UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

MAURICE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:24-cv-1114

v. Honorable Phillip J. Green

UNKNOWN BLEDSOE, et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to

(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act,

(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”

. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”

(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil

action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was

made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under

(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”

(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the

same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood,

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from

such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.,

(7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under

(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King,

, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp,

, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). capacity claims against each Defendant. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against the Defendants in their respective personal capacities remain. Discussion I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues ICF Sergeant Unknown Bledsoe and ICF Correctional Officers Unknown Way and Unknown Allen. Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from mental health disorders and takes medication. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) At approximately 10:30 p.m. on February 7, 2024, while in segregation cell I-34, Plaintiff “began to experience anxiety[] and nervous energy.” (Id.) As of that date, Plaintiff had been in segregation for over a year. (Id.) Plaintiff told an officer making rounds that Plaintiff did not feel like living anymore and that he felt alone and isolated. (Id.)

Non-party segregation unit psychologist Vantoff was called to speak to Plaintiff. (Id.) Vantoff determined that Plaintiff was to be put on suicide observation. (Id.) Accordingly, Defendant Bledsoe instructed Plaintiff to come to his cell door to be placed in restraints and put on suicide observation. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to be placed in restraints, and he refused suicide observation. (Id.) An emergency response team (ERT) was assembled to extract Plaintiff from his cell. (Id.) The team deployed three canisters of chemical agents during the extraction. (Id.) Plaintiff was removed from his cell, and he was taken “to the shower

where he was allowed to decontaminate his body.” (Id.) Then Plaintiff was returned to his cell by the three Defendants and the ERT. (Id.) When Plaintiff returned to his cell, he saw that the mattress and blanket had “chemical agent residue” on them. (Id.) Defendants Way and Allen told Plaintiff that “was their ‘get back’ for not uncovering his cell window, refusing to be placed in restraints, and making them suit up.” (Id.) Plaintiff told all three Defendants that the chemical agent was making his skin burn and interfering with his breathing. (Id.)

He asked to have his cell decontaminated. (Id.) They told Plaintiff that “he would have to stay in the cell and suffer.” (Id.) Plaintiff reports that the chemical agent residue burned his feet, back, arms, legs and groin. (Id., PageID.7.) Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the Defendants’ failure to decontaminate the cell. (Id.) Defendants Way and Allen claimed they decontaminated the cell prior to Plaintiff’s return. (Id.) Defendant Bledsoe vouched for them. (Id.) Plaintiff put

in three medical requests seeking treatment for the burns and breathing problems. Healthcare personnel eventually saw him in March or April, but took no further action. (Id.) In late April, Plaintiff was transferred to MBP. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by returning him to the contaminated cell.2 (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages against each Defendant. (Id.)

II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

2 Plaintiff’s allegations are clear with regard to the scope of his claims. He does not indicate that he is suing any Defendant for placing him in segregation, the conditions in segregation, or the duration of his stay there. Similarly, he does not allege that he is suing Defendants for the deployment of chemical agents during the removal. Finally, Plaintiff does not state that he is suing Defendants for the failure to treat his burns or breathing problems. The Court is addressing Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims as he has succinctly stated them in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) unlawfully. ”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well- pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is

entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). Plaintiff invokes the protections of the Eighth Amendment. III. Discussion Plaintiff sues each Defendant for damages arising from the violation of his

Eighth Amendment rights. He sues the Defendants in their respective personal and official capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2, 5.) A. Official Capacity Claims A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity, here the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989); Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune from suit in the federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g.,

Harrison v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan,

, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

(2002) (citing Will,

); Harrison,

.

Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) However, an official capacity defendant who is employed by the state is absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will,

; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr.,

(6th Cir. 1998). And, as noted above, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to his monetary damages claims against the Defendants in their official capacities. B. Personal Capacity Claims Defendants do not have the protection of sovereign immunity in their

respective personal capacities, and they are certainly “persons” and therefore subject to liability under § 1983. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

, 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison

officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson,

(6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes,

). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes,

; see also Wilson v. Yaklich,

, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,

(citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot

every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey,

. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian,

(1992) (quoting Rhodes,

). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”

In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.”

Mingus v. Butler,

, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,

(1994)) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims); see also Helling v. McKinney,

(1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate- indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer,

; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Farmer,

. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”

. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.”

. “[P]rison

officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”

. Although Plaintiff has by no means proven that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety when they returned Plaintiff to his contaminated cell, accepting his allegations as true, his claims are plausible. Accordingly, the Court

will not dismiss those claims on preliminary review. Conclusion The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Further, having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the Defendants. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants in their respective personal capacities remain in the case.

An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: January 13, 2025 /s/ Phillip J. Green PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge