In re Lambrecht
Cases that cite this one
35 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n (Mich. 2006)
- People v. Couch (Mich. 1990)
- People v. Schultz (Mich. 1990)
- Automotive Service Councils v. Secretary of State (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
- Rockwell v. Crestwood School District Board of Education (Mich. 1975)
- Rushton v. Schram (6th Cir. 1944)
- People v. Lowell (Mich. 1930)
- People v. Chesebro (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
- In re Wright (Mich. 1960)
- Thompson v. Graham (District Court, D. Utah 1956)
- Elliott v. Department of Corrections (Mich. 1955)
- Emanuelli Fontánez v. District Court of Puerto Rico (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1953)
- Hemans v. United States (6th Cir. 1947)
- Luff v. State (Ohio 1925)
- Klug v. Auditor General (Mich. 1916)
- Price v. Township Board (Mich. 1915)
- Donohue v. Vosper (Mich. 1915)
- In re Forscutt (Mich. 1911)
- People v. Schoenberg (Mich. 1910)
- People v. Vitali (Mich. 1909)
- Board of Supervisors v. Board of Supervisors (Mich. 1909)
- Ocasio v. Díaz (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1963)
- Ocasio v. Díaz (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1963)
- Figueroa Fuentes v. Díaz (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1953)
- Emanuelli Fontánez v. Tribunal de Distrito de Puerto Rico (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1953)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
{after stating the facts).
Is the act retroactive F The legislative intent must govern when it can be ascertained. “ It is a sound rule of construction that a statute should have a prospective operation only, unless its terms show clearly a legislative intention that it should operate retrospectively.” Cooley,
“A thing which is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, although not within the letter; and the thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention.” Common Council of Detroit v. Rush, 82 Mich. 542 (46 N. W. 951, 10 L. R. A. 171).
We are therefore of the opinion that the legislature, im providing for the sentence of persons “hereafter convicted of crime,” intended only crimes committed after the act took effect.
*455 “Not unfrequently a clause is inserted in a statute repealing all laws in conflict or inconsistent with it, ‘ contravening ’ it, or the like. If the provisions of the former and present enactments are in direct contrariety, the repeal takes place, but only to the extent of the repugnance. If, on the other hand, by any reasonable contracting, expanding, cutting short, or extending of the old laws or the new, as explained in the foregoing chapter, they can be brought into harmony without repeal, the interpretation should be so, and all suffered to stand together.” Bishop on Stat. Crimes, par. 2, § 152.
See, also, Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330. Where a subsequent act is absolutely repugnant to and inconsistent with any other provisions of a prior act, the former act is repealed to the extent of such repugnance only, and the repugnancy must be clear and unavoidable. Connors v. Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168 (19 N. W. 938); Tillotson v. City of Saginaw, 94 Mich. 240 (54 N. W. 162); Crane v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 111 Mich. 496 (69 N. W. 721).
A statute in conflict with a prior statute in so far as the one is in conflict with the other, is no more effective as a repeal than if such repealing clause were omitted. In either case the former statute is repealed in so far as the later one is in conflict with it. In Murphy v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 264 (52 N. E. 505, 43 L. R. A. 154, 70 Am. St. Rep. 266), the indeterminate sentence act is nearly identical in its terms with that of Michigan. It was held that it did not repeal a prior act which entitled a prisoner to a deduction for good behavior. The court in that case Said:
‘ ‘ To hold that that statute operates by necessary implication as a repeal of it to that extent, as it would seem that we should be obliged to do if the statute of 1895 (Stat. 1895, chap. 504) is construed to apply to all sentences to State prison after it took effect, whether the offenses occurred before or after it went into operation (Flaherty v. Thomas, 12 Allen, 428, and Commonwealth v. McDonough, 13 Allen, 581), would result in the discharge of all persons who might have been sentenced under it to the State prison for offenses committed before it took effect.*456 On the other hand, by construing it, as we think properly may be done pursuant to the general rule that statutes are to be construed prospectively, to apply to sentences for offenses committed after it took effect, this difficulty will be avoided.”
After the first act providing for indeterminate sentences was declared unconstitutional (People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249 [50 N. W. 310, 14 L. R. A. 285]), the people adopted a constitutional amendment authorizing such sentences. The present act was passed in accord with that amendment. It was not intended to repeal any of the statutes providing for criminal offenses. It recognized such crimes as still existing under the various laws of the State, and provided only a new mode or character of punishment, which the people and the legislature believed would tend to the reformation of criminals. It was evidently intended, and should be regarded, rather as an amendment to the criminal statutes. We must therefore hold that it did not operate as a repeal of the statute under which the petitioner was convicted.
The sentence for the minimum time is therefore affirmed, and the prisoner remanded to complete that term of imprisonment, in accordance with the law and rules in existence at the time of the commission of the crime.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.