UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

MICHAEL JONES,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-272 v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou MTU CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim and as frivolous. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues MTU and MTU Correctional Officer Unknown Alexander. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 2.) In Plaintiff’s complaint, he states, in sum: Mr. Alexander performed a cell inspection in building C room #22 in camera plain view. He stole a pair of green shorts from assigned housing unit, also, one long john thermal top came up missing as well. This was during MDOC day shift (1st shift) in the morning of January 31st 2024. (Id., PageID.3 (no corrections made).) The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a Fourth Amendment claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. As relief, Plaintiff seeks “the grand prize,” which the Court construes as a request for monetary damages. (Id., PageID.4.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility

standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). A. Defendant MTU In this action, Plaintiff names MTU as a Defendant. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) However, as explained below, Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against MTU itself or the MDOC.

As an initial matter, MTU is not a separate entity capable of being sued. See, e.g., Ryan v. Corizon Health Care, No. 1:13-cv-525,

(W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2013) (discussing that “individual prisons named as Defendants . . . (ICF, IBC, LRF and RGC) are buildings used by the MDOC to house prisoners,” and “[t]hey are not the proper public entity for suit”); Poole v. Michigan Reformatory, No. 09-CV-13093,

, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11. 2009) (“Plaintiff names the Michigan Reformatory, the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility, and the Macomb Correctional Facility as defendants in this action. Those entities, however, are institutions operated by the MDOC and are not . . . legal entities subject to suit . . . .”). Additionally, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) and MTU are not “persons” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

(2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989)); Harrison v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 2013); Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 2006). And, regardless, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant MTU fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff fails to name

Defendant MTU in the body of his complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights). Moreover, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of

Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison,

; Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan,

, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant MTU will be dismissed. B. Defendant Alexander Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Alexander “performed a cell inspection” of Plaintiff’s cell on January 31, 2024, and that during the search, Defendant Alexander “stole a pair of green shorts” and a “long john thermal top” from Plaintiff’s cell. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) The Court construes this allegation to raise both a Fourth Amendment claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. 1. Fourth Amendment Claim In Hudson v. Palmer,

(1984), the United States Supreme Court considered

and rejected a Fourth Amendment claim based upon a prison official searching a prisoner’s cell and destroying some of his legal papers in the process.

. The prisoner claimed that the prison official’s conduct constituted an unreasonable search and seizure of his property, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

. The Supreme Court disagreed. First, the Supreme Court recognized that while prisoners are not beyond the reach of the Constitution, “curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a ‘myriad of institutional needs and objectives’ of prison facilities, . . . chief among which is internal security.”

at 523–24 (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court then determined that the official’s search of the prisoner’s cell did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might

have in his prison cell.”

. According to the Court, “[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.”

at 527– 28. For similar reasons, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment “does not protect against seizures in a prison cell.”

at 528 n.8. According to the Court, “[p]rison officials must be free to seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional interests.”

Here, Plaintiff does not provide any allegations about whether he was permitted to have the items that Defendant Alexander removed from Plaintiff’s cell during the search. Regardless, under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, applying Hudson to Plaintiff’s case, the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the search of Plaintiff’s cell, and it did not prevent the confiscation of the items in Plaintiff’s cell. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed. 2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim As to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, Plaintiff’s claim that

Defendant Alexander deprived him of property without due process of law is barred by the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor,

(1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams,

(1986). Under Parratt, an individual deprived of property by a “random and unauthorized act” of a state employee cannot maintain a federal due process claim unless the state fails to afford an adequate post-deprivation remedy. If an adequate post-deprivation remedy exists, the deprivation, while real, is not “without due process of law.” Id. at 537. This doctrine applies to both negligent and intentional deprivations of property, as long as the deprivation was not pursuant to an established state procedure. See Hudson v. Palmer,

, 530–36 (1984). Plaintiff must plead and prove the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. See Copeland v. Machulis,

, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1995); Gibbs v. Hopkins,

(6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit has noted that a prisoner’s failure to sustain this burden requires dismissal of his § 1983 due process action. See Brooks v. Dutton,

(6th Cir. 1985). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that his state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Plaintiff has available to him numerous state post-deprivation remedies. First, a prisoner who incurs a loss through no fault of his own may petition the institution’s Prisoner Benefit Fund for compensation. MDOC Policy Directive 04.07.112, ¶ B (eff. Oct. 2, 2023); MDOC Policy Directive 04.02.110, ¶ E (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). Moreover, aggrieved prisoners may submit claims for property loss of less than $1,000.00 to the State Administrative Board. Mich. Comp. Laws. § 600.6419; MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.131 (eff. Mar. 27, 2017). Finally, Michigan law authorizes actions in the Court of Claims asserting tort or contract claims “against the state and any of its departments or officers.”

(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that Michigan provides adequate post-deprivation remedies for deprivation of property. See Copeland,

. Plaintiff alleges no reason why a state-court action would not afford him complete

relief for the deprivations, either negligent or intentional, of his personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Alexander. Duplicative Filing In addition to the above-discussed reasons for dismissal of this action, Plaintiff’s action is subject to dismissal as duplicative of prior cases filed by Plaintiff, which remain pending in this Court. Plaintiffs generally have “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp.,

(3d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). Accordingly, as part of its inherent

power to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

(1976); Missouri v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.,

, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A.,

, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. SEC,

, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). The power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co.,

(1952), and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject matter.” Adam v. Jacobs,

(2d Cir. 1991). In addition, courts have held that a complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be dismissed on PLRA screening as frivolous or malicious. See, e.g., McWilliams v. State of Colo.,

(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed as frivolous or malicious); Cato v. United States,

, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that an action may be dismissed as frivolous

when the complaint “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims” (citations omitted)); Pittman v. Moore,

, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that it is “malicious” to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff); Bailey v. Johnson,

(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that it was appropriate to dismiss a civil rights suit by a prison inmate where the suit was duplicative of facts and allegations made in a previously dismissed suit, and merely named a different defendant whose actions formed a partial basis for the previous suit); Hahn v. Tarnow, No. 06-cv-12814,

, at *3–7 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2006). A complaint is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties, and available

relief do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,

(7th Cir. 1993). Although complaints may not “significantly differ,” they need not be identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint. See, e.g., Bailey,

(holding that a complaint was duplicative although different defendants were named because it “repeat[ed] the same factual allegations” asserted in the earlier case). Here, Plaintiff’s claims regarding Defendant Alexander’s cell search in January of 2024 and the loss of Plaintiff’s personal property during the search are presented in two of Plaintiff’s prior actions, both of which are pending in this Court: (i) Jones v. MDOC et al., No. 1:24-cv-120 (W.D. Mich.),1 and (ii) Jones v. People of the State of Michigan et al., No. 1:24-cv-217 (W.D. Mich.).2 Considering the substantial similarities between the legal claims and factual allegations in the present action and in Plaintiff’s prior actions, the Court concludes that the present complaint is duplicative of Plaintiff’s prior complaints with regard to all of Plaintiff’s present claims.

Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power and the screening provisions of the PLRA, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is wholly duplicative and, therefore, frivolous. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim and as frivolous under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue

1 In action no. 1:24-cv-120, Plaintiff names MTU Correctional Officer Alexander as a defendant, but he does not name MTU as a defendant. See Am. Compl., Jones v. MDOC et al. Jones v. MDOC et al., No. 1:24-cv-120 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2024), (ECF No. 7). The claim presented in the instant action is otherwise identical to the claim presented in action no. 1:24-cv-120. 2 In action no. 1:24-cv-217, Plaintiff does not name either MTU or MTU Correctional Officer Alexander as a defendant; instead, he names the People of the State of Michigan and the MDOC as defendants. See Compl., Jones v. People of the State of Mich. et al., No. 1:24-cv-217 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2024), (ECF No. 1). The claim presented in the instant action is otherwise essentially identical to the claim presented in action no. 1:24-cv-217. Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a dismissal as described by

(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 21, 2024 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE