UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

CHRISTOPHER THOMAS TAYLOR,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-658

v. Honorable Phillip J. Green

COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH, et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. On June 26, 2025, the Court entered an order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 4.) Specifically, the Court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint contained only conclusory allegations without any factual allegations to support his claims under § 1983. (Id., PageID.18.) The Court allowed 28 days for Plaintiff to comply and warned Plaintiff that if he failed to comply, the Court could dismiss his complaint. More than 28 days have elapsed and Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint. The Court will, therefore, screen Plaintiff’s complaint as originally filed. Pursuant to

(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re

Prison Litig. Reform Act,

(6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.”

. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.”

(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to

function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.”

. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under

(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”

(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the

same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood,

(5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.,

(7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under

(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King,

, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp,

, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Saginaw County Correctional Facility (SRF) in Freeland, Saginaw County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred

at the Kalamazoo County Correctional Facility, in Kalamazoo County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Community Mental Health, Deputy Unknown Lopez, Lieutenant Unknown Faulk, and “Mike,” a Community Mental Health Employee. In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that Defendants Lopez and Faulk responded to Plaintiff’s grievances and that Plaintiff was denied medical care on April 24, 2024, by Defendants Mike and Community Mental Health. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)

As relief for his claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and asks that Community Mental Health not deny their services to anyone else. (Id., PageID.4.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well- pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). A. Claims Against Defendants Lopez and Faulk Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lopez and Faulk each responded to Plaintiff’s

grievances. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any facts concerning the subject of Plaintiff’s grievances or the actions (or inactions) of Defendants Lopez and Faulk. It is well-settled that conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct such as these without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678– 79; Twombly,

.

Moreover, even if the Court were to presume that these Defendants denied Plaintiff’s grievances or otherwise failed to meet the demands set forth in his grievances, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell,

(6th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, for each of the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Lopez and Faulk.

B. Medical Care Claims Plaintiff also alleges, in a conclusory fashion, that he was denied “mental health” by Defendants Mike and Community Mental Health. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff does not specify whether he had been convicted or was a pretrial detainee at the time, which means that it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s claims should be judged according to an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment standard. While the Eighth Amendment limitation applies to “punishments,” a pretrial detainee “may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish,

(1979) (footnote and citations omitted). When a

claim of deliberate indifference “is asserted on behalf of a pretrial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper starting point.” Griffith v. Franklin Cnty.,

, 566 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The Supreme Court has long recognized that the government has a constitutional obligation to provide medical care to those whom it detains.” Griffith, 975 F.3d at 566 (citing Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976); Rhinehart v. Scutt,

, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2018); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty.,

(6th Cir. 2004)). Both “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated ‘when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.’”

(citations omitted).

The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary,

(6th Cir. 2001). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for

medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty.,

(6th Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty.,

, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Until recently, the Sixth Circuit “analyzed Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee claims and Eighth Amendment prisoner claims ‘under the same rubric.’” Greene v. Crawford Cnty.,

, 605 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brawner v. Scott Cnty.,

(6th Cir. 2021)). Then, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

(2015), the Supreme Court differentiated the standard for excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause from those brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.

at 392–93. Kingsley left unanswered the question of “whether an objective standard applies in other Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainment context[s].” Brawner,

.

Subsequently, in Brawner, the Sixth Circuit “modified the second prong of the deliberate indifference test applied to pretrial detainees to require only recklessness.”

. At issue in Brawner was a pretrial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. The Sixth Circuit held that to demonstrate deliberate indifference, “[a] pretrial detainee must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.”

at 597 (quoting Castro v. City of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)); see also Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky.,

, 316–17 (6th Cir. 2023) (affirming that Kingsley, as interpreted by Brawner, required courts to “lower the subjective

component from actual knowledge to recklessness”). A pretrial detainee must prove that the defendant acted “deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Brawner,

(citation and quotation marks omitted). However, regardless of whether an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment standard applies, again, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any facts whatsoever regarding his medical condition, the alleged denial of care, the actions of Defendants,

or the events of April 24, 2024. Therefore, the Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s medical care claims for failure to state a claim. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore,

. For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: August 7, 2025 /s/ Phillip J. Green PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge