UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-10635 v. Honorable Linda V. Parker

JOHN DOE subscriber assigned IP Address 68.43.101.247,

Defendant. ______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

This is a copyright infringement action in which Plaintiff Strike 3 Holdings, LLC (“Strike 3”) alleges that the subscriber associated with IP address 68.43.101.247 has unlawfully downloaded and distributed Strike 3’s motion pictures. In an effort to identify the subscriber to obtain service of the summons and Complaint, Strike 3 moved ex parte (ECF No. 4) and was granted leave to serve a third-party subpoena on Comcast Cable, which is the internet service provider (“ISP”) that assigned the identified IP address (ECF No. 5). The subpoena seeks the name and contact information of the Defendant to whom Comcast Cable assigned the IP address. The matter is presently before the Court on John Doe’s motion to quash the subpoena. (ECF No. 6.) Strike 3 opposes the motion. (ECF No. 7.) Applicable Standard Motions to quash subpoenas are governed by Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Rule 45 instructs district courts to quash or modify a subpoena that: “(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires

disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(3)(A). A subpoena also may be quashed or modified “if it requires . . . disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information” or

“an unretained expert’s opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert’s study that was not requested by a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(3)(B).

The party seeking to quash a subpoena bears the burden of proof. Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC,

(S.D. Ohio. 2011). “Ordinarily, a party has no standing to oppose a subpoena issued to a non-party unless the party can demonstrate a claim of privilege or personal right in the

documents sought.” Morris v. Kia Motors Corp., No. 24-mc-51120,

, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2024) (quoting Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe subscriber assigned IP address 76.190.140.193, No. 15-cv-1342,

, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2015)). “Such rights or privileges have been recognized with respect to personal bank records, information in a personnel file, corporate bank records[,] or Indian tribal records.”

(quoting Pictsweet Co. v.

R.D. Offutt Co., No. 19-cv-0722,

, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2020)). “That documents are confidential is not in itself grounds for quashing a subpoena.”

(quoting Pictsweet,

, at *3). “[T]he party

seeking to quash a third-party subpoena must meet a heavy burden of proof.”

(quoting Proto Gage, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-12286,

, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2022)). Discussion

John Doe asserts several arguments for why the subpoena directed at Comcast Cable must be quashed. None are legitimate grounds for quashing the subpoena.

John Doe first argues that the subpoena subjects him or her to an undue burden “by potentially exposing [him or her] to costly litigation over claims that have not been adequately substantiated.” However, the subpoena, itself, does not require John Doe to do anything. It is directed at Comcast Cable. John Doe lacks

standing to challenge the subpoena on the basis that it burdens, not him, but his or her ISP. Breaking Glass Pictures v. John Does 1-32, No. 13-cv-849,

, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2014) (citing Levitin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,

No. 12-cv-24,

, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2012)). John Doe next argues that Strike 3 fails to state a plausible claim against the owner of the IP address identified in the Complaint because an IP address, alone, is

insufficient to state a claim for copyright infringement. John Doe accurately points out that an IP address only identifies the location at which any number of persons may have used the internet connection. Nevertheless, in granting Strike 3’s motion

for leave to issue the third-party subpoena, this Court already found that the Complaint alleged sufficient facts to plausibly plead that a user at Defendant’s IP address downloaded, copied, and distributed copies of Strike 3’s copyright- protected movies. Even if the subscriber of the identified IP address is not the

infringer, and “discovery later reveals that a person other than the subscriber violated [Strike 3’s] copyright[s], the subpoenaed information (the subscriber’s contact information) is nevertheless reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery

of admissible information, i.e., the identity of the actual infringer.” TCYK, LLC v. Does 1-47, No.13-cv-539,

, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2013). As one district court has explained: [The victim of copyright infringement in a position like Strike 3] cannot engage in discovery to probe the facts underlying its claim without first naming a defendant. Unless [that victim] is permitted, at least in the initial stages of litigation, to proceed against a subscriber, it will be caught in a Catch-22 in which it cannot commence an action without engaging in discovery to determine the actual infringer but cannot engage in discovery without first filing a complaint. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 13-365,

, at *6 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2014).

John Doe also contends that the subpoena seeks information protected by the right to privacy. Specifically, John Doe maintains that it would associate him or her with allegations of copyright infringement before proof is presented that he or

she personally engaged in wrongful conduct. The subpoena, however, only seeks information related to the ISP subscriber’s identity. This is information the subscriber already has shared with Comcast Cable. In other words, such information is neither privileged nor protected. This is not a basis to quash the

subpoena based on privilege or privacy interests. Malibu Media,

, at *3 (citing Breaking Glass Pictures,

, at *4 (collecting cases)).

Lastly, John Doe asserts that Strike 3 seeks the improper joinder of defendants, and that personal jurisdiction is lacking because there is no evidence that John Doe has minimum contacts with this judicial district. These are not proper grounds for John Doe to challenge the subpoena addressed to a third party.

See supra. But, in any event, they lack merit. The only defendant Strike 3 has sought to include in the action at this time is the subscriber of the IP address identified in the heading of its Complaint. In other

words, joinder currently is not at issue. As far as personal jurisdiction, Strike 3 alleges in the Complaint that it used geolocation technology to trace the identified IP address to a physical address in the Eastern District of Michigan. (ECF No. 1 at

PageID.3 ¶ 9.) The alleged infringement causing Strike 3 injury was, therefore, committed here, conferring specific jurisdiction over the infringer. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

(1985). In any event, the issue of

personal jurisdiction over John Doe is premature. The subpoena is directed only to Comcast Cable. Conclusion For these reasons, the Court DENIES John Doe’s motion to quash the

subpoena directed to Comcast Cable (ECF No. 6). SO ORDERED. s/ Linda V. Parker LINDA V. PARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE Dated: June 11, 2025

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record and/or pro se parties on this date, June 11, 2025, by electronic and/or U.S. First Class mail.

s/Aaron Flanigan Case Manager