UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______

TORRENCE D. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:24-cv-198

v. Honorable Ray Kent

HEIDI WASHINGTON,

Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. In a separate order, the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to

(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 3.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act,

(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”

. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”

(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non

directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under

(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent

of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”

(c). Because the named Defendant has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that the Defendant is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way the Defendant is not a party who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood,

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi Washington in her individual capacity. Plaintiff alleges that, on August 27, 2024, an unidentified corrections officer improperly operated the control panel, causing a metal door to close on Plaintiff’s leg. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2,

3.) As a result, Plaintiff suffered a ruptured right Achilles tendon (Id., PageID.2.) Plaintiff claims that he is unable to walk properly and continues to experience pain and suffering. (Id., PageID.3.)

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.,

(7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under

(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King,

, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp,

, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Washington failed to properly train corrections officers and brings claims against her for deliberate indifference in the operation of the control panels and the failure to “keep prisoners safe in the MDOC custody.” (Id.) Plaintiff also mentions “discrimination” and “harassment” and various MDOC policies. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to

identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). Here, Plaintiff faults Defendant Washington for the wrongs he suffered at the hands of an unidentified corrections officer. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Washington is responsible for the overall operations of the MDOC, including implementing “a policy of failure to properly train staff of the MDOC to use the control panel properly and not shut the metal doors causing pain and injury.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff also brings a specific claim against Defendant Washington for deliberate indifference related to the operation of the control panels and mentions “discrimination” and “harassment.” (Id., PageID.4.)

Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal,

; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1978); Everson v. Leis,

(6th Cir. 2009). Likewise, “[i]ndividual liability on a failure-to-train or supervise theory ‘must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to control employees.’” Zakora v. Chrisman,

(6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell,

(6th Cir. 1999)); see also Iqbal,

; Monell,

; Everson,

. A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight,

, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,

(6th Cir. 2002). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,

. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis,

(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee,

) (citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty.,

(6th Cir. 2008); see also Copeland v. Machulis,

(6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode,

, 375–76 (1976); Bellamy v. Bradley,

(6th Cir. 1984)); Walton v. City of Southfield,

(6th Cir. 1993); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff,

(6th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege even a single fact that would support his conclusory claim for failure to train. He does not describe the training program in place or its deficiencies and does not allege that Defendant Washington was on notice of a lack of training or of a risk to Plaintiff such that it could be said that Defendant Washington was personally deliberately indifferent to the same. Plaintiff further fails to provide the Court with any facts that would suggest that Defendant Washington personally engaged in any “discrimination” or “harassment” of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678– 79; Twombly,

. Plaintiff’s complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim against Defendant Washington. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against Defendant Washington premised upon the violation of MDOC policies (see ECF No. 1, PageID.4), he may not do so. Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

(1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of state law. Pyles v. Raisor,

(6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1994). Therefore, any assertion that Defendant Washington violated MDOC policy fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore,

. For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a dismissal as described by

(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: February 10, 2025 /s/ Ray Kent Ray Kent United States Magistrate Judge