive, we remand to the Court of Claims for reconsideration of whether plaintiff is entitled to a tax exemption under the GSTA and UTA.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Riordan, J., concurred with Gadola, P.J.

K.F. Kelly (dissenting.)

I respectfully dissent. Because the machines are not involved in "industrial processing" as that term is defined in *267 MCL 205.54t(7)(a), I would affirm the Court of Claims' well-reasoned decision. *304 The analysis in this case should begin and end with the statutory definition of "industrial processing" as set forth in Subsection (7)(a), which provides:

"Industrial processing" means the activity of converting or conditioning tangible personal property by changing the form, composition, quality, combination, or character of the property for ultimate sale at retail or for use in the manufacturing of a product to be ultimately sold at retail. Industrial processing begins when tangible personal property begins movement from raw materials storage to begin industrial processing and ends when finished goods first come to rest in finished goods inventory storage . [Emphasis added.]

"When a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls." Haynes v. Neshewat , 477 Mich. 29 , 35, 729 N.W.2d 488 (2007). However, rather than focusing on the Legislature's definition of "industrial processing" in Section (7)(a), the majority mistakenly looks to those activities specifically enumerated in MCL 205.54t(3). Contrary to the majority's conclusion, Subsection (3) does not expand the definition specifically set forth in Subsection (7)(a). Rather, as the Court of Claims aptly noted, Subsection (7)(a) has a temporal requirement that must be met before the activities in Subsection (3) are even considered. That is, only after the definition in Subsection (7)(a) is met do the activities set forth in Subsection (3) have any relevance. Those activities must occur within the statutorily defined period in Subsection (7)(a).

The Court of Claims correctly recognized that the machines perform activities before the industrial process begins. The machines may sort, separate, and compress items and, in that regard, some processing necessarily occurs. However, while some processing may occur, the machines do not perform " industrial processing" as statutorily defined. Instead, the machines *305 simply facilitate the collection of raw materials. In order to be exempt, the machines must perform an activity at some point after tangible personal property begins movement from raw-material storage and before the finished goods first come to rest in inventory. The machines in this case are used before the start of the industrial process and, therefore, the equipment is not exempt. Thus, any inspection, quality control, and recycling that the machines perform is irrelevant because those activities take place before the industrial process begins. 1

The majority erroneously concludes that the Court of Claims made its decision contingent on the existence of raw materials. However, it is clear that the Court of Claims made no such finding. Instead, the Court of Claims appropriately recognized that where, as here, there is raw material, then the industrial process begins when tangible personal property begins movement from raw-materials storage to begin industrial processing. In so doing, the *268 Court of Claims was faithful to the definition as set forth by our Legislature.

I find plaintiff's reliance on Detroit Edison Co. v. Dep't of Treasury , 498 Mich. 28 , 869 N.W.2d 810 (2015), unavailing. The focus in the Detroit Edison case involved electricity. The issue was not whether there was *306 raw storage, but whether electricity ever "came to rest" in inventory storage. Our Supreme Court concluded that "industrial processing of electricity does not become complete until final distribution to the consumer because there is simply no point within the electric system at which 'finished goods first come to rest in finished goods inventory storage' before that point." Id . at 42, 869 N.W.2d 810 . Our Supreme Court further concluded that "the nonexempt activities in MCL 205.94o(6)(b) are in no way within the scope of MCL 205.94o(7)(a), and the exempt activity in MCL 205.94o(7)(a) is in no way within the scope of MCL 205.94o(6)(b)." Id . at 45, 869 N.W.2d 810 . Therefore, as applied to the statutes at issue here, once there is industrial processing as defined in Subsection (7)(a), the exclusions set forth in Subsection (6) no longer apply. The only premise that Detroit Edison confirmed was that Subsection (6) does not modify the definition in Subsection (7)(a). Again, the Court of Claims did not rely on Subsection (6), which excluded storage of raw materials as an industrial activity; rather, the Court of Claims relied exclusively on the statutory definition of ''industrial processing'' in Subsection (7)(a).

Because the machines perform activities that occur before an industrial process begins, I would affirm.