UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______

JOSEPH MALATAMBAN RAAB,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:19-cv-237

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

JAMES P. LAMBROS et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A. The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion I. Factual allegations At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint, he was a pretrial detainee in the Chippewa County Jail. Since filing, Plaintiff has entered a plea (Supplement, ECF No. 8, PageID.56), and, apparently, awaits sentencing. Nonetheless, presently, he is still housed in the Chippewa County Jail. Plaintiff sues Judge James P. Lambros of the Chippewa Circuit Court, Chippewa County Prosecutor Robert Stratton, III, Chippewa County Chief Assistant Prosecutor Jillian Sadler, and Plaintiff’s appointed defense counsel, Sara R. MacGregor. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Lambros, Prosecutor Sadler, and defense counsel MacGregor all conspired to, and actually did, violate his constitutional rights in connection with

his criminal prosecution in the Chippewa County Circuit Court. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of one million dollars from each Defendant. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly,

; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal,

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating

federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and, because Defendants were involved in the hearing on a denial of a motion to suppress, his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. III. Defendant MacGregor In addition to alleging the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution, to state a claim under

, Plaintiff must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.,

(6th Cir. 2009); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). In order for a private party’s conduct to be under color of state law, it must be “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

(1982); Street,

. There must be “a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of [the defendant] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,

(1974)). Plaintiff cannot show that his court-appointed attorney acted under color of state law. In Polk Cty. v. Dodson,

(1981), the Supreme Court held that defense counsel perform a private, not an official, function: In our system[,] a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State. The system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness. But it posits that a defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing “the undivided interest of his client.” This is essentially a private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not needed.

(footnotes omitted). The Polk County Court further held that this is true even of the state-appointed and state-paid public defender.

. The Court said that, once a lawyer undertakes the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serves in a legal aid or defender program.

. The Court held that, even though a public defender is paid by the state, he or she does not act under color of state law in representing the accused.

. Rather, defense counsel—whether privately retained or paid by the state—acts purely on behalf of the client and free from state control.

The Sixth Circuit has adhered to the holding in Polk County in numerous decisions. See, e.g., Floyd v. Cty. of Kent,

(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that, when performing traditional functions as counsel, a public defender is not a state actor); Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Defender,

(6th Cir. 2007) (same); Harmon v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas,

(6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s court- appointed attorney does not act under color of state law, and no claim under § 1983 can be maintained against her. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims of fraud and legal malpractice, these claims arise solely under state law. Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor,

(6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit has stated that district courts should generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under these circumstances. See Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp.,

(6th Cir. 1993); Hawley v. Burke, No. 97-1853,

, at *1-2 (6th Cir. June 18, 1998). Accordingly, any state-law claims against Defendant MacGregor will be dismissed without prejudice. IV. Immunity A. Judicial immunity Plaintiff claims that Judge Lambros violated his due process rights when he presided over Plaintiff’s motion to suppress certain evidence in Plaintiff’s criminal trial and then

denied relief. Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages. Mireles v. Waco,

(1991) (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”) (internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington,

(6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Winchell,

(6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. Mireles,

; see Forrester v. White,

(1988) (noting that immunity is grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”). Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 12. Plaintiff’s allegations clearly fail to implicate either of the exceptions to judicial immunity. There is no doubt that presiding over and deciding Plaintiff’s suppression motion were judicial acts and that Judge Lambros was acting within his jurisdiction in doing so. Accordingly, Judge Lambros is absolutely immune from liability. Because Judge Lambros is clearly immune from liability in this case, Plaintiff failed to state a claim for monetary damages against him.

(e)(2)(B)(iii). B. Prosecutorial immunity Prosecutors Stratton and Sadler are also entitled to absolute immunity for actions in prosecuting the criminal action against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court embraces a functional approach to determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity. Kalina v. Fletcher,

(1997); Burns v. Reed,

(1991); Forrester v. White,

(1988); accord Koubriti v. Convertino,

(6th Cir. 2010); Lomaz v. Hennosy,

(6th Cir. 1998). Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when performing the traditional functions of an advocate. Kalina,

; Spurlock v. Thompson,

(6th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Hollenbach,

(6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman,

(1976); Lomaz,

. Acts which occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as advocate are entitled to protection of absolute immunity, in contrast to investigatory or administrative functions that are normally performed by a detective or police officer. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,

(1993); Grant,

. In the Sixth Circuit, the focus of the inquiry is

how closely related the prosecutor’s conduct is to his role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Spurlock,

; Ireland v. Tunis,

(6th Cir. 1997). Obviously, Stratton’s selection of Defendant Sadler to present the state’s position in the suppression hearing and Sadler’s presentation of that position are part of the prosecutorial role as an advocate. Accordingly, Defendants Stratton and Sadler are entitled to immunity and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for monetary damages against them. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s claims under

against all Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff’s state law claims, if any, against Defendant MacGregor will be dismissed without prejudice because the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore,

, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by

(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: January 10, 2020 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge