UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

DEQUINDRE JENKINS,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-104

v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat

UNKNOWN HEILIG et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Pursuant to

(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act,

(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”

. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”

(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless

a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under

(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent

of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”

(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood,

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendant Heilig. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Geisen and Quezada remain in the case. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following IBC

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.,

(7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under

(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King,

, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp,

, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). personnel: Assistant Resident Unit Manager Unknown Geisen and Correctional Officers Unknown Heilig and Unknown Quezada. Plaintiff alleges that on an unknown date, he talked to Defendant Geisen about the fact that Plaintiff had not received a shower for five days. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff suggests

that at the time of the incident, he was on loss of privileges (LOP) status. (Id.) When staff began passing out breakfast trays, Plaintiff asked Defendant Quezada how staff could deny him his “LOP shower.” (Id.) Plaintiff explained to Defendant Quezada that he had “been waiting patiently for [his] shower.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges further that when Defendant Quezada came to collect his breakfast tray, Plaintiff told Defendants Quezada and Geisen that he was not giving the tray back until he received his shower. (Id.) Defendants Quezada and Geisen asked for the tray again, and Plaintiff asked if he could take his LOP shower. (Id.) Defendants Quezada and Geisen told Plaintiff no. (Id.) Plaintiff replied that he was not giving the tray back. (Id.) Defendants Quezada and Geisen then placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and took him downstairs. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that as soon as a door opened,

Defendants Quezada and Geisen “slam[med him] on [his] face.” (Id.) One of them held Plaintiff down with a knee on Plaintiff’s neck. (Id.) Plaintiff said that he could not breathe and passed out “for a minute.” (Id.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment excessive force claims. (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff requests $4 million in damages, as well as for the MDOC to “pay for [his] physical therapy” for the injuries caused to his right shoulder and lower back. (Id.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). A. Claims Against Defendant Heilig Although Plaintiff has named Corrections Officer Heilig as a Defendant, he fails to name Heilig in the body of his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–61 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.

See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch.,

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson,

(6th Cir. 2008)). By failing to mention Defendant

Heilig in the body of his complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege how Defendant Heilig allegedly violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Heilig fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). B. Claims Against Defendants Geisen and Quezada Plaintiff contends that Defendants Geisen and Quezada violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. The Eighth Amendment embodies a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of a crime. Punishment may not be “barbarous”, nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” See Rhodes v. Chapman,

, 345–46 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,

(1958)). The Eighth Amendment also prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Rhodes,

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia,

(1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions

of pain are those that are “‘totally without penological justification.’”

However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson,

(6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian,

(1992) (holding that “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)). On occasion, “[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.” Combs v. Wilkinson,

(6th Cir. 2002) (citing Pelfrey v. Chambers,

(6th Cir. 1995)), quoted in Cordell v. McKinney,

, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2014). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Williams v. Curtin,

(6th Cir.

2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x. 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011). There is an objective component and a subjective component to an Eighth Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle,

(6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary,

(6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams,

. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson,

. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams,

(quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

(1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson,

(internal quotation marks omitted). The objective component requires a “contextual” investigation, one that

is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’”

at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). While the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy,

(2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson,

. “Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.”

As set forth supra, Plaintiff alleges that while he was handcuffed, Defendants Quezada and Geisen “slam[med him] on [his] face.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff also contends

that one of them held Plaintiff down with a knee on Plaintiff’s neck, causing Plaintiff to be unable to breathe. (Id.) Plaintiff sets forth that he passed out “for a minute.” (Id.) In light of these allegations, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Geisen and Quezada on initial review. Conclusion The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Moreover, having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendant Heilig will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Geisen and Quezada remain in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 21, 2025 /s/ Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge