Appellees, doing business as tbe Hotel Tuller, gave notice to quit and demand for possession of property in Detroit described in the notice and also in tbe subsequent complaint for repossession as

“Tbe one-story building on tbe southeast corner of tbe east % of Lot 24, Block No. 12, of Governor and Judges Plan, located in tbe City of Detroit, State of Michigan.”

Defendant leased tbe premises on a month-tomontb basis. Plaintiffs prevailed in a suit to recover possession before a circuit court commissioner. On appeal to tbe circuit court, tbe judgment for restitution was affirmed. Defendant appeals to this court. Defendant contends on appeal that tbe description in tbe notice to quit as well as tbe complaint for possession was insufficient; that it only sought possession of tbe building and not of tbe land on which it stood. He further claims that be owned tbe building and that tbe court improperly excluded an answer to a question as to whether be bad been paying rent for the building and tbe ground occupied by it. Tbe case was tried without a jury.

Tbe trial judge in rendering a judgment stated that it would be without prejudice to tbe ownership of tbe building on the premises described in tbe complaint. Defendant became tenant of tbe premises in 1937 and at tbe time obtained a bill of sale from Vivian McBride, a former tenant. Tbe bill of sale covered “a movable brick building 14x16 and height about 9 ft. with a tar paper roof known as 128 Bagley Avenue, Detroit, Michigan,” together with stock in trade, various equipment and trade fixtures, tbe stock in trade being valued at $144.41. The total purchase price of the property described was $850. There was no showing whatsoever as to *188 who erected the brick building or that Vivian McBride had owned it, whether the brick building had been erected by the former lessor or by a tenant, and whether there was any agreement that the tenant could remove it. During the eight years the premises were occupied by defendant, he received each month from the Tuller Hotel a bill addressed to defendant, billing him for rent for the “refreshment stand. ’ ’ The building itself consisted of a one-story brick building built on a concrete slab to which the building was cemented, the concrete slab being a foot or fifteen inches below the surface of the ground. The brick started from the top of the slab.

"We believe that the notice to quit was sufficient and that defendant was not deceived thereby. It described the premises with sufficient accuracy so that there could not possibly be any mistake. While from a strictly technical point of view, there might be some criticism as to the notice, it distinctly described the property. If plaintiffs claimed ownership of the building, they might have been precluded from asserting such ownership had they worded their notice differently. Unquestionably the notice showed that plaintiffs wanted repossession of the premises. The judge correctly decided that they were entitled to it under the notice given. He fully protected defendant in not making any determination of the ownership of the building. In view of our decision, we need not enter into the other questions as to whether the building was personal property or so attached to the realty as to become part of it, or the effect of the sale of the property to the State for taxes and subsequently at “scavenger sale, ’ ’ or the many other questions raised.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs to plaintiffs.