ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PROHIBIT DEFENDANT FROM INTRODUCING PLAINTIFF’S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES, NUMBERED 38 and 39, INTO EVIDENCE

On August 8, 1985, Plaintiff, Sandra Fiarman, filed a Motion in Limine, seeking to prohibit Defendant from introducing into evidence two of her answers to Defendant’s second set of interrogatories. In response to interrogatory numbers 38 and 39, Plaintiff stated what she believed to be the amount of damages she sustained as a result of her allegedly discriminatory employment termination. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s sole purpose for posing the questions was to determine whether a settlement of the lawsuit could be achieved.

At the hearing held on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories before a Magistrate on May 4, 1985, Defendant’s counsel stated that one of the purposes of discovery is to secure information that may lead to a settlement.1 In opposition to the instant motion, Defendant assumed a contrary position, claiming that the information concerning the value of the case was not presented to it during settlement negotiations.

Analogizing the factual scenario to the typical offer to compromise protected by F.R.E. 408,2 the Court holds that it would be unfair for Defendant to reveal to the jury the value that Plaintiff placed on her case, when the value was stated in response to a discovery request.3 Under the circumstances of the case, Plaintiff’s assessment' of the amount of damages she allegedly sustained is simply not relevant to the lawsuit, since the amount she set may have been motivated by a desire for settlement rather than from a concession of weakness. Defendant’s interrogatory request placed Plaintiff in a Hobson’s choice: if she set a low value, Defendant could argue that Plaintiff recognized the minimal value of the case; if she set an inflated value, Defendant could attack it with the hope of demonstrating the absurdity and unreasonableness of Plaintiff’s position. The damages sought by Plaintiff for mental anguish and emotional distress, unlike claims for a simple breach of contract, are not readily quantifiable.

In view of the foregoing analysis, the Court holds, pursuant to F.R.E. 403, that the probative value, if any, of Plaintiff’s Answers to Defendant’s Second Set of Interrogatories numbered 38 and 39 is greatly outweighed by the unfairness that Plaintiff would incur by the admission of the *112evidence. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Motion to prohibit Defendant from introducing her answers to the two aforementioned interrogatories is GRANTED.

So Ordered.