Henderson v. William Moors Concrete Products, Inc.
Henderson v. William Moors Concrete Products, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
Defendant, acting through its employee, Charles Johns, delivered a load of cinder blocks to a site where plaintiff’s employer, a contractor, was erecting a house. The blocks measured-12 by 16 by 8 inches and weighed 45 pounds each. At the contractor’s request, Johns took a shovel, leveled an area of earth which was sandy, placed on it a number of planks, 2 inches thick and 8 or 10 inches wide, in 4 parallel and contiguous rows and piled the blocks on the planks. The blocks were stacked in 3 rows. The center row straddled the joint between the 2 center planks and a row of blocks on each side thereof covered the joint between one of the center and one of the outer row of planks. The 3 rows of blocks touched and apparently supported each other. They were stacked 10 and 11 blocks high. Johns knew that it had rained shortly before,
The court below granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to show negligence on defendant’s part which was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries and plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the case presented a question of fact for the jury as to those matters.
There can be no doubt that if the collapse of the pile of blocks was due to Johns’ negligence the latter was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Testimony, although disputed, that stacking the blocks 10 and 11, rather than only 8, high was contrary to the usual practice; that the higher stacking increased the danger of their falling; that the rows of planks upon which the blocks were piled stood
Defendant says that from the fact that the 2 rows of planks were not level on the day of accident an inference may not be drawn that they were uneven á days earlier when the blocks were delivered. In this connection it cites 20 Am Jur, Evidence, § § 158, 210, for the proposition that a presumption of continued existence of a state of things is prospective and not retrospective. It also cites Blank v. Township of Livonia, 79 Mich 1, in which this Court said that there was no presumption, merely because a wooden stringer of a bridge was defective from dry rot on a given date, that it was equally thus defective 7 months earlier when it had been inspected and the defect, so plaintiff contended, should have been discovered. Whatever the construction to be placed on our dicta in that case on the subject of presumption, it is inapplicable here where the problem is not one of presumption but of inference. We are
Plaintiff testified that in his 7 years of doing the kind of work in question, he had never removed blocks from a stack in a different manner than he did in this case, that is to say, one row at a time, and that never before had a pile of blocks fallen down while he was so removing- blocks therefrom. There was evidence that, because of the manner in which Johns had stacked them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiff to remove blocks from the 3 rows evenly by commencing at one end, and plaintiff testified that he could not have removed them other than in the manner he did. This is sufficient, in answer to defendant’s contention that plaintiff should have known that removal of the 2 rows would have left the third row unsupported and likely to fall, at least to make the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, in that respect, one of fact for the jury.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.