UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

TYREE DAMON PITTS,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-280

v. Honorable Phillip J. Green

UNKNOWN GOULDIO, et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Pursuant to

(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act,

(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”

. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”

(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil

action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was

made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under

(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”

(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the

same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood,

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from

such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, as well as any intended constitutional claims premised upon the violation of prison policy.

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.,

(7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under

(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King,

, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp,

, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants remain in the case. Discussion I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF) in St. Louis, Gratiot County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following ICF personnel in their official and personal capacities: Sergeant Unknown Costellio and Corrections Officers Unknown Gouldio and Unknown Tumbleson. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)

On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff was placed in cell 61 inside of 5 Block at ICF because his toilet was not functioning properly. (Id., PageID.3.) However, once Plaintiff was placed in cell 61, he realized that the toilet in that cell also was not working. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Defendants Gouldio and Tumbleson that same day. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was left in cell 61 without a working toilet for “multiple days at a time.” (Id.) Plaintiff sets forth that the toilet was “filled up to the

max with urine and [feces] so [he could not] use the bathroom.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he held his bowel movements and urine, which caused him to have stomach complications to the point that he had to go to the healthcare department, where he received “milka” to help him use the bathroom. (Id.) Plaintiff sets forth that he still tosses and turns in his sleep because of the stomach complications. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he spoke to all named Defendants about the issue, but that they did not “make any efforts to help” him. (Id.) Based on the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment conditions of

confinement claims. Plaintiff also mentions that Defendants “violated many policies and laws”; the Court construes this reference to assert claims premised upon the violation of MDOC policy. Plaintiff asks to be financially compensated. (Id., PageID.4.) II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well- pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility

standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive

rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). As set forth above, the Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims, as well as claims premised upon violations of MDOC policy. A. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff has sued Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (Compl.,

ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989); Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment

immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

(2002) (citing Will,

); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771. Here, Plaintiff seeks damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) However, as

noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacity claims. For that reason, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. B. Personal Capacity Claims 1. Eighth Amendment Claims The Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert Eighth Amendment

conditions of confinement claims against Defendants. The Eighth Amendment protects against the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman,

(1981); see also Wilson v. Yaklich,

, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). However, the Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes,

(citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson,

(6th Cir.

1987). “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian,

(1992) (quoting Rhodes,

). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”

In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that defendants acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Mingus

v. Butler,

, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,

(1994)); see also Helling v. McKinney,

(1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims). The deliberate- indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer,

; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Farmer,

. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[ ] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”

. Here, Plaintiff contends that he was held in a cell without a working toilet for multiple days. Plaintiff alleges that the toilet was “filled up to the max” with urine and feces, and that Plaintiff had to hold his bowel movement and urine, causing him

to experience stomach issues. Plaintiff alleges that he told all Defendants about the issue but alleges that they did nothing to help him. (Id.) At this stage of the proceedings, although Plaintiff has by no means proven deliberate indifference, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants on initial review. Cf. DeSpain v. Uphoff,

(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that exposure to non-working toilets and other inmates’ urine and feces via standing water for thirty-six hours was sufficiently serious); Taylor v. Riojas,

, 7–9 (2020) (per curiam) (concluding that a prisoner who alleged that he was placed in “shockingly unsanitary” cells for six days, one of which was covered in “massive amounts” of feces and the other of which was equipped with only a clogged drain to dispose of bodily waste, stated a violation of the Eighth Amendment). 2. Violations of MDOC Policy The Court has also construed Plaintiff’s complaint to assert § 1983 claims premised upon the violation of MDOC policy. However, claims under § 1983 can only

be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

(1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v. Raisor,

(6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1994). Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated MDOC policy fails to state a claim under § 1983. Moreover, “[w]ithout a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal procedural due process claim.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris,

(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,

(1972)). Courts routinely have recognized that a prisoner does not enjoy any federally protected liberty or property interest in state procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona,

(1983); Laney v. Farley,

, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); Brody v. City of Mason,

(6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims regarding the violation of MDOC policy will be dismissed. Conclusion

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Moreover, having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims, as well as any constitutional claims premised upon the violation of prison policy, will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s personal capacity Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants remain in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 26, 2025 /s/ Phillip J. Green PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge