UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

ROSCOE MARK HETTICH, JR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-697

v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering

UNKNOWN HOSKINS,

Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under

. In a separate order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On July 9, 2025, the Court entered an Order (ECF No. 6) directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies of Plaintiff’s original complaint. Specifically, the Court noted that Plaintiff had sued Defendant Hoskins in his official capacity only and explained in detail why Plaintiff was unable to seek either monetary or injunctive relief against Defendant Hoskins in his official capacity under § 1983. The Court allowed Plaintiff 21 days to comply. On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a timely amended complaint (ECF No. 7), which is now before the Court for screening. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,

(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992).Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan.As with his original complaint, Plaintiff sues LRF Officer Unknown Hoskins in his official capacity only. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 7, PageID.38.). Plaintiff allegesthat Defendant Hoskins used excessive force against him. (Id., PageID.39.) As relief for the use of force described within the amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id., PageID.40.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to

relief.”

at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,

(1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

(6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver,

(1994). Despite the Court’s detailed instructions in its Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint (see ECF No. 6, PageID.33–35), Plaintiff continues to sue Defendant Hoskins in his official capacity only. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 7, PageID.38.)1 As the Court previously explained, a suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

,

1 Because Plaintiff provides a “clear statement of capacity in his complaint” after an opportunity to amend, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s complaint as asserted against Defendant Hoskins in his official capacity only and will not construe the complaint to assert claims against Defendant Hoskins individually. See Rashada v. Flegel, No. 23-1674,

, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024). 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones,

(6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh,

(1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton,

(6th Cir. 1994). Congress has

not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan,

(1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,

(6th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents,

(2002) (citing Will,

); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771. Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 7, PageID.40.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

Will,

(“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”). Therefore, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendant Hoskins in his official capacity. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, asking to put a stop to excessive force being used against inmates. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 7, PageID.40.) Although damages claims against official capacity defendants are properly dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity. Kentucky v. Graham,

, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young,

, 159–60 (1908)). The Ex parte Young doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a ‘fiction’—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign immunity purposes.” Va. Ofc. for Prot. and Advoc. v. Stewart,

, 255 (2011) (internal citation omitted.) The Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v.

Marchbanks,

(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,

(2002)). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that transfer to another correctional facility moots a prisoner’s injunctive and declaratory claims. See Kensu v. Haigh,

(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief became moot when the prisoner was transferred from the prison about which he complained); Mowatt v. Brown, No. 89-1955,

(6th Cir. May 9, 1990); Tate v. Brown, No. 89-1944,

(6th Cir. May 3, 1990); Williams v. Ellington,

(6th Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff is no longer confined at LRF, which is where he avers that

Defendant Hoskins is employed. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against Defendant Hoskins does not relate to an ongoing violation and is not prospective. Thus, he cannot maintain a claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Hoskins in his official capacity. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, under

(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of

(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: August 20, 2025 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge