UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

CLINTON MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-175

v. Honorable Ray Kent

MATT MACAULEY et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to

(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act,

(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”

. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”

(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless

a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all

proceedings in this case under

(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”

(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood,

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues IBC Warden Matt Macauley and IBC Assistant Deputy Warden S. Jones. Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities only. (Compl., ECF No. 1,

PageID.2.)

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.,

(7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under

(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King,

, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp,

, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). Plaintiff alleges that on August 1, 2022, he was sent to administrative segregation to quarantine following a COVID-19 exposure. (Id., PageID.3.)2 Plaintiff’s property was taken from him. He had nothing but his bedroll during his stay in segregation. When he returned to general population after 12 days, he did not receive his property back—at least not any of his property with value. He filed a claim for the loss, but heard nothing back. He filed forms to obtain new

clothing—again, no response. He filed a grievance to no avail. Plaintiff convinced his mother to call the prison. His mother also “got the run around,” so she wrote a complaint to Lansing. (Id.) The Assistant Deputy Director’s office called IBC and directed them to issue Plaintiff clothing. When Plaintiff was called to the quartermaster to obtain his clothing he was threatened: “You don’t make any friends by doing this.” (Id.) He was transferred to AMF about 10 days later. With regard to the involvement of the Defendants, Plaintiff states: “ADW Jones was known for doing retaliatory things like this as well as being a co-signer on my grievance in this matter and sitting on [the Security Classification Committee]. The Warden[,] Matt Macauley[,] is

responsible for the culture of corruption at this facility.” (Id.) The form complaint invites the prisoner to state what he wants the court to do. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff’s initial response is that he “want[s] the abuses to stop.” (Id.) The Court will address that statement as a request for injunctive relief. In addition, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) Failure to state a claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

2 All of Plaintiff’s factual allegations appear on the third page of the complaint.

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of

prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). Retaliation Plaintiff’s single sentence allegation for each of the two Defendants is not particularly illuminating.3 Because Plaintiff uses the word “retaliatory,” the Court presumes Plaintiff is attempting to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Jones. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Moreover, because Defendant Macauley “is responsible for the culture of

corruption” at IBC, the Court presumes that Plaintiff seeks to impose liability for Jones’s allegedly wrongful actions on Macauley. (Id.) Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,

(6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct.

Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s

3 The purportedly retaliatory transfer is not the only difficulty that Plaintiff faced. He notes that he lost his property and contends that his reimbursement claim and subsequent grievance were mishandled. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jones was “a cosigner on [Plaintiff’s grievance,” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3), a claim that is addressed below. But Plaintiff does not allege facts to support an inference that Defendant Jones participated in any of Plaintiff’s other difficulties. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly,

(holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson,

(6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp.,

(6th Cir. 2002)). To the extent Plaintiff intended to hold Defendant Jones to account for any of the wrongs Plaintiff claims were perpetrated against him other than the transfer and the potential mishandling of the grievance, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell,

(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

(1977)). Plaintiff alleges that he talked his mother into calling the prison about Plaintiff’s problem with the quartermaster. He reports that she “got the run around.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) That made Plaintiff’s mother so upset that she wrote a letter to Lansing. That letter apparently

prompted an MDOC assistant deputy director’s office to contact IBC. Only then did Plaintiff get his clothing. But when he was called to the quartermaster, he was threatened: “you didn’t make any friends by doing this.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not identify the threatener. For purposes of this preliminary review, the Court will presume that Plaintiff’s contact with his mother was protected conduct. And even accepting that a transfer to the Baraga Correctional Facility was “adverse action.” Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support the inference that Defendant Jones—if he was the moving force behind the transfer—moved Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff talking to his mother about the clothing problem or his mother talking to “Lansing” about the clothing problem. Plaintiff offers only that Jones “was known for doing

retaliatory things like this.” (Id.) It is well recognized that “retaliation” is easy to allege and that it can seldom be demonstrated by direct evidence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter,

(6th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Lane,

(7th Cir. 1987). “[A]lleging merely the ultimate fact of retaliation is insufficient.” Murphy,

. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” Harbin-Bey,

(quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch,

, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also Murray v. Unknown Evert,

(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that in complaints screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (citations omitted)); Lewis v. Jarvie,

(6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive § 1915A screening].” (citing Crawford-El v. Britton,

(1998))). Plaintiff merely alleges the ultimate fact of retaliation in this action. He has not presented any facts to support his

conclusion that Defendant Jones retaliated against him because he complained to his mother about the quartermaster. Accordingly, his speculative allegation fails to state a claim against Defendant Jones. Mishandling the Grievance Plaintiff alleges a few words about his clothing grievance: “Grievance Filed. Denied said ***** illegible.” Neither was true.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)4 Defendant Jones was a co- signer on the grievance response. (Id.) Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell,

(6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,

. Stating that Defendant Jones signed a grievance fails to state a claim. Moreover, there is no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms,

(1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer,

(6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy,

, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson, No. 99-

4 The word replaced with asterisks is illegible. 3562,

, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan,

(7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice,

(4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona,

(1983); Keenan v. Marker,

(6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93- 2411,

(6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in

the grievance process, any mishandling of Plaintiff’s grievance couldnot deprive him of due process. Similarly, mishandling of a grievance would not violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition the government. The First Amendment “right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn,

(6th Cir. 1999); see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight,

(1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond). For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s brief statement regarding Defendant Jones’s role in

resolving Plaintiff’s grievance fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Supervisory Liability Plaintiff does not suggest that Warden Macauley played any role in the transfer or the retaliation or the grievance. Instead, Plaintiff claims Macauley is responsible for the entire culture of corruption at IBC, presumably including the purportedly retaliatory transfer and the other incidents set forth in the complaint. Essentially, Plaintiff is alleging that Macauley may be liable because he failed to adequately supervise his subordinates. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal,

; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1978); Everson v. Leis,

(6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight,

, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,

(6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter,

; Greene,

; Summers v. Leis,

(6th Cir. 2004). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,

. Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Macauley took any action, much less a constitution-violating action, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Macauley. Official Capacity Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan,

, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff sues both Defendants in only their respective official capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit brought against the governmental entity: in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989); Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994). An official- capacity defendant is absolutely immune from monetary damages. Will,

; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr.,

(6th Cir. 1998); Wells v. Brown,

, 592–93 (6th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the additional reason that Defendants, sued only in their official capacities, are

absolutely immune from monetary damages. An official capacity action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex Parte Young,

, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). Importantly, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks,

, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,

(2002)). “If the complaint fails to ‘make clear what those ongoing violations are,’ the exception does not apply.” Morgan v. Bd. or

Pro. Resp. of the Supreme Ct. of Tenn.,

, 515 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Boler v. Earley,

(6th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law by these Defendants. Therefore, his official capacity claim for injunctive relief against Defendants in their respective official capacities is barred by sovereign immunity and he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see

McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum. This is a dismissal as described by

(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: February 29, 2024 /s/ Ray Kent Ray Kent United States Magistrate Judge