UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION PABLO AGUILAR,

Petitioner, Case No. 25-13497 Honorable Laurie J. Michelson v.

KEVIN RAYCRAFT, KRISTI NOEM, and PAM BONDI,

Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [1] On November 3, 2025, Pablo Aguilar filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) seeking “a prompt individual bond hearing under

(a) or, alternatively, his release from custody” (id. at PageID.1) and a “[d]eclar[ation] that [his] removal proceeding is subject to § 1226(a), not §1225(b)” (id. at PageID.20). Since filing his petition, Aguilar was released from detention (see ECF Nos. 6-3, 9), so the injunctive relief sought (his release or a bond hearing) is no longer applicable. The Court, however, GRANTS IN PART Aguilar’s request for declaratory relief and finds, for the reasons stated in this Court’s recent decision in Robledo Gonzalez v. Raycraft, No. 25-13502,

(E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2025), that Aguilar’s removal proceedings are governed by

(a). See

(collecting cases); see also Castañon Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-03757,

, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2025) (noting that “well over 100 district judges from around the country” have found that § 1226, not § 1225, governs the removal proceedings of noncitizens similarly situated to Aguilar) (citing Mendez v. Noem, No. 25-02062,

, at *2 & n.4 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2025); Kyle Cheney, More than 100 judges have ruled against the Trump admin’s mandatory

detention policy, Politico (Oct. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/R4SP-9A4F); cf. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 25-01873,

, at *11–14 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (rejecting respondents’ argument that case was moot because similarly situated petitioners had received bond hearings, reasoning that “[p]etitioners in this case have not received complete relief due to the real risk of re-arrest and mandatory detention” and that live question remained of whether petitioners were subject to

§ 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a), concluding that voluntary cessation exception to mootness applied, and granting petitioners’ request to declare unlawful new DHS policy of applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) to petitioners and similarly situated noncitizens). The Court in turn finds that Aguilar is conditionally paroled pursuant to

(a). (See ECF No. 12, PageID.99 (“[Aguilar] prays this Court for the relief he sought among others in his petition, namely, a finding or declaration that his removal proceedings are subject to §1226(a), and, as such, that he was recently conditionally paroled as

provided by §1226(a).”).) A separate judgment will follow. SO ORDERED. Dated: December 8, 2025

s/Laurie J. Michelson LAURIE J. MICHELSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE