UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

JESSE EDEN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-182

v. Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou

UNKNOWN PARTY #1,

Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint1 for failure to state a claim.

1 In a prior order, the Court severed Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants in this suit except for Defendant Unknown Party #1 due to misjoinder. This action proceeds against Defendant Unknown Party #1 as the sole Defendant. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) Grievance Coordinator/Investigator Unknown Party #1 in Defendant’s individual capacity and official capacity. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2–

3, 5, 7.) As relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Unknown Party #1, Plaintiff alleges that on August 30, 2024, at MTU, he was “stabbed, stomped, [and] beat with a padlock,” and “his property was taken from his cell [and from] his person[] when [he] was transferred to the hospital after [the assault].”2 (Id., PageID.8.) Subsequently, on September 9, 2024, “Plaintiff packed up his property to ride out of MTU.” (Id.) Plaintiff was transferred to the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (JCF), and upon arrival at JCF, Plaintiff “received some of his personal property,” but some of his personal property was missing. (Id., PageID.9.) On November 13, 2024, “Plaintiff grieved MTU again [for] not giving him his personal property, footlocker, boots, etc.” (Id., PageID.18.) Plaintiff alleges that the “grievance was rejected [and] never investigated by

[Defendant Unknown Party #1].” (Id.) Plaintiff presents no further allegations about Defendant Unknown Party #1. Based on the foregoing allegations against Defendant Unknown Party #1, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Defendant Unknown Party #1. As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive

2 In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization in quotations from Plaintiff’s complaint. damages, injunctive relief related to his receipt of medical care, and a declaratory judgment. (Id., PageID.26–29.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). A. Official Capacity Claim Plaintiff sues Defendant Unknown Party #1 in Defendant’s individual capacity and official

capacity. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989); Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir.

1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

(2002) (citing Will,

). Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.26–29.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendant in Defendant’s official capacity. Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young,

, 159–60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex parte Young for prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v. Graham,

, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that unconstitutional acts cannot

have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered done under the state’s authority.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks,

(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,

(2002)). Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons,

(1983) (addressing injunctive relief); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

(2007) (addressing declaratory relief). In the present action, Plaintiff does not allege that the activities alleged in the complaint are likely to occur to him again. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to past harm, not future risk of harm. Therefore, for these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Unknown Party #1 in Defendant’s official capacity upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Defendant Unknown Party #1 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. B. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Defendant Unknown Party #1 regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance procedure. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.18 (alleging that Defendant Unknown Party #1 failed to investigate Plaintiff’s grievance and rejected the grievance).) However, Plaintiff has no due process right to file a prison grievance. Various courts have repeatedly held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms,

(1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t

of Corr.,

(6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer,

(6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy,

, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan,

(7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice,

(4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). And, Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona,

(1983); Keenan v. Marker,

(6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411,

(6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Therefore, Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim against Defendant Unknown Party #1 regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance procedure will be dismissed. Furthermore, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an

administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell,

(6th Cir. 1999). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Unknown Party #1 liable due to this Defendant’s supervisory position, he fails to state such a claim. Government officials, such as Defendant Unknown Party #1, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal,

; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1978); Everson v. Leis,

(6th Cir. 2009). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. See Grinter v. Knight,

(6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber,

(6th Cir. 2002); Summers v. Leis,

(6th Cir. 2004). The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official: “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis,

(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee,

); see also Copeland v. Machulis,

(6th Cir. 1995)); Walton v. City of Southfield,

(6th Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Unknown Party #1 encouraged or condoned the conduct of Defendant’s subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in their conduct. And, any conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility are insufficient to show that Defendant Unknown Party #1 was personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Grinter,

; Greene,

; Summers,

. Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Unknown Party #1 will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a dismissal as described by

(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: May 21, 2025 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE