(after stating the facts). A libel is a malicious publication, tending to expose a person to contempt, ridicule, hatred, or degradation of character. Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 390 (30 Am. Rep. 367), and authorities cited. “Words are to be understood in their plain and natural import, according to the ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are addressed.” 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 378. Or, as Lord Ellen-borough stated in Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93, 96, “words are now construed by courts, as they always ought to have been, in the plain and popular sense in which the rest of the world naturally understand them.” Wieman v. Mabee, 45 Mich. 484 (40 Am. Rep. 477); Brettun v. Anthony, 103 Mass. 37. What the article referred to in the communication as having appeared in This Week was, does not appear. It is not given. It is certainly not defamatory to say that that paper “will *254retract its former statement, and publish the facts in the case from my side.”- Neither is it defamatory to say that plaintiff got up the raffle without the consent of the defendant Gladman, or that the defendant Gladman was opposed to it. To oppose it would be very creditable. There is no defamation in the statement that the defendant Gladman had received nothing from the result of the raffle, or that the mortgage was still in the hands of the collector to foreclose. The letter does not charge that plaintiff had received any of the money resulting from the raffle, or that he had anything to do with the matter any further than to appoint a committee. The article cannot be fairly construed into charging plaintiff with having received the money, and a refusal to pay it over. Fairly construed, it means no more than that plaintiff got up a raffle without the consent of defendant Gladman; that he appointed a committee to take charge of it; that defendant Gladman has received nothing from it; that plaintiff said he had received no money from it; that some members purchased tickets (but does not charge that they were purchased of the plaintiff); and that defendant Gladman states the facts, so that those who bought may get their money back. There is nothing in the article which can be construed into charging criminal or degrading conduct on the' part of the plaintiff. No claim is made in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff that this article is libelous because it charges him with engaging in a lottery scheme. If this were so, the article would clearly be libelous, and the judgment should be reversed. The only reason claimed for holding that this article is libelous is that it imputed the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses and the crime of embezzlement.

Judgment affirmed.

(dissenting). I am of the opinion that the demurrer should not have been sustained. It is *255obvious that the alleged article charges a crime under 3 Comp. Laws 1897, § 11344, which- punishes by fine not •exceeding $2,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, those who engage in lottery schemes. This makes it libelous per se. To my mind, the language of the article -declared upon is susceptible of the' interpretation given it hy the innuendo, viz., that the plaintiff had procured money from the friends of the defendant Grladman upon a raffle gotten up by the plaintiff for the professed, purpose of relieving the necessities of the defendant Gladman, but that he had not applied it to such purpose, and had denied laving received any money from the raffle. It is said that the words must be given their natural meaning, which forbids such a construction; but this cannot be, or there would be no occasion for the use of innuendoes. Words- many times do not, upon their face, fully convey the meaning intended or understood. Sometimes, when used ironically, they mean the exact opposite of their commonly understood meaning. It is competent to show this by the circumstances under which they are used, but in such cases an innuendo becomes necessary. The meaning may depend upon the inflection, emphasis, or manner of the speaker. So, when the libel consists of a picture. 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 394; Edwards v. Chandler, 14 Mich. 471 (90 Am. Dec. 249); Ewing v. Ainger, 96 Mich. 593; Simons v. Burnham, 102 Mich. 193 et seq. It is elementary that, when words are susceptible of two or more constructions, the jury must determine the meaning (13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 378 et seq., and 385); and we should not apply the rule that words are to be understood in their plain and natural meaning where the circumstances (as set up in an inducement or indicated by the alleged libel) under which they were spoken or published show that they were intended and understood differently. We are not trying the merits of this case, and we must take these words as charged. If we do, they are libelous, both because they charge a crime, and because they charge dishonesty in withholding funds received for a given purpose.

*256The order of the circuit court should be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.