UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

JUAN CARLOS SANCHEZ ALVAREZ

Petitioner, Case No. 1:25-cv-1090

v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering

KRISTI NOEM et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner Juan Carlos Sanchez Alvarez initiated this action on September 15, 2025, by filing a counseled combined petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan. Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the following relief: to enter an order prohibiting Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings; to declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act; to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

ordering Respondents to promptly schedule a bond hearing for Petitioner’s removal proceedings; to accept jurisdiction to issue a bond order; and, to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16–17.) In an order (ECF No. 5) entered on September 26, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 6) on September 29, 2025. Petitioner, through counsel, filed his reply (ECF No. 7) on October 1, 2025. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to

. Because the Court is granting Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, his motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3), in which Petitioner seeks the same relief set forth in his § 2241 petition, will be denied as moot. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Petitioner is a native and citizen of El Salvador. (Pinson Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.76.) On January 22, 2004, Petitioner first attempted to enter the United States without inspection. (Id.) At that time, he was encountered by the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and voluntarily returned to Mexico. (Id.) Petitioner entered the United States at some later time in 2004 “and has remained in the country since that time.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) On August 26, 2025, Petitioner was

encountered and arrested by USBP. (Pinson Decl. ¶ 6.) USBP placed Petitioner in removal proceedings before the Chelmsford Immigration Court, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner was an “immigrant who was present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or who arrived at a time or place not designated by the Attorney General.” (Id. ¶ 6, PageID.76–77.) USBP also served Petitioner with a Warrant or Arrest of Alien and a Notice of Custody Determination. (Id. ¶ 6, PageID.77.) The warrant noted that Petitioner was being detained pursuant to § 236 of the INA. (Id.) Petitioner was first detained at the Northwest Correctional Facility in St. Albans, Vermont. (Id.) On September 2, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to the North Lake Processing Center. (Id. ¶ 77.) ICE Enforcement and Removal Operation detained Petitioner “under INA § 235 because [Petitioner] is an applicant for admission to the United States seeking admission and he is not

clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id.) On September 4, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel filed a request for bond redetermination with the Detroit Immigration Court. (Id. ¶ 8.) At that time, Petitioner was in removal proceedings before the Chelmsford Immigration Court, and so “the court created the bond case before the Chelmsford Immigration Court.” (Id.) On September 5, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel “filed a motion for change of venue to the Detroit Immigration Court but did so in his bond case and not in his merits case.” (Id. ¶ 9, PageID.78.) On September 8, 2025, an immigration judge with the Chelmsford Immigration Court “issued an order reflecting ‘no action’ and deeming the bond request withdrawn given [Petitioner’s transfer].” (Id. ¶ 10.) The Chelmsford Immigration Court “changed venue [for

Petitioner’s] removal proceedings to the Detroit Immigration Court.” (Id. ¶ 11.) On September 16, 2025, Petitioner appeared “for a master calendar hearing via Video Teleconferencing before an Immigration Judge at the Detroit Immigration Court.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Through counsel, Petitioner “admitted all factual allegations contained in his [Notice to Appear] and conceded the charge of inadmissibility.” (Id., PageID.78–79.) Petitioner is currently “seeking relief from removal in the form of asylum and withholding of removal as well as cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents.” (Id. ¶ 15, PageID.79.) Moreover, Petitioner has a pending “Form I-914, Application for T Nonimmigrant Status with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, which he filed on June 10, 2025.” (Id.) Per Citizenship and Immigration Services’ website, “the current processing time for a Form I-914 is just under twenty-four months.” (Id.) Petitioner appeared before the Detroit Immigration Court for a bond redetermination hearing on September 30, 2025. (Id. ¶ 16; ECF No. 6-2, PageID.82.) The immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request for a change in custody status on the basis that Petitioner was “subject to

mandatory detention. See Matter of YAJURE HURTADO,

(BIA 2025).” (ECF No. 7-1, PageID.106.) Petitioner reserved his right to appeal that decision. (Id., PageID.107.) II. Exhaustion Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 6, PageID.54.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner “will have the right to appeal [the denial of bond] to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).” (Id., PageID.55.) Petitioner argues that exhaustion is not required for “those petitions, such as Petitioner’s, brought under

.” (ECF No. 7, PageID.101.) Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,

whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v. Holder,

(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan,

(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This discretion is referred to as “prudential” exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan,

(6th Cir. 2019), and such a court- made exhaustion rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention.” See Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv- 12546,

, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621,

, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp.,

(9th Cir. 1983), to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required.” See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486,

, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,

courts may require prudential exhaustion when: (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.

(citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781,

, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)). Upon consideration of those factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is whether

or

applies to Petitioner. That determination relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo,

, 413 (2024) (noting that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”). Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion. The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here, generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzalez,

(6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest

and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

(2025). It is unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead to the Government changing its position and precluding judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required. Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion, the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos,

, at *4. A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for

resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,

(2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson,

(citation omitted). Here, there is no question that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” See Rodriguez v. Bostock,

. 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Petitioner represents that his final merits hearing is scheduled to be conducted by the immigration court on January 8, 2026—less than six months away. (ECF No. 7, PageID.104.) In light of that fact, requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies by proceeding with an appeal to the BIA would not effectively afford him relief, given that any final determination regarding removal would likely come before the BIA’s determination of whether Petitioner is entitled to bond. It is unmistakable that “depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . –detention.” See Lopez- Campos,

, at *5.

In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alterative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. III. Merits Discussion A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in

(b)(2). (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens who “previously entered the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in removal proceedings” are detained pursuant to

(a) and are eligible for release on

bond, “unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.” (Id.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner “unambiguously meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),” and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its structure and history support the agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.57.) In order to address the parties’ arguments, this Court must engage in principles of statutory interpretation. “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v. United States,

(2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden,

, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n,

(6th Cir. 2016)). But, “the ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’”

(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

(2000)).

“The words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.,

(2012). This Court must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Raimondo, 603 U.S. at 400. With these principles in mind, the Court begins with the language of the statutes in question. Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” See

(b)(2)(a). An “applicant for admission” is

defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” See

§ 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See

(a)(13). Section 1226(a), on the other hand, states that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See

(a). Respondents argue that Petitioner “unambiguously is an ‘applicant for admission’ under the plain text of [§ 1225] because he is a noncitizen, he was not admitted to the United States, and he was present in the United States when he was apprehended.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.58 (citing

(a)(1); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

(2020)). Respondents assert further that because “Petitioner has not agreed immediately to depart, logically he must be seeking to remain—a legal action that requires ‘admission,’ i.e., a lawful entry.” (Id., PageID.60.) Respondents also argue that “applicant for admission” presumptively “characterizes all unlawfully present noncitizens as applying for admission until they are either removed or

successfully obtain a lawful entry, regardless of their subjective intent.” (Id.) Essentially, Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of any noncitizen who is “present” in the United States and who has not been lawfully admitted. However, for the reasons discussed below, this Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is far too broad. As set forth supra, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention of an “alien seeking admission” after an “examining immigration officer” determines that the alien “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” In this Court’s opinion, the phrase “seeking admission” refers to an action that is currently occurring and that would occur at the United States’ border

when the alien is being inspected. Here, under the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s case, an “examining immigration officer” did not make a determination as to whether Petitioner was not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted when Petitioner came into the United States at some point in 2004. Petitioner was not crossing the border when he was arrested and detained. Instead, Petitioner represents, he was detained on August 26, 2025, in Vermont, following a traffic stop. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Granted, Petitioner is now seeking admission to the United States via a petition for asylum and withholding of removal, as well as cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents. (Pinson Decl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.79.) Moreover, on June 10, 2025, Petitioner filed a Form I-914, Application for T Nonimmigrant Status. (Id.) There is nothing in the record before the Court, however, suggesting when Petitioner initiated his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. Thus, there is nothing in the record currently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner ever attempted to gain lawful status in the United States before being apprehended and detained.

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at the United States’ border, when they are seeking lawful entry into the United States. Thus, because the record clearly shows that Petitioner resided in the United States for 21 years before being arrested and detained, there is simply no logical reason to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applying to Petitioner given that Petitioner was not actively “seeking admission” during those 21 years. Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), section 1226(a) provides that, when dealing with “apprehension and detention of aliens,” the Attorney General may issue a warrant and “arrest[] or detain[] [an alien] pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See

(a). Here, § 1226(a) clearly applies to Petitioner’s situation—Petitioner was apprehended during a traffic stop, arrested, and detained. Petitioner has been detained pending removal proceedings before an immigration judge; thus, under § 1226(a), the Attorney General has discretion to either detain or release Petitioner on bond or conditional parole. This language clearly allows the alien to request a bond redetermination by an immigration judge—which is exactly what Petitioner did at his hearing before the immigration judge on September 30, 2025. This Court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s clarification that sections 1225 and 1226 apply in different circumstances. See Jennings v. Rodriguez,

(2018). Jennings noted that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”

. Section 1226, however, applies to the process of “arresting and detaining” aliens who are already living within the United States but are still subject to removal. See

. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens arriving to the United States, who are, therefore, governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already

present in the country who are, accordingly, governed by § 1226. The record before the Court also supports this conclusion. As noted above, when Petitioner was arrested, he was served with a Notice of Custody Determination and Warrant or Arrest of Alien. (Pinson Decl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.77.) Notably, the warrant “cited INA § 236 as authority for [Petitioner’s] detention in DHS custody.” (Id.) INA § 236 is codified at

. The record indicates that the Government did not state Petitioner’s detention was pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) until Petitioner requested a bond redetermination hearing. In the order denying Petitioner’s request for a bond redetermination, the immigration judge noted that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention per the BIA’s decision in Matter v. Yajure Hurtado, in which the

BIA stated that any individual who had entered the United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado,

(2025). The Court does not credit this post hoc rationalization, particularly given the above evidence that Petitioner was not detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to classify a subset of noncitizens as exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. See

(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely superfluous. See Corey,

(“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.”) In sum, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens,

such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States for over 20 years and who were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested. The text of the relevant statutes compels the Court’s conclusion, which has been reached by many other federal courts on analogous facts.1 Petitioner’s case is governed by § 1226(a), and he is subject to the discretionary bond determination set forth therein. B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.14.) Petitioner avers that there is “no credible argument” that he “cannot be safely released back to his community and family.” (Id., PageID.15.) He

1 See, e.g., Lopez-Campos,

, at *8; see also Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–61; Singh v. Lewis, No. 4:25-cv-96-RGJ,

, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC,

, at *7–12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025); Campos Leon v. Forestal, 1:25-cv-1774-SEB-MJD,

, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1408 (LMB/IDD),

, at *5–9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-2677-CNS,

, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Kostak v. Trump et al., No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE- KDM,

, at *2–4 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11631- BEM,

, at *8–13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv- 03142-SRN-SGE,

, at *9–16 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); dos Santos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-JEK,

, at *6–9 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 1:25-cv-05937-DEH,

, at *3–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No. 2:25-cv-02157-DLR,

, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted,

(D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571-JEK,

, at *6–8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). In his reply brief, Petitioner has provided an even more comprehensive list of federal district courts that have reached this conclusion as of October 1, 2025. (Reply, ECF No. 7, PageID.98–99.) contends that he “should have the opportunity to have a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge,” and that “[b]y issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has taken nearly all bond authority away from Immigration Judges.” (Id.) Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Petitioner has received due process because he “received notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, has appeared in immigration court, has requested bond, and has been

detained by ICE for only five weeks.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.70.) “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” See Zadvydas v. Davis,

(2001). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump,

(2025). Thus, noncitizens such as Petitioner are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045,

, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023). Respondent indicates that Petitioner has already received all the process due to him because “the Supreme Court has held that the process due under the [C]onstitution is coextensive with the

removal procedures provided by Congress.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.70 (citing Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 138–40). Thus, Respondent asserts, “statutory provisions denying bond during administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id.) If this Court agreed with Respondents that § 1225(b)(2)(A) governed Petitioner’s detention, the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However, as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) provides a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision. The statute expressly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien or release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See

(a)(1), (2). This discretionary framework “requires a bond hearing to make an individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos,

, at *9. The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,

(1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention. See United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio,

(6th Cir. 2020). Thus, under Mathews, this Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos,

, at *9 (citing Mathews,

). The first Mathews factor weighs strongly in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, one of the “most elemental of liberty interests.” See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

(2004). The Court may also consider

Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-CV-01151,

, at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,

(1st Cir. 2021) and Velasco Lopez v. Decker,

(2d Cir. 2020)). Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he is married and has children who are citizens of the United States. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Petitioner and his family reside in Dorchester, Massachusetts, and Petitioner is “the primary financial support for the family.” (Id.) Petitioner now finds himself detained at a processing center halfway across the country from his family—he is certainly “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin,

, at *7. The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”

of his rights. See Lopez-Campos,

, at *9. Under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does, indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK,

, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025). However, given the record available to the Court, Respondents have not established a significant interest in potentially “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator, following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that his ongoing detention is not warranted.” See

Furthermore, Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would pose “administrative or financial costs” in this case—“[t]o

the contrary,” Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s] detention[.]” See

In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. IV. Prohibition on Transfer Petitioner requests that the Court order Respondents “not to transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings to preserve jurisdiction and access to counsel.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) Respondents counter that such a restriction “is unnecessary . . . because the Court will maintain jurisdiction regardless of where DHS holds [Petitioner] in custody.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.71.) “The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct. of Ky.,

, 494–95 (1973). As the Supreme Court has explained:

[r]ead literally, the language of [§] 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 495. The Sixth Circuit has “concluded that a detained alien generally must designate his immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft,

(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named Robert Lynch, the ICE Field Office Director, and Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as Respondents. Respondents request that Secretary Noem be dismissed because “only the ICE Field Office Director is a proper respondent in this case.” (ECF No. 6, PageID.72.) In Roman, although the Sixth Circuit “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners,” it also noted “the possibility of exceptions to this rule.”

. The Sixth Circuit reasoned as follows: Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 374. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp .2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”). In light of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of a transfer. Arias– Agramonte,

, at *8 (explaining that a petition naming only one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to another local district).

at 325–26 (cleaned up). Thus, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.”

. In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to enter an order directing Respondents not to transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings. However, in order to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive a bond hearing or, alternatively, be released in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings. V. Summary The Court rejects Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. Instead, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a) and, therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to a discretionary and individualized bond determination as set forth in that statute. Likewise, the Court concludes that because Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a), his current detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. As a court in the Eastern District of Michigan recently stated, “[t]he recent shift to use the mandatory detention framework under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also fundamentally unfair. In a nation of laws vetted and implemented by Congress, we don’t get to arbitrarily choose which laws we feel like following when they best suit our interests.” Lopez- Campos,

, at *10. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, but the Court notes that the immigration judge is in the better position to evaluate whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the community. Accordingly, the Court leaves to the immigration judge’s sound discretion a determination on that issue. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court will enter an order and judgment granting Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under

(a) within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order and judgment or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 3), in which Petitioner seeks the same relief set forth in his

§2241 petition, will be denied as moot.

Dated: October 17, 2025 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge