The plaintiffs sued to recover their charges for sawing for defendants a large quantity of lumber under a contract, a copy of which appears in the margin.* *454The larger portion of their bill had been paid, and the defense to the remainder was that the lumber was damaged by bad sawing, and also that great delay occurred in doing the work, from which the defendants suffered damages to a considerable amount.

The case was sent by the circuit court to a referee, and comes before us on his findings and on a bill of exceptions. The bill of exceptions is peculiar in that it is silent respecting the proof of the plaintiffs’ case. It is of course to be assumed that the plaintiffs made a jprima facie case, but in the absence of any statement how this was done and on proof of what facts, we are somewhat embarrassed in considering *455the exceptions of the plaintiffs, who are the party now complaining.

The first exception is to the admission of evidence on the part of defendants that they had made a measurement of the lumber sawed under the contract, which they completed on the Monday preceding the trial; which was on the tenth day of April, 1878, and more than a year after the sawing was completed. A reference to the contract will show that this was not such a measurement as was contemplated by its terms. But in the absence of any explanation we cannot say that this was inadmissible. A sti’ict compliance with the terms of the contract in respect to .measurement may have become impossible, ór may have been waived; and under such circumstances the parties must arrive at the quantity as best they might. Measurement by either or both as delivery was made would have been admissible, and under any circumstances would have been proper, to guard against frauds or mistakes on the part of the scales agreed upon. And if measurement was not made at delivery, it might be made afterwards.

The second exception relates to the following question put to the defendant Field when on the stand as a witness, and the answer thereto: Question. “ Have you heard anything which goes to affect the correctness of the scale made by the plaintiffs? when, and from whom?” Answer. “From Frank "Whittaker and John Newton, within the last three weeks; one within the last ten days.” This is said to be hearsay. Had the witness stated what he had heard, it would have been improper, but it might.be entirely competent for him to state that he had but recently had occasion to doubt the correctness of the plaintiff’s scale. We are without explanation here as we are in respect to the preceding exception ; but it is possible for this evidence to have been proper, and we must presume it was.

A third exception, resting on the same ground as the first, requires no further notice.

The referee found that the plaintiffs began the sawing July 6, 1876, and continued it to December 1, 1876, having then *456sawed 2,323,356 feet; that they resumed sawing April 14,, 1877, and completed the job June 9, 1877.

That defendants found fault with the sawing as it progressed, and that 300,000 feet of this lumber was injured by bad sawing to the amount of $300.

That the defendants suffered damages by reason of the sawing not having been completed as agreed, to the amount of $414.79.

That after deducting from the plaintiff’s bill the payments made and the damages suffered as above, there remained due to the plaintiffs $1011.91.

The damages suffered by the defendants from the delay were computed by the referee as follows: Value of time spent in caring for the lumber the second year that should have been sawed the first, $150; additional expenses in moving the lumber to Lockwood, $175 ; interest on value of logs which by reason of the delay defendants could not have the benefit of the first year, $89.79. All these items are objected to, as is also the evidence upon which the referee computed them. But we do not find in the record any valid objection, either to the evidence or to the conclusions. It is true that, as to this last item, the defendants were not entitled to interest'as such, but the circumstances may have been such that the rate of interest constituted a very fair measure of the damages actually suffered. Suppose, for example, the defendants by the delay were deprived for a year' of the opportunity of putting their lumber upon the market as they intended and desired, and in the meantime the market price remained stationary, nothing could be nearer exact justice than to award damages equivalent to the lawful interest. The damages will not be interest, but the rate of interest will very justly measure them.

It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that it was not made to appear before the referee that defendants could have sold their lumber the first year if they had had it. As to this we do not know how the fact was. The bill of exceptions does not contain all the evidence, and the presumption is that all the referee’s conclusions were supported by proofs. More*457over if an article has a market value, it is presumptively salable. Some other objections to the recovery are based upon the supposed absence of sufficient showing, and are equally untenable.

We discover no error in the action of the circuit court confirming the report of the referee, and it must be affirmed with posts.