People of Michigan v. Christopher Andrew Canales

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED May 14, 2026 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:36 AM v No. 374070 Wayne Circuit Court CHRISTOPHER ANDREW CANALES, LC No. 19-002316-01-FC Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BAZZI, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.

BOONSTRA, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority regarding the appropriate scoring of Offense Variable (OV) 4 and OV 14. But I am unable to agree that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exercise its own judgment when resentencing defendant on the torture conviction. Because I would affirm the sentence, I respectfully dissent in part.1 I. ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION First, it is not clear to me that the trial court simply deferred to the predecessor judge’s sentence on the torture conviction while declining to exercise its own discretion. Although the trial court indicated at times during the resentencing hearing that it was going to “respect” the predecessor judge’s sentence (and scoring decisions), I believe that a fair reading of the trial court’s comments in their totality properly reflects that the trial court, after considering all of the arguments raised, expressed its agreement with the predecessor judge’s sentence (and scoring decisions). But even assuming that the trial court simply deferred to the predecessor judge’s sentence, I would find no abuse of discretion because, contrary to the majority’s apparent

It is clear both from defendant’s brief on appeal and from oral argument that defendant’s arguments on appeal relate solely to the sentence on defendant’s torture conviction. Yet it appears that the majority is vacating all of defendant’s sentences and remanding for resentencing generally, despite the limited scope of this appeal. To the extent the majority does so, I again respectfully dissent.

-1- assumption, our prior opinion in this case did not remand the case “in a presentence posture, allowing the trial court to consider every aspect of defendant’s sentences de novo.” People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 112; 933 NW2d 314 (2019) (Lampe II).

Although the majority relies on Lampe II, it is distinguishable from this case. In People v Lampe, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 23, 2016 (Docket No. 326660), p 3 (Lampe I), the defendant challenged his sentences for multiple criminal sexual conduct convictions on the basis that the trial court improperly scored Prior Record Variable (PRV) 5. This Court held that PRV 5 was improperly scored and “[b]ecause this scoring error altered the appropriate guidelines range, defendant [was] entitled to resentencing.” Id. at 4. The opinion did not address any other PRV or OV. Id. The case was merely “[a]ffirmed as to defendant’s convictions, but remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 10. During the defendant Lampe’s resentencing, the trial court reassessed the OVs and imposed an even higher sentence. Lampe II, 327 Mich App at 109-111. On Lampe’s second appeal, this Court explained that “[b]y ordering ‘resentencing’ without any specific instructions or any prohibitions on scoring OVs, this Court returned the case to the trial court in a presentence posture, allowing the trial court to consider every aspect of defendant’s sentences de novo.” Id. at 112.

But this Court did provide specific instructions when it remanded this case for resentencing. Our prior opinion specifically stated that “remand is appropriate for the task of correcting the PSIR to omit the violent offender provision of the fourth-offense habitual offender statute for all of defendant’s felony convictions, except AWIGBH, and to correct the maximum sentence for defendant’s felonious assault conviction.” People v Canales, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 22, 2021 (Docket No. 350536) (Canales I), p 13. This Court held that the trial court had misinterpreted MCL 769.12(1)(a) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment for violent habitual offenders convicted of an enumerated “serious crime”), Canales I, unpub op at 13, and had “proceeded to sentence defendant to ‘the minimum of 25 years’ for felonious assault, AWIGBH, unlawful imprisonment, and unarmed robbery” even though the mandatory minimum only applied to AWIGBH. Id. This Court in Canales I therefore only “[r]emanded to the extent necessary to correct the PSIR and to resentence defendant under the correct and applicable statutes.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

Because this Court in Canales I (unlike in Lampe I) provided specific instructions to the trial court on remand, Lampe II’s predicate for deeming a case remanded “in a presentence posture, allowing the trial court to consider every aspect of defendant’s sentences de novo,” Lampe II, 327 Mich App at 112, is lacking in the matter now before us.

“When an appellate court remands a case with specific instructions, it is improper for a lower court to exceed the scope of the order.” People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 714; 825 NW2d 623 (2012). Furthermore, “[w]here a court imposes a sentence that is partially invalid, the Legislature has provided that the sentence is not to be wholly reversed and annulled, but rather is to be set aside only in respect to the unlawful excess. MCL 769.24.” People v Thomas, 447 Mich 390, 393; 523 NW2d 215 (1994) (quotation marks omitted). In Thomas, the defendant was sentenced to 60 to 75 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 391. He successfully challenged that sentence

-2- as a violation of the Tanner rule,2 and in response, the trial court resentenced him to 60 to 90 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 391-392. Our Supreme Court held that the trial court had no authority to correct the maximum sentence, explaining that “there was no legal flaw in the 75-year maximum sentence originally imposed by the court. The only aspect of the sentence that was unlawfully excessive was the final ten years of the 60-year minimum term. Only to that extent was the original sentence invalid, and subject to correction.” Id. at 393-394.

In this case, our prior opinion in Canales I only found error with respect to the torture sentence to the extent that the trial court mistakenly thought that the 25-year (300-month) mandatory minimum sentence applied to all felony convictions, not just AWIGBH. It remanded only “to the extent necessary to correct the PSIR and to resentence defendant under the correct and applicable statutes,” Canales, unpub op at 14, not for a general resentencing. But the trial court’s mistaken impression (about the applicability of the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence) was inconsequential to defendant’s sentence on the torture conviction. The sentencing guidelines for defendant’s torture conviction provided for a minimum sentence of 270 to 900 months’ (or life) imprisonment. See MCL 777.62; MCL 777.21(3)(c). The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 to years’ imprisonment (600 to 900 months) for that conviction, which was well within the applicable sentencing guidelines. And as the majority explains, although the predecessor judge’s assessment of OV 4 was erroneous, that error also did not affect the sentencing guidelines for the torture conviction, and therefore did not require resentencing. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 91-92; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). The predecessor judge sentenced defendant within the applicable guidelines regardless of any mistaken assumption about mandatory minimum sentences. And as explained in the next section of this opinion, the sentence imposed was not disproportionate to the offense. Therefore, aside from correcting the PSIR as this Court ordered in Canales I, the torture sentence remained valid. Given this Court’s specific instruction to the trial court on remand, it had no available option other than to respect the predecessor judge’s sentence on the torture conviction. See MCR 6.429(A) (“The court may not modify a valid sentence after it has been imposed except as provided by law.”). In other words, the trial court did not fail to exercise its discretion because it had no discretion to exercise in the first place.3

People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972) (“[A]ny sentence which provides for a minimum exceeding two-thirds of the maximum is improper as failing to comply with the indeterminate sentence act.”).

Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to articulate the reasons for its sentence. “The articulation requirement is satisfied if the trial court expressly relies on the sentencing guidelines in imposing the sentence or if it is clear from the context of the remarks preceding the sentence that the trial court relied on the sentencing guidelines.” People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 313; 715 NW2d 377 (2006). During the initial sentencing, the trial court told the parties, “let’s deal with the sentencing information report, the guidelines.” After addressing concerns with the PRV and OV scoring, it specifically confirmed the total OV score, the guidelines range for the torture conviction, and defendant’s habitual-offender status. It was abundantly clear from the context of the proceeding that the trial court heavily relied on the sentencing guidelines when imposing the torture sentence, so further articulation of its reasoning was unnecessary.

-3- II. PROPORTIONALITY Defendant also argues that his sentence for the torture conviction was disproportionate, despite falling within the sentencing guidelines. The majority does not reach this issue, but I will address it to further demonstrate that the sentence was not unlawfully excessive, such that the trial court again could not have deviated from the predecessor judge’s valid sentence.

A trial court must take the defendant’s sentencing guidelines into account when considering an appropriate sentence. People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 475; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). But the guidelines are only advisory—the trial court may deviate from the guidelines if the circumstances justify a harsher or more lenient sentence. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 399; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). The proportionality of a sentence “must be measured according to the offense and the offender, not according to the sentence’s relationship to the guidelines.” People v Posey, 512 Mich 317, 356; 1 NW3d 101 (2023) (opinion by BOLDEN, J.). But the guidelines are still highly indicative of a reasonable sentence—a sentence within the guidelines is presumed proportionate, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. Id. at 359. “In order to overcome the presumption that the sentence is proportionate, a defendant must present unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.”

People v Bowling, 299 Mich App 552, 558; 830 NW2d 800 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

When reviewing a within-guidelines sentence for proportionality, we may consider any relevant factor, including but not limited to the following: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. [People v Ventour, 349 Mich App 417, 430; 27 NW3d 660 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

Adjusting to correct the trial court’s error in scoring OV 4 does not change defendant’s guidelines range for the minimum sentence of the torture conviction: 270 to 900 months’ or life imprisonment. See MCL 777.62; MCL 777.21(3)(c). The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum term of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment (600 to 900 months) for that conviction, which was within the guidelines. Accordingly, defendant must overcome the presumption that his sentence was proportionate. See Posey, 512 Mich at 359.

But defendant has not presented any unusual circumstances that would rebut that presumption. The victim’s torturing was especially brutal. The victim testified that defendant and his friend (later a codefendant) approached him to collect the $20 that he owed to another person.

When the victim said that he did not have any money, they dragged him into a nearby apartment building, where they beat him and removed his clothes. Defendant escalated the violence when he picked up a stick and beat the victim so hard that the stick broke. Defendant also lit the victim’s face on fire and forced him under hot water. Defendant acknowledges the severity of the offense, but he does not articulate how the sentencing guidelines failed to adequately assess an appropriate

-4- sentence. During his initial sentencing, defendant raised factors not considered by the guidelines, including that defendant was remorseful, that the victim’s injuries appeared fully healed at the time of the trial and were not permanent or extensive, that defendant was on parole and would already be serving a sentence for an unrelated offense, and that defendant allegedly never received some photographs of the victim’s injuries that were introduced at trial. None of these circumstances is sufficiently unusual to render the within-guidelines sentence disproportionate, especially when the minimum sentence was just barely past the middle of the guidelines.4 III. CONCLUSION I agree with the majority regarding the appropriate scoring of OV 4 and OV 14. But because our prior opinion in this case provided specific instructions to the trial court on remand, the trial court was not required (or allowed) to sentence defendant de novo on all convictions and did not abuse its discretion even if it simply deferred to the predecessor judge’s sentencing decisions. And because the sentence on defendant’s torture conviction was not disproportionate, there was no basis for correcting it on remand. Even if the trial court deferred to the previously imposed, valid sentence, that was the only principled outcome given the posture of this case, and there consequently was no abuse of discretion. For these reasons, I would affirm the sentence on defendant’s torture conviction.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

Notably, defense counsel requested during the resentencing hearing that defendant be resentenced “towards the middle of the guidelines” on all convictions except AWIGBH. The trial court’s sentence substantially aligned with that request.

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If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED May 14, 2026 Plaintiff-Appellee, 9:36 AM v No. 374070 Wayne Circuit Court CHRISTOPHER ANDREW CANALES, LC No. 19-002316-01-FC Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BAZZI, P.J., and BOONSTRA and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant previously appealed his conviction and sentence for various offenses including torture and assault. This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded the case for resentencing because mistakes in defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) resulted in errors in defendant’s sentencing. People v Canales, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 22, 2021 (Docket No. 350536), p 14. Defendant was resentenced in the trial court and now appeals again, arguing that his sentencing guidelines were incorrectly scored and that the trial court abused its discretion. Although the trial court’s error in scoring offense variable (OV) 4 does not affect defendant’s sentencing-guidelines range, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for a second resentencing because the trial court failed to exercise its own discretion when it resentenced defendant.

I. BACKGROUND A jury convicted defendant of torture, MCL 750.85; unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b; assault with intent to do great bodily harm (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84; felonious assault, MCL 750.82; and assault or assault and battery (assault and battery), MCL 750.81. The victim testified at trial about the attack by defendant and another offender, often referring to the two offenders as a collective.1 When it came to defendant specifically, the victim testified that he recognized defendant but not the other offender and

For a more complete history of the underlying facts of this case, see Canales, unpub op at 2-6.

-1- defendant began beating the victim with a stick before the other offender joined. According to the victim, defendant told the victim that he was not leaving until defendant received money and that if the victim did not remain quiet, defendant was going to kill him.

When the trial court originally sentenced defendant, the trial court scored OV 14 at 10 points and scored OV 4 at 10 points at the prosecutor’s request, thereby rejecting defendant’s argument that there was a lack of testimony of psychological injury. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, and this Court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing based on an error in the PSIR and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to address this error. Canales, unpub op at 1. Defendant’s PSIR incorrectly stated that all of his felony convictions were subject to 25-year mandatory-minimum sentences under MCL 769.12(1)(a), so this Court directed the trial court “to correct the PSIR and to resentence defendant under the correct and applicable statutes.” Id. at 12-14.

On remand, the trial court, with a different judge than the one who originally sentenced defendant, corrected the PSIR with the parties and resentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for the torture conviction, 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the unarmed-robbery conviction, 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the unlawful-imprisonment conviction, 25 to 37 years’ imprisonment for the AWIGBH conviction, 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the felonious-assault conviction, and 93 days in jail for the assault-and-battery conviction. After correcting the PSIR, the trial court asked the parties whether they had any issues with the scoring of the offense variables contained in the PSIR. Defendant raised his objections to several of the offense variables and the trial court responded that it was going to “respect” the previous judge’s scoring and scored the offense variables at 115 points in total. Specifically, defendant argued that there was nothing in the victim’s testimony or the PSIR that indicated that the victim suffered any sort of psychological injury; although the trial court noted defendant’s objection, the trial court left the previous judge’s scoring of OV 4 at 10 points. When the trial court sentenced defendant on his torture conviction, the trial court stated that it was “going to respect the sentence of [the previous judge] and sentence the defendant to a minimum of 50 years, a maximum of 75 years.”

Defendant now appeals for a second time.

II. ANALYSIS A. SENTENCING GUIDELINES SCORING On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it assessed OV 4 and OV 14.

We review for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact, which must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). The trial court committed clear error if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Davis, 509 Mich 52, 68; 983 NW2d 325 (2022). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” People v Hutcheson, 308 Mich App 10, 13; 865 NW2d 44 (2014). “The trial court may rely on reasonable inferences arising from the record evidence to sustain the scoring of an offense variable.” People v Earl, 297 Mich App 104, 109; 822 NW2d 271 (2012).

-2- OV 4 is scored at 10 points if the victim suffered a “serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment.” MCL 777.34(1)(a). Possible psychological effects include “personality changes, anger, fright, or feelings of being hurt, unsafe, or violated.” People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 247; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). Although the victim is not required to have previously sought treatment, MCL 777.34(2), “a court cannot merely assume that a victim has suffered a ‘serious psychological injury’ solely because of the characteristics of the crime,” People v White, 501 Mich 160, 164-165; 905 NW2d 228 (2017).

Both parties agree in their briefing on appeal that the trial court erred in its assessment of OV 4. The record includes no testimony that describes serious psychological injury incurred by the victim. The prosecutor on appeal claims that victim testified during the preliminary examination that he was afraid during the attack but even the prosecutor acknowledges that this alone is insufficient to find serious psychological injury. See id. (“While crime victims are often obviously, and understandably, frightened when a crime is being perpetrated, this fear does not necessarily result in a ‘serious psychological injury.’”). The factual finding of the trial court relating to OV 4 is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. OV 4 should have been scored at 0 points based on a lack of evidence of a serious psychological injury, and the trial court erred by scoring it at 10 points.

In addition to OV 4, defendant on appeal argues that the trial court incorrectly scored OV 14. OV 14 is scored at 10 points if, when considering the entire criminal transaction, defendant “was a leader in a multiple offender situation.” MCL 777.44. When scoring OV 14, “a trial court should consider whether the defendant acted first or gave directions or was otherwise a primary causal or coordinating agent.” People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 22; 909 NW2d 24 (2017) (cleaned up). If there were only two offenders involved in the situation, then only one may be considered the leader. People v Baskerville, 333 Mich App 276, 300; 963 NW2d 620 (2020).

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant played a leadership role in the offenses. The victim testified that defendant was the offender who made threats toward the victim and the first offender to beat the victim with a stick. Further, because the victim knew defendant before the attack, it was not unreasonable to infer that defendant caused the initial contact with the victim. Because there was evidence that defendant guided or initiated the attack on the victim, including escalating the situation with a stick and threats, it was not clear error for the trial court to score OV 14 at 10 points. See People v Rhodes, 305 Mich App 85, 90-91; 849 NW2d 417 (2014).

B. ABUSE OF DISCRETION In addition to guidelines scoring, defendant on appeal argues that the trial court failed to exercise its own judgment when resentencing defendant. We review this claim for an abuse of discretion. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 268-270; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). We review de novo whether the trial court followed this Court’s ruling on remand. People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 111; 933 NW2d 314 (2019).

-3- By vacating and remanding for resentencing “without any specific instructions or any prohibitions on scoring OVs, this Court returned the case to the trial court in a presentence posture, allowing the trial court to consider every aspect of defendant’s sentences de novo.” Id. at 112.

With a de novo resentencing, the trial court is “to make the sentencing decision anew, without any respect for the prior (now invalid) sentence.” People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 307; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). The trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion when it has an affirmative obligation to do so is an abuse of that discretion. People v Stafford, 434 Mich 125, 134 n 4; 450 NW2d 559 (1990). For example, the trial court abuses its discretion if it defers to the judgment of a prior court to such an extent that it was “not engaging in its own analysis and . . . not making its own independent determination on the issue.” People v Grant, 329 Mich App 626, 638; 944 NW2d 172 (2019).

Here, the record confirms that the trial court did not use its own discretion when it resentenced defendant. When responding to several of defendant’s arguments, including the erroneously scored OV 4, the trial court stated that it was respecting the previous judge’s decisions on the issues without referring to any evidence, analyses, or consideration of the arguments. The same sentiment was repeated when the trial court rendered the new sentence for the torture conviction: “the court is going to respect the sentence of [the previous judge] and sentence the defendant to a minimum of 50 years, a maximum of 75 years.”

Although it may not be necessary for the trial court to state explicitly all of its findings when sentencing, see People v Posey (On Remand), 349 Mich App 199, 207; 27 NW3d 137 (2023), the trial court “must justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review,” People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). By simply deferring in large part to the prior judge’s sentencing decisions, the trial court did not exercise its own discretion, nor did the trial court provide sufficient explanation for our review on appeal.

Given the error in scoring OV 4 and the trial court’s abuse of discretion in deferring to the prior judge, we vacate defendant’s sentences and remand for resentencing. On remand, the prosecutor is free to argue for the same or similar sentences as those now vacated, and we offer no opinion on the appropriateness of those sentences, given the characteristics of this offender and these offenses.

Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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