District Court, W.D. Michigan, 2026

Harold Bryan Diaz Fernandez v. Warden, North Lake Correctional Facility et al.

District Court, W.D. Michigan · Decided March 5, 2026

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______ HAROLD BRYAN DIAZ FERNANDEZ, Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-152 v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering WARDEN, NORTH LAKE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al., Respondents. ____________________________/ OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)

In an Order entered on January 20, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted.1 (Order, ECF No. 6.) Respondents filed their response on January 23, 2026 (ECF No. 7), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 6, 2026 (ECF No. 9).

II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 7-2, PageID.109.) On or about July 28, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States at the Paso del Norte Bridge port of entry in El Paso, Texas. (Id.) At that time, Petitioner was paroled into the United States for a period of two years. (Id.; Form I-213, ECF No. 7-1, PageID.106.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (NTA, ECF No. 7-2, PageID.112.)

Petitioner subsequently applied for asylum. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Petitioner also applied for, and was granted, Temporary Protected Status (TPS),2 which was valid from May 2024

1 In this order, the Court dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent. (Order, ECF No. 6.) 2 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals of that state cannot return there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions,” unless the Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens] to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.”

Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)).

“Such a designation permits certain nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided in the United States since the effective date of the designation, to register for employment authorization and protection from deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). Additionally, there are other restrictions, including, for example, that applicants for TPS “must not have been ‘convicted of any felony or 2 or more misdemeanors committed in the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i)). Further, “TPS does to April 2025.3 (Form I-797A, ECF No. 2-3, PageID.19.) In May 2025, Petitioner received authorization to work in the United States. (Employment Authorization Card, ECF No. 2-8, PageID.39.) Petitioner is the primary financial support for his mother and has no criminal record. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Order of Immigration Judge, ECF No. 7-3, PageID.117.)

On July 27, 2025, ICE agents encountered and detained Petitioner while he was on his way to work. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) On September 30, 2025, while Petitioner was detained at North Lake Processing Center, ICE granted Petitioner parole until March 29, 2026, and released Petitioner.4 (Id.; Notification Granting Parole, ECF No. 2-2, PageID.17) A condition of that parole was that Petitioner report to ICE’s Detroit Field Office, beginning on October 8, 2025.

not provide beneficiaries with a pathway to permanent resident status, nor does it include any right to petition for visas on behalf of family members in the United States or abroad.” Id. With respect to TPS for Venezuela, “[o]n January 17, 2025, Secretary Mayorkas extended the 2023 [TPS] Designation by eighteen months, through October 2, 2026.” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2026) (footnote and citation omitted). “The extension was set to become effective on April 3, 2025,” the day after the 2023 TPS Designation was due to expire. Id. (citation omitted). “On January 24, 2025, DHS began drafting the decision to vacate the TPS extension” for Venezuela. Id. Thereafter, on January 26, 2025, “DHS began drafting a termination of Venezuela’s TPS.” Id. On January 28, 2025, Secretary Noem signed off on the decision to vacate the January 17, 2025, extension of TPS for Venezuela, meaning that the 2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela effectively expired on April 2, 2025. (Id.) Subsequently, on February 1, 2025, “Secretary Noem signed off on the termination [of TPS]” for Venezuela. Id. (citation omitted). Secretary Noem did not terminate the 2021 TPS Designation for Venezuela, however, the 2021 TPS Designation “had only been extended to September 10, 2025.” Id. (citation omitted).

4 The record before this Court contains little information regarding this parole outside of the document Petitioner provided. (Notification Granting Parole, ECF No. 2-2, PageID.17; Resp., ECF No. 7, PageID.91.) The document submitted by Petitioner indicates that Petitioner was “granted parole” and released from custody on September 30, 2025; however, there is nothing in the record before the Court that shows that the parole Petitioner received on September 30, 2025, was humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Cf. Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing that “parole into the United States,” which is typically granted at the border, is a term of art that is distinct from “conditional parole” under § 1226, and “parole into the United States” specifically refers to parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which “allows the executive to permit certain aliens ‘on a case-by-case basis’ to enter or remain in this country only for ‘urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit’”). (Notification Granting Parole, ECF No. 2-2, PageID.17.) When Petitioner appeared for that initial ICE check-in, Petitioner was re-detained and has been in detention since that time. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)

On December 12, 2025, DHS moved to pretermit Petitioner’s Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding Removal “based on the safe-third-country bar of INA § 208(a)(2)(A)” and the United States’s agreement with Ecuador. (Order of Immigration Judge, ECF No. 7-3, PageID.116, 117.) The Detroit Immigration Court held a hearing on this motion on December 15, 2025, and then granted that motion in an order entered on December 22, 2025. (Id., PageID.116, 117.) Because Petitioner had been “found removeable from the United States and made no other applications for relief,” the Immigration Court ordered that Petitioner be removed from the United States to Ecuador. (Id., PageID.118.) On December 29, 2025, Petitioner appealed that ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the appeal remains pending. (Filing Receipt for Appeal, ECF No. 7-4, PageID.121.) Because Petitioner has appealed the order of removal, that order is not “administratively final” for purposes of the INA.5 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).

5 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).

For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL 4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order (or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word ‘final’ in the first provision.”). Here, Petitioner filed an appeal with the BIA on December 29, 2025, and that appeal is pending. Therefore, § 1231 does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).

IV. Merits Discussion A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).6

Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).

6 In addition to arguing that Respondents are unlawfully subjecting Petitioner to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Petitioner contends that Respondents have unlawfully detained Petitioner despite Petitioner’s TPS. (See, e.g., ECF No. 4.) Based on this, Petitioner seeks immediate release, alleging a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4), which provides that if a noncitizen has TPS, then the noncitizen “shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). As set forth above, Secretary Noem vacated the extension of the 2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela and then signed off on the termination of TPS for Venezuela. See supra note 3. The validity of Secretary Noem’s actions regarding TPS for Venezuela is currently being litigated. In October 2025, the United States Supreme Court allowed the termination of TPS for Venezuela to take effect pending the Government’s appeal and “disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.” Noem v. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2025). On January 28, 2026, in National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739 (9th Cir. 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of California’s finding that Secretary Noem exceeded her statutory authority by revoking TPS protections for Venezuelans and Haitians. At this time, based on the procedural history of National TPS Alliance v. Noem, this Ninth Circuit case does not affect the Court’s analysis in this habeas action. Cf. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. at 24 (allowing the termination of TPS for Venezuelan nationals to take effect pending the Government’s appeal). Therefore, although the Court will conditionally grant Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.7 The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.

Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25- cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).8 B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received “notice, counsel, and a hearing before an immigration judge[.]”

The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will not grant Petitioner’s request for immediate release based on Petitioner’s prior TPS.

7 For the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 because the NTA charged him as an “arriving alien” (see Resp., ECF No. 7, PageID.98), and the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. 8 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At this time, this non-binding case does not change the Court’s analysis.

Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.

Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).

V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.

Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment conditionally granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment with notice to the Parties as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody.9 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with this Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.

Dated: March 5, 2026 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days, even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.