UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

CLEOPHUS LEMONT DENTMOND,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:20-cv-293

v. Honorable Janet T. Neff

MONTCALM COUNTY JAIL,

Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion I. Factual allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Charles Egeler Reception & Guidance Center (RGC) in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Montcalm County Jail. Plaintiff sues the Montcalm County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that, on December 5, 2019, he was assaulted by another jail inmate, resulting in an injury to the upper right side of Plaintiff’s head that required eight stitches. Plaintiff contends that, while he was being transported to the hospital, Montcalm County Deputy Evans

told Plaintiff that he and other deputies on duty at the time had been listening to and watching the verbal altercation for about 10 minutes before it escalated into a physical assault. Plaintiff also alleges that other inmates have told him that unknown officers had admitted that they were waiting outside the pod and hoping that a fight would happen, so that they could use their tasers. Plaintiff alleges that the deputies were deliberately indifferent to his safety. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. II. Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While

a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly,

; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal,

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). Plaintiff sues the Montcalm County Jail. The jail is a building, not an entity capable

of being sued in its own right. However, construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint with all required liberality, Haines,

, the Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to sue Montcalm County. Montcalm County may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under § 1983. See Connick v. Thompson,

(2011); City of Canton v. Harris,

(1989); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1978). Instead, a county is liable only when its official policy or custom causes the injury.

Plaintiff’s allegations against the county essentially rest on a theory of vicarious liability and therefore do not state a claim.

To the extent that Plaintiff suggests the existence of a custom of permitting the conduct he alleges, his allegations are wholly conclusory. As the Supreme Court has instructed, to demonstrate that a municipality had an unlawful custom, a plaintiff must show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to “practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick,

. Plaintiff cites no prior incidents demonstrating a widespread pattern. He merely implies that such a pattern exists. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail

to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal,

; Twombly,

(2007). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against the Montcalm County Jail or Montcalm County. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate

filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore,

, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by

(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: May 19, 2020 /s/ Janet T. Neff Janet T. Neff United States District Judge