In March, 1947, plaintiff obtained a judgment against Charles F. Budds for $15,200, with costs, which remains unsatisfied.

On July 15, 1947, plaintiff garnisheed the Hubbard State Bank to collect the judgment. The bank filed a disclosure denying liability to the principal defendant and representing that the moneys in the bank were the property of Ann M. Budds, his wife.

Ann M. Budds, by stipulation and court order, was permitted to intervene in the garnishment proceedings and filed a motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment on 2 grounds — (1) that the funds belonged to her; and (2) that plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the statute * providing for garnishment proceedings against a nonresident principal defendant.

At the hearing before the circuit judge, counsel for Ann M. Budds and for the plaintiff stipulated in open court that Ann M. Budds waived her objection to the claimed jurisdictional defect in the proceeding and plaintiff waived any right to appeal; *201 and on that basis said parties submitted tbe matter to the court for final decision on tbe merits, without appeal.

Tbe circuit judge beld that tbe fund belonged to Ann M. Budds, entered judgment against tbe plaintiff, and no appeal was taken. Eleven days later plaintiff instituted a second garnishment against tbe same bank, on tbe same judgment, in which proceedings tbe garnishee defendant bank made tbe same disclosure as before. Ann M. Budds again intervened, again claimed tbe fund, and moved tbe court to dismiss tbe proceedings on tbe ground that the previous judgment was res judicata, and that tbe issuance of tbe second writ was a gross abuse of process.

Tbe trial court so beld, and from tbe order dismissing tbe writ of garnishment tbe plaintiff appeals. Her counsel claims — (1) that inasmuch as tbe first garnishment proceeding was void because of jurisdictional defects; and (2) because there is nothing to indicate that tbe fund garnisheed in the instant proceeding is tbe same as that claimed in tbe previous garnishment, tbe court erred in dismissing the writ.

We find no merit in either claim. Tbe question in tbe first casé as to tbe jurisdictional defect was waived and was not decided. Insofar as tbe present case is concerned, tbe former writ was not void. That case was submitted on its merits as to whether Ann M. Budds was tbe owner of tbe funds in tbe bank. On being served with tbe second writ 11 days later, tbe bank disclosed tbe same amount of money in its possession as before, and that it belonged to Ann M. Budds, as before disclosed. Nothing in this record tends to show tbe contrary. Plaintiff made no showing of any other funds or any change of condition in the interim between tbe issuance of tbe 2 writs, and tbe disclosure of tbe garnishee defendant *202 was not controverted at the hearing on the motion. On this record, the court’s finding in the first case is res judicata of plaintiff’s rights against the bank, and the issuance of the instant writ was a gross abuse of process.

Appellant now makes a claim that she is not barred by the unappealed judgment in the previous garnishment, because of her stipulation not to appeal from that decision. There is no merit in the claim.

“Where an arbitration agreement provides that any controversy between the parties thereunder shall be submitted to the circuit court, and that its decision shall be final, such agreement is valid and binding on the parties, though it ousts the Supreme Court of jurisdiction of an appeal, and precludes a review of the decision of the circuit court.

“On grounds of public policy, litigants should be encouraged to accept as final the decisions of courts of original jurisdiction.” Hoste v. Dalton (syllabi), 137 Mich 522.

Affirmed, with costs to appellees.