WILLIAM WILSON STUBBLEFIELD, II LIVING TRUST v. CITY OF DETROIT
WILLIAM WILSON STUBBLEFIELD, II LIVING TRUST v. CITY OF DETROIT
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
WILLIAM WILSON STUBBLEFIELD, II LIVING TRUST
Plaintiff, Civil No. 25-13839
v. Judge Jonathan J.C. Grey
CITY OF DETROIT,
Defendant. ______________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS (ECF No. 2) AND DISMISSING CASE
I. BACKGROUND Pro se Plaintiff1 William Wilson Stubblefield, II Living Trust (“Stubblefield”) filed a notice of removal and an application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs on December 1, 2025. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.)
1 The Court notes that, despite listing himself as the defendant in the notice of removal (ECF No. 1), Stubblefield lists himself as the plaintiff in his application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs and his exhibit filing. (ECF Nos. 2, 4.) Based on the limited pleadings, the Court interprets Stubblefield to be the plaintiff in this matter. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Stubblefield’s application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs and DISMISSES
the case. II. LEGAL STANDARD Under § 1915, the Court may allow a person to proceed without
prepayment of fees or costs, i.e., in forma pauperis. However, the Court is required to review each case for summary dismissal if the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Courts liberally construe the pleadings of
pro se litigants but still require the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594(6th Cir. 1989). III. ANALYSIS
The Court finds that Stubblefield is unable to pay the filing fee (see ECF No. 2) and GRANTS his application to proceed in forma pauperis under
28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, the Court finds that Stubblefield fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “Federal courts uniformly agree that a plaintiff in a state court action cannot remove the action to federal court.” Zambrano v. Scott, No. 5:24-CV-336-KKC,
2025 WL 1833814, at *1 (E.D. Ky. July 2, 2025) (emphasis added). See Am. Int'l Underwriters (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont'l
Ins. Co.,
843 F.2d 1253, 1260(9th Cir. 1988) (“The right to remove a state court case to federal court is clearly limited to defendants.”); Conner v. Salzinger,
457 F.2d 1241, 1243(3d Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original) (“It
is settled that the cited removal statutes confine the right of removal from a state court to a federal district court to a defendant or defendants.”);
Biegon v. City of Dallas, No. 22-10075,
2022 WL 3098241, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 4, 2022) (“[N]either
28 USC § 1441nor
28 USC § 1443authorizes a plaintiff to remove a case to federal district court. The right of removal is
only granted to a defendant.”); Montero v. Tulsa Airport Improvements Tr.,
770 F. App’x 439, 440 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Section 1441 does permit removal of a case from state court to federal court. But a plaintiff like Mr.
Montero cannot remove the case.”); Shabazz v. King, No. 1:24-CV-00488,
2024 WL 1210071, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2024) (“Additionally, it is equally well established that federal courts have uniformly ruled that
removal is only available to a defendant or defendants.”); First Nat. Bank of Pulaski v. Curry,
301 F.3d 456, 461(6th Cir. 2002) (“As the statutory language makes plain, only ‘the defendant or the defendants’ may remove under § 1441(a).”). Despite Stubblefield listing himself as the defendant in his notice
of removal, the Court interprets Stubblefield, based on the content of his pleadings, to be the plaintiff in this matter. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1, PageID.2 (“Defendant [Stubblefield] was arrested or cited without
probable cause … [he] is proceeding as a Living Trust, and municipal actions attempting to ticket or enforce obligations against a trust are
invalid … Defendant cannot enforce federally guaranteed civil rights in state courts because State proceedings are biased or fail to recognize trust immunity.”).) As the plaintiff, Stubblefield cannot remove a state
case to federal court. Furthermore, the Court notes that only a notice of removal, (ECF No. 1); an application to proceed without prepaying fees and costs, (ECF
No. 2); and an exhibit containing (a) a receipt for “impounding trust property automobile” and (b) a ticket from Detroit Police Department, (ECF No. 4) were filed on the docket. No complaint was filed.
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES this case. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Stubblefield’s application to proceed without prepaying fees and costs and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action against the defendant. SO ORDERED. Date: December 17, 2025 s/Jonathan J.C. Grey Jonathan J.C. Grey United States District Judge
Certificate of Service The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on December 17, 2025. s/ S. Osorio Sandra Osorio Case Manager
Reference
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