Joseph Alexander v. Dawn Hill-Kearse, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH ALEXANDER, Plaintiff, Case No. 1:26-cv-271 v. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou DAWN HILL-KEARSE, et al., Defendants. ___________________________________/ OPINION Plaintiff Joseph Alexander, proceeding pro se, filed a three-paragraph complaint containing one allegation of fact. He alleges, without further elaboration, that “Defendants conspired together and intentionally delayed the calendar of motions, in violation of due process.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” which “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Federal subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be waived or forfeited,” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012), and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte whether they have such jurisdiction,” Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014). In this regard, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (Federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”). The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction “when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999).

In addition, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court can dismiss the action if it is “frivolous” or if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). To pass this initial screening, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Here, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint is unsubstantial.

Plaintiff provides no facts upon which to base any sort of claim. The assertion that Defendants conspired to delay a calendar of motions is vague and conclusory. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the case.

A judgment will enter in accordance with this Opinion.

Dated: February 2, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou HALA Y. JARBOU CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE