Jane Doe v. Derek D. Hammond

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION JANE DOE, Case No. 24-11490 Plaintiff, Hon. F. Kay Behm v. U.S. District Judge DEREK D. HAMMOND, Defendants. ___________________________ / OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING SECOND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF No. 42) I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY This order grants default judgment to Plaintiff Jane Doe for tort claims regarding a sexual assault by Defendant Derek D. Hammond.

Doe originally filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court against Defendant Hammond (“Hammond”) and the Wellness Plan Medical Center (“TWP”), alleging assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress due to a sexual assault committed by Hammond (Counts I and II), and negligent hiring, training, and supervision as to TWP (Counts III and IV). ECF No. 1, PageID.7-9. TWP removed the matter to federal court because it is deemed to be an employee of the U.S. Public Health Service, and is eligible for coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 233(a) and (g). Therefore, the proper claim was against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the FTCA is the “exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff in this case with respect to the alleged acts or omissions” of TWP. ECF No. 1, PageID.2. Removal was thus proper because the U.S. District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims within the scope of the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). At the time of removal, pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 §§ 5, 6, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679), the United States of America was substituted as defendant in place of Wellness Plan Medical Centers. ECF No. 2; see 42 U.S. Code § 233(c) (procedure to remove to United States district court). Plaintiff and the United States later stipulated to dismissal of the claims against the United States with prejudice. ECF No. 41, PageID.201 (dismissing Counts III and IV).

Hammond, however, has not appeared in this action. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Default Judgment against Hammond for Counts I and II (ECF No. 42). In addition to service of the summons in the state court action, Plaintiff served Hammond with the notice of removal in its entirety, including the complaint, as well as the request for clerk’s entry of default for failure to defend, and filed on this docket proof of such service. ECF No. 25, PageID.144; ECF Nos. 36, 37, 38.1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1) provides that a defendant must provide an answer within twenty-one (21) days of being served with a summons and complaint. The deadline for Defendants to serve an answer or otherwise respond to the complaint in this matter was June 13, 2024.

Plaintiff filed her renewed request for entry of default against Hammond on March 25, 2025, which was entered the next day. ECF Nos. 25, 26. On June 17, 2025, Plaintiff moved for a default judgment against Defendant Hammond. ECF No. 42. On January 28, 2026, the court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion at which Plaintiff’s counsel appeared.

The material on which the court relies for its damages calculations was at first filed under a motion to seal. ECF Nos. 47, 48. But the court denied the motion to seal as to all but two exhibits. ECF No. 49.

So Plaintiff’s brief and most of her exhibits were re-filed in redacted form at ECF No. 50; the complete unredacted versions remain under seal and may be considered by the court because Plaintiff promptly filed the narrowly redacted version. See LR 5.3(b)(3)(C)(ii), (iii)(2).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On or about October 29, 2021, Plaintiff sought medical treatment at TWP’s East Medical Center.2 Plaintiff was instructed to go sit in an examination room, where she would get her blood pressure taken.

Shortly after Plaintiff entered the examination room, Defendant Hammond entered and closed the door behind him. Plaintiff pulled her arm out from under her jacket so that Hammond could properly wrap the blood pressure cuff around her arm. When Plaintiff pulled her arm out from under her jacket, her bra was exposed and, due to the fact that she had a hole in her bra, so was her breast. Hammond sat down in a chair next to Plaintiff while he wrapped the cuff around Plaintiff’s arm.

Once Hammond wrapped the cuff around Plaintiff’s arm, he leaned down and began sucking and licking the nipple of Plaintiff’s exposed breast. Hammond simultaneously grabbed Plaintiff’s hand and forced

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “Entry of default and a default judgment are distinct events that require separate treatment.” Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Baroda Enters., LLC, 220 F.R.D. 303, 304 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (internal citation omitted). An entry of default is a prerequisite to a default judgment.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” An entry of default “conclusively establishes every factual predicate of a claim for relief.” Thomas v. Miller, 489 F.3d 293, 299 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Harmon v. CSX Transp., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)). However, entry of a default does not establish damages. See Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Kelley v. Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831, 841 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (“A default judgment on well-pleaded allegations establishes only defendant’s liability; plaintiff must still establish the extent of damages.”). Thus, the plaintiff is required to provide proof of all damages sought in the complaint. See John E. Green Plumbing and Heating Co., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1984) (“We recognize that the law ‘does not require impossibilities’ when it comes to proof of damages, but it does require whatever ‘degree of certainty tha[t] the nature of the case admits.’”) (internal citations omitted). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) allows courts to conduct hearings in order to “determine the amount of damages” so it may effectuate a judgment.

Because a default has been entered, all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations, except those relating to damages, are deemed to be admitted. However, the facts must still be “sufficient to support a finding of liability as to each defendant” as to each claim. Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2006). “In other words, the complaint must be able to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Howard v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC, No. 17-12724, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45175, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2020).

IV. ANALYSIS A. Default As to Liability 1) Count I: Assault and Battery “A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such contact.” Rowlery v. Genesee Cty., 54 F. Supp. 3d 763, 772-73 (E.D.

Mich. 2014) (citing Espinoza v. Thomas, 189 Mich. App. 110, 119 (1991)) (second citation omitted). An assault is the intent to commit a battery; the presence of a battery presumes the existence of an assault. See Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401 (1940). Hammond willfully and intentionally committed an offensive touching of Plaintiff, and is liable for assault and battery.

2) Count II: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress. Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 602 (1985).

By virtue of defaulting, Hammond has admitted that his sexual assault was extreme and outrageous, that he intended to commit it and to cause severe emotional distress or in reckless disregard to the risk of such harm, and that his conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress.

See ECF No. 1, PageID.8; see Swain v. Morse, 332 Mich. App. 510, 536 (2020).

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is therefore GRANTED as to Counts I and II.

B. Remedies The only remaining matter is to ascertain Plaintiff’s damages with “reasonable certainty.” Vesligaj v. Peterson, 331 F. App’x. 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where damages are unliquidated a default admits only defendant’s liability and the amount of damages must be proved”) (citation omitted). While Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) gives courts the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing, damages may also be ascertained through evidence on the record. Vesligaj, 331 F. App’x at 355. The court may, for example, rely on affidavits and other documentary evidence. Garrett v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 24-cv- 12790, 2025 LX 119563, at *3, 2025 WL 1524457 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2025).

In tort cases, actual damages include damages for all the legal and natural consequences of an injury, including economic loss, pain and suffering, and mental and emotional distress. Hannay v. Dep’t of Transp., 497 Mich. 45, 65 (2014). That may include past and future pecuniary losses (including medical expenses, lost wages, or lost earning capacity) and past and future nonpecuniary damages (such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, denial of social pleasure, embarrassment, or humiliation). See Davis v. Ivy, No. 11-10803, 2013 LX 77550, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 26, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-10803, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155982, at *1, 2013 WL 5902035 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2013) (citing Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 448 Mich. 239, 251 & n. 32 (1995)).3 1) Economic Damages Plaintiff’s claims for economic damages primarily sound in her claim that, in fear and anxiety of Hammond knowing her address (as her medical provider), Plaintiff packed up her family and moved out of state. See ECF No. 50-2, PageID.357-58 (affidavit). Plaintiff says she became afraid to live in Southeast Michigan and sold her home for less than it was worth because Defendant Hammond had access to her address, phone number, and personal information on her medical

Plaintiff did not seek these damages, however, and so the court does not award records. See ECF No. 50, PageID.339 (brief). Plaintiff argues that, due to this fear and significant breach of trust by a medical provider, Plaintiff left everything behind—except what she could fit into her car.

See id. In this process, Plaintiff allegedly lost her music production equipment and accessories of her music production company, her main source of income. Because Plaintiff’s company was run from her home, she says that she lost everything when she left the state.

Given that Defendant has not appeared or presented controverting evidence, the court will ultimately not question Plaintiff’s sworn statements that she fled the state for fear of Defendant, even several months after the event, and will credit Plaintiff’s explanation that the primary reason for that move and immediate economic loss was Defendant’s conduct and the resulting emotional distress, anxiety, and paranoia. But overall, the court is not convinced that each of Plaintiff’s travel expenses over multiple moves and multiple states are attributable solely to Defendant’s conduct, nor does the evidence show those facts by the preponderance of the evidence or reasonable certainty.

For example, the court is not convinced that Plaintiff’s decision not to hire a moving van when leaving Michigan is attributable to Defendant’s conduct, or that the loss of her music equipment is fairly considered an economic loss resulting from his conduct. Nor are ordinary living expenses attributable to Defendant’s conduct, because at least some amount of housing cost and ordinary living expenses would have been incurred by Plaintiff even had she remained in her prior home. The court can compensate her mental anguish and emotional harms done to her through noneconomic damages, but these particular harms are too downstream of the conduct at issue to be recoverable.

Plaintiff’s sale of her old home and purchase of a new home is also insufficiently related to Defendant’s conduct to be recoverable, and the court does not award any amount of that cost. The evidence indicates that Plaintiff sold her old home for less than it was worth, but it is not explained whether the proceeds of the sale were used solely to pay off a mortgage and thus no cash was generated, or whether she was able to pocket any cash that was then used for some of these other expenses. It is also likely the case that there were options available other than selling the home, such as renting the property. The court finds that any economic damage incurred by that sale and subsequent purchase is too attenuated from Hammond’s actions to be recoverable, and that any damage from those events was in any case not established with reasonable certainty.

That leaves the costs associated with Plaintiff’s various moves when leaving Michigan and the housing costs as a result of those moves. The court finds that the evidence shows Plaintiff’s initial move from Michigan was at least in part attributable to her credible fear of Defendant, so the court would award some percentage, perhaps 40%, of her housing expenses from December 2021 to January 2022, though would not award any damages for food and clothing or other necessities during that time. However, on review of Plaintiff’s briefing, she does not actually attach any evidence for the fact that her expenses were $4,000 at the Red Roof Inn. That statement is her counsel’s assertion in her brief – Plaintiff’s affidavit, for example, does not address that amount, and no receipts are attached. See ECF No. 50, PageID.346; ECF No. 50-2, PageID.358. So the court cannot award any damages in this regard with “reasonable certainty.”

Subsequent moves are likewise in part attributable to Defendant’s original conduct and Plaintiff’s initial move from Michigan based on her fear of Defendant, but each of these successive moves significantly attenuates the chain of causation. See ECF No. 48, PageID.245 (“insect infestation, financial hardship, and other extenuating circumstances” forced them to move again); ECF No. 48-3, PageID.263 (relocating again for unexplained reasons). The court would award 25% of these expenses in recognition that she would likely not have left Michigan at all but for Hammond’s conduct, but some of these expenses are again unsupported by evidence. For example, $1,750 allegedly spent on 5 weeks of housing is not accounted for by any particular line item that the court can see.

Charges related to that stay appear to be incidental expenses while at that location, not a particular hotel. See ECF No. 48-11. The court awards 25% of the expenses involved in moving from state to state, exclusive of food, clothing, and other necessities, and only regarding those expenses that can be calculated with “reasonable certainty.” The court calculates this amount to be $421.48.4 Plaintiff does not explain or provide evidence to back up any lost wages attributable to Hammond’s conduct, and so the court ignores the allegation regarding the loss of the business run from her home.

2) Noneconomic damages The far greater amount of her damages are her noneconomic damages. Since the assault, Plaintiff alleges that she has continually suffered severe mental anguish, PTSD, anxiety, depression, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, mortification and embarrassment, and constant fear and anxiety. On the day of the assault, she was diagnosed with dyspnea, hypertension, tachycardia, and tachypnea. ECF No. 48- 1; ECF No. 50, PageID.341. Plaintiff subsequently sought and received treatment and medical care for anxiety, paranoia, and other mental health conditions from Avalon Healing Services, Team Mental Health Services, and DWIHN.5 On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff presented for a psychiatric evaluation with Gerald A. Shiener, M.D. ECF No. 48-4. Dr. Shiener’s diagnostic impression of Plaintiff (notably, four years after the event) was that the sexual assault severely impacted her mental health and relationships. ECF No. 48-4, PageID.272.

ECF No. 50, PageID.342. The court notes that the negative impact of sexual assault on a plaintiff’s relationships, family, behavior, and general wellbeing may be considered, including lost relationships with children and parents, sleeplessness, depression, and anxiety. See Buetenmiller v. Cogswell, No. 20-11031, 2022 LX 40353, at *24 (E.D.

Mich. July 8, 2022) (citing Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 813 (2d Cir. 1997)). The court finds that Plaintiff has proven that she suffered mental anguish, anxiety, depression, loss of enjoyment of life, humiliation, mortification and embarrassment, and fear and anxiety, all of which are compensable.

The court also considers comparable cases. In assessing non- economic damages, “[a] review of other cases involving sexual assaults reflects that they frequently trigger substantial compensatory awards, typically in the low-to-mid hundreds of thousands of dollars.” See Offei v. Mahmoud Abdel-Salam Omar, No. 11-cv-4283, 2012 WL 2086294, at *5, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80171, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (citing cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2086356, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80144 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2012); see also Sarhadi v. Geever, No. 1:24-cv-31, 2025 LX 297737, at *18-19 (N.D.N.Y. July 22, 2025) (awarding $600,000 where plaintiff was raped once, had PTSD and depression, and terminated a pregnancy); Angulo v. 36th St. Hospitality LLC, 19-cv-5075, 2020 WL 4938188, at *12-14, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137816, at *32-38 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020) (awarding $300,000 in emotional distress damages where defendant raped plaintiff once and harassed her on an ongoing basis), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4936961, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153278 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020); see also A.B. v. Staropoli, No. 08-4585, 2013 WL 12441525, at *6-8, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206771, at *19-25 (awarding $600,000 in compensatory damages where plaintiff, a minor, was groomed and sexually abused in numerous instances by defendant, her soccer coach, but noting that there was “little evidence” concerning the plaintiff's more recent psychological state).6 Cases in this circuit award similar numbers, if sometimes slightly more modest. See McPeters v. Thomas, No. 3:18-39, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50478, 2021 WL 1033240, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2021) ($250,000 default judgment where a probationer was sexually harassed by and forced to perform oral sex on her probation officer), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50264, 2021 WL 1030981 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2021), aff’d sub nom. McPeters v. Parker, No. 21-5401, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 12325, 2022 WL 1440652 (6th Cir. May 6, 2022); Mize v. Tedford, No. 08-10660, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45316, 2009 WL 1508375, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2009) ($350,000 default judgment for an individual who was raped by a police officer after a traffic stop), aff’d, 375 F. App’x 497 (6th Cir. 2010); Buetenmiller v. Cogswell, No. 20-11031, 2022 LX 40353, at *27 (E.D. Mich. July 8, 2022) (awarding $550,000 in compensatory damages per plaintiff where a jail medical director groped and digitally penetrated plaintiffs during All of these are S.D.N.Y. cases. The court found Sarhadi, which collected cases from that district, persuasive, and so the court repeats some of those citations here. The court does not find there to be a substantive reason to treat amounts awarded in that district for compensatory emotional damages as dramatically exams on one occasion each). Other cases, which involved facts not present here, resulted in higher default judgments in this state. See Langton v. Combalecer, No. 06-11987, 2008 WL 11504510, at *2 (E.D.

Mich. July 11, 2008) ($2 million default judgment for pain and suffering where a prisoner repeatedly was sexually harassed and assaulted by a psychiatrist over the course of two years); Morgan v. Wayne Cty., No. 17-12094, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63908, 2021 WL 1220870, at *3 (E.D.

Mich. Apr. 1, 2021) ($1 million default judgment to a prisoner who was sexually assaulted by another inmate and gave birth as a result of the assault); Wilcox v. Kalchert, No. 20-00234, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70846, 2022 WL 1138079, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70801, 2022 WL 1137054 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2022) ($1.5 million default judgment to a prisoner who was beaten and raped three times by a fellow inmate).

The facts here are offensive and the court does not doubt the harm to Plaintiff. In consideration of the facts of the complaint which are now taken as true, Plaintiff’s sworn statements as to the effect on her, the effect on Plaintiff’s relationships with her children, Plaintiff’s proven psychiatric condition (ECF No. 48-4), the circumstances of the assault, and that there is no controverting evidence presented for the court’s consideration in this posture, the court awards $250,000 in noneconomic compensatory damages.7 V. CONCLUSION Therefore, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to Counts I and II and finds Defendant Hammond liable to Plaintiff in the following amounts: $421.48 in economic damages and $250,000 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $250,421.48.

This opinion adjudges all remaining claims in this case. A separate and final order of judgment will follow, consistent with this opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Date: January 29, 2026 s/F. Kay Behm F. Kay Behm United States District Judge