(after stating the facts). The chancellor was right, for reasons considered at length in Porter v. Landis, 329 Mich 76, in holding that the deed created an entirety tenancy and that its designation of the grantees as husband and wife is not under these pleadings open to contradiction.

The principal cases on which defendants rely are readily distinguishable. Wright v. Kaynor, 150 Mich 7, presented the instance of a deed which did not describe or designate the 2 grantees as husband and wife. In McNitt v. McNitt, 230 Mich 303, no written instrument was produced or involved; the claim being one of oral agreement (p 304) “that the property should be conveyed to plaintiff and her husband jointly.” In Scott v. Grow, 301 Mich 226 (141 ALR 819), the deed in scrutiny did not identify the 2 grantees as husband and wife. Rather, they were designated as “tenants by entireties and not as joint tenants.” In Collins v. Norris, 314 Mich 145, the evidentiary question on which Porter turns wás not raised or considered. In Cristia v. Cristia, 317 Mich 66, language appears which doubtless tends to sustain defendants’ position. However, the suit, was for divorce, in which case the chancellor js eTnpowqred *546 without/regard for the question now considered to settle and determine property rights as between the contending husband and wife. For these reasons we conclude that the authorities on which defendants rely are inapplicable to the case before us.

The point most earnestly stressed by defendants is that they have a right to formal trial of what they specify as allegations of fraud. Such allegations are limited to the following:

“3. That at the inception or time of the execution of said deed to parties as grantees, as husband and wife, the plaintiff had full knowledge that she was not the wife of Alexander Franklin, but she was the wife of one Scott "Webb.

.“4. That the plaintiff’s conduct and her knowledge, at the time of taking title to said real estate, that she was not the wife of Alexander Franklin, constituted fraud and deceit upon Alexander Franklin and his heirs.”

•■-■We perceive that these allegations make no issue •of fraud. Since the defendant heir — likewise the defendant fiduciary — stands, at best, in the shoes of his father, he became obligated if desirous of success to plead a case of actionable fraud upon his father. This he has not done. His cross bill is not supported by pleaded conclusions of fact on which it may be said that fraud or deceit in the preparation, delivery and recording of the deed was in some manner perpetrated by Lucy upon and against Alexander. That Lucy knew, on the occasion, that she was not in fact the wife of Alexander, of itself would constitute no fraud on Alexander. For aught these pleadings show, Alexander also may have known that Lucy was not his wife. Indeed, with such knowledge he may have caused the deed in question to be prepared in its present form and promptly recorded. If so *547 Alexander, and bis beir in turn, would bé unable to plead and prove actionable deceit.

Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.