UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION ______

KEYJUAN LAMAR ALEXANDER,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-17

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

UNKNOWN NACHTMAN et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 3). Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following MBP personnel in their official and personal capacities: Warden Unknown Schroeder, Deputy Warden Unknown

James, Prison Counselor Unknown Leboeuf, and Sergeant Unknown Nachtman. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that on an unknown date, he submitted a grievance concerning the fact that there had been feces on a wall inside his housing until for 65 to 70 days at that point. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff claims that he repeatedly told “staff” about the issue, but that the mess was not cleaned until he reached Step II of the grievance process. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that his Eighth Amendment rights, as well as “their operating procedure,” were violated. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks “compensation.” (Id., PageID.4.) Motion to Appoint Counsel As noted above, Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel to represent him in this

matter. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that his imprisonment “will greatly limit his ability to litigate this case,” and that this matter “will likely involve substantial investigation and discovery.” (Id., PageID.11.) Plaintiff states further that a lawyer would be able to assist in “in the presentation of evidence and the cross[-]examination of opposing witnesses.” (Id.) Indigent parties in civil cases have no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court may, however, request an attorney to serve as counsel, in the Court’s discretion. Abdur-Rahman,

; Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604–05; see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,

(1989). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court should consider the complexity of the issues, the procedural posture of the case, and Plaintiff’s apparent ability to prosecute the action

without the help of counsel. See Lavado,

. The Court has carefully considered these factors and determines that, at this stage of the case, the assistance of counsel does not appear necessary to the proper presentation of Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 3) will, therefore, be denied. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by

a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989); Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994). The states and their

departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

(2002) (citing Will,

); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771. Here, Plaintiff seeks “compensation.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities, and he

fails to state a claim against Defendants in their official capacities upon which relief can be granted. B. Personal Capacity Claims As set forth supra, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights, as well as MDOC operating procedures. The Court construes Plaintiff to bring both of these claims under § 1983. As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to name the Defendants in the body of his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly,

(holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations

of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Lanman v. Hinson,

(6th Cir. 2008) (citing Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psych. Hosp.,

(6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Frazier v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402,

, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (citing Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn.,

(6th Cir. 1998)) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010,

(6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.”).

While Plaintiff references “staff” in the body of his complaint, “[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or officers or staff] does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady,

(6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s reference to “staff” is insufficient to show that any of the individual Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights. And, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants fall far short of the minimal pleading standards set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Defendants upon

which relief may be granted. Conclusion The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 3) for the reasons set forth above. Moreover, having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a dismissal as described by

(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 19, 2025 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge