The essential facts and issues, presented by petition addressed to the circuit court pursuant to section 2 of the so-called Dodge act of 1921 (PA 1921, No 249), which act was re-enacted and superseded by part of the probate code of 1939, (CL 1948, §§ 702.45-702.48 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev §§ 27.3178(115)-27.3178(118)]), appear comprehensively in the first seven paragraphs of the chancellor’s opinion. Such paragraphs read:

“This is a contest over the validity of the purported last will and testament of Pansy Lee Reeder, *659dated April 17, 1961.1 The will contest was certified to this court on 19th day of March A. D. 1964. This will left the bulk of a two million dollar estate to Mrs. Esther Melin, a practical nurse, who was in her employ at the time of the execution of the 1961 will and until the time of her death. On October 25, 1958 Pansy Lee Reeder had executed a previous will which left the bulk of the estate in the trust for charities.

“Pansy Lee Reeder died on the 13th day of December, 1963, at the age of 78 years. Separate petitions for the probate of the 1961 will and the 1958 will were filed in the Genesee county probate court. The attorney general of the State of Michigan appeared and filed objections to the 1961 will, alleging fraud, undue influence, improper execution, and lack of testamentary capacity. Several of the charitable beneficiaries named in the 1961 and the 1958 will joined in the attorney general’s objections. All of the charitable beneficiaries named in the 1961 will and 1958 will appeared in the case. Substantial discovery has been had both here and in probate court. The final pretrial has been held. The depositions taken are part of the court file.

“A stipulation for the settlement of the contest has been negotiated and entered into, not only by all of the devisees, legatees and beneficiaries named in both the 1958 and 1961 wills, but also by all of the heirs at law of Pansy Lee Reeder. This stipulation has been approved by the corporate trustee named in the 1958 will. No trust was created under the terms of the 1961 will.

*660“The stipulation for settlement has been submitted to the court in accordance with paragraph 14 of the stipulation. This matter was brought on for hearing by counsel for the heirs at law of Pansy Lee Reeder as determined by the Genesee county probate court. Notice was given by the counsel for the heirs at law to all parties. Paragraph 13 of the stipulation for settlement provides that all the parties signing the stipulation waive notice of any hearing on the submission of the stipulation for approval. Counsel for several of the signatories to the stipulation appeared at the hearing which was held October 18, 1965 and the court was advised that they joined in the submission of the stipulation.

“The attorney general and the Genesee county prosecuting attorney have continuously refused to sign the stipulation. At the time of the hearing .representatives of the attorney general’s office appeared and argued in opposition to the settlement as contained in this stipulation. Arguments pro and con on this settlement and whether or not .it could be approved over the objection of the attorney general were also presented at the final pretrial.

“The court is faced with two basic questions in this case:

“ (1) Whether the court has the power and authority to approve the proposed settlement over the objection of the attorney general and the prosecuting' attorney.

“(2) Whether the terms of the proposed settlement are such that they ought to be approved by the court under the circumstances of the case.

“The attorney general asserts CL 1948, §§ 554.351, 554.352 (Stat Ann 1953 Rev §§ 26.1191, 26. 1192) as authority for his position, that he is a proper party to this will contest and that no settlement of this will contest can be made without his approval.”

For those interested in further detail of the differences between the testaments of 1958 and 1961, there apipears by appendix, infra, appellees’ com-*661preb.en.sive column by column comparison of tbe two.

Several critical aspects of the stated contentions of the attorney general and prosecuting attorney should be kept in constant mind. They suggest persuasively that the chancellor did not err.

The first is that this proceeding, having been instituted in circuit rather than probate,2 is purely equitable. With or without aid of the Dodge act, the chancellor was invested with plenary jurisdiction over the subject matter, plenary jurisdiction over all interested parties competent, and plenary jurisdiction over all other duly represented parties in interest, whether such parties are under legal disability or unknown, or are “uncertain or indefinite.” Such jurisdiction perforce included and now includes all those for whom the attorney general has appeared by authority of statute. Clothed with that jurisdiction, the chancellor was empowered to proceed with equity’s assigned task, that of determining whether the instrument in question (of 1961) was contested in good faith, and, if so, whether the compromise of that contest as proposed should be approved and executed by the then-before-the-court *662legal representatives of all whose interests equity should protect.

The jurisdiction below was conferred, not only by the Dodge act, but also by the inherent powers of equity. Section 48 of the probate code (CL 1948, § 702.48), formerly section 4 of the Dodge act, provides expressly that “The provisions of sections 45 through 47 of this chapter is [are, sic] intended to provide a definite method for the exercise of the existing power and jurisdiction of courts of probate and of chancery in addition to and in nowise in exclusion of any other regular method or methods of exercising such power and jurisdiction; but nevertheless if necessary to the validity or operative effect of this act or any part thereof, the same shall be deemed to be a grant of power and jurisdiction.” That the jurisdiction conferred by the Dodge act is not exclusive appears with clarity in the unanimous opinion of Metzner v. Newman (1923), 224 Mich 324. See Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co. (1942), 300 Mich 575, wherein the Court reviewed the background and litigation growing out of the John F. Dodge estate and the reasons for enactment and applicability of the Dodge act itself. At page 604 the Court found occasion to refer to Metzner v. Newman in these words:

“In passing, we call attention to Metmer v. Newman (1923), 224 Mich 324 (33 ALU 98), where we held that the chancery court had jurisdiction, independent of that statute [the Dodge act], to adjudicate the rights and equities of infants by approving, as in the best interests of such minors, a settlement agreement compromising litigation involving a will contest.”

The second is that no representative or other fiduciary officer, whether appointed by order of court, by will, by trust agreement or other legal instru*663ment, or as here by election to executive office and enabling statute, may in any equity proceeding effectively substitute bis or its judgment of what by way of compromise is best done, on bebalf of the beneficially interested persons or parties thus represented, for the judgment of the equity court itself. Here this equity court was duly called upon to perform an assigned task of judicial power, a power reserved exclusively to the third branch by Const 1963, art 3, § 2. True, any such representative or fiduciary may freely litigate the merits and then review the judgment of the court, but be may not usurp or otherwise defeat the vested judicial power without offense to the principle of separation of powers. Nor may the legislature vest him with any such power. See T. M. Kavanagh, J., writing for the Court in Gray v. Clerk of Common Pleas Court (1962), 366 Mich 588, 595, and the flat declaration of Justices Cooley, Campbell, Maeston, and Graves in Allor v. Wayne County Auditors (1880), 43 Mich 76, 96, 97:

“Upon that subject it is for most purposes enough to say that no court, in tbe exercise of its functions, can be lawfully subjected to tbe control or interference of any executive or ministerial authority, or can receive directions for any purpose except from such other courts as are authorized by tbe Constitution to have ‘superintending control over inferior courts.’ No court has a right to allow any other interference or to submit to it.”

These limitations upon the authority of appointed representatives of others are demonstrated best, perhaps, by the exhaustive opinion of the chancellor which the Court adopted in Detroit v. Detroit United Railway (1924), 226 Mich 354, referring particularly to the controlling jurisdiction of equity as regards trusts, trustees, and beneficiaries of trusts commenc*664ing on page 361, or, possibly, by this summary which, appears in another Dodge act proceeding, Detroit Trust Company v. Neubauer (1949), 325 Mich 319, 335, 336:

“The rights of all interested in an estate who are under disability to represent themselves, and all interests of such a nature that those who will be the ultimate recipients may not be in being or cannot be ascertained, shall be protected by the court through the guardian ad litem. Such representation does not preclude, nor is it inconsistent with, further representation by a trustee, or by others having like interest with the one so represented. Certain phases of the Dodge act were under consideration in In re Marxhausen’s Estate, 247 Mich 192; Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank, 255 Mich 275; and Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich 575. See, also, Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich 324 (33 ALR 98), and In re Milner’s Estate, 324 Mich 269. In the Rose Case it was said:

“ ‘That an equity court has the power under our statute to modify a trust or in some circumstances to extinguish it entirely with or without the consent of the trustee, there can be no doubt.’ ”3

In In re Dissolution of Detroit Metropolitan Corporation (1939), 289 Mich 358, 377 it was said that “The whole subject of trusts is one of equity jurisdiction.” Pomeroy proceeds (1 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence [4th ed], § 151, pp 183-185):

“§ 151. Trusts. The whole theory of trusts, which forms so large a part of the equity jurisprudence, and which is, in a comprehensive view, the foundation of all equitable estates and interests, has undoubtedly been developed from its germ existing *665in the Roman law, a peculiar mode of disposing of property by testament called the ‘fidei-commissum/ * * * The whole system fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of chancery; the doctrine of trusts became and continues to he the most efficient instrument in the hands of a chancellor for maintaining justice, good faith, and good conscience; and it has been extended so as to embrace not only lands, hut chattels, funds of every kind, things in action, and moneys. I shall merely state, without describing in this part of my work, the various kinds and classes of trusts which are thus subject to the exclusive equitable jurisdiction.”

The attorney general, standing before the Court in this case as an appointed legal representative of the people and of that class of charitable beneficiaries contemplated by the various statutory provisions upon which he relies, is no less amenable to the judgment of equity than are other appointed legal representatives of persons unknown or indefinite, or under legal disability, or otherwise requiring representation. So far as concerns the pending contest the attorney general is no more or less than a supervisory trustee by virtue of such statutory provisions, particularly by PA 1961, No 101,4 which act (by section 16) is known and cited as the “supervision of trustees for charitable purposes act.”

The most that may be said for the attorney general’s legal position in this proceeding is that he was entitled to appear for those represented by him per statute; that he, the 1958 testament considered, was eligible to contest the 1961 testament and to certify such contest to circuit; that he was entitled to object to the petition for approval of compromise of that contest for any reason legally available to any fiduciary or trustee representing.legally a per*666son or persons or party or parties in direct or contingent interest; that he was entitled to litigate the merits of the ultimate question raised by him, namely, that the proposal of compromise, if given effect, would not serve best the interests of all concerned .including the charitable and benevolent beneficiaries designated in the testament of 1958; and, finally, that he was entitled to review the merits of the chancellor’s judgment respecting that ultimate question. Beyond these rights, however, neither he nor the prosecuting attorney was entitled to forbid the judgment of the chancellor, any more than he might veto the judgment of this Court, reached on de novo consideration, that the same proposal receive approval.5

He says that specific authority, to represent the people and uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries in actions involving charitable trusts, and to control the settlement of any will contest involving any testament which contains a devise or bequest to the uses .represented by him, is vested in his office by PA 1961, No 101 (CLS 1961, § 14.251 et seq.); by PA 1915, No 280 (CL 1948, § 554.351 et seq.)-, and by PA 1917, No 207 (CL 1948, § 720.51 et seq.). We find upon examination of these statutes that none purport to bestow upon the attorney general the power claimed by him, that is, the power of an adult competent heir or legatee to interdict an agree- . ment for compromise of a pending contest all other like heirs and legatees have signed.

This brings us to PA 1965, No 11, and PA 1965, No 353, amending respectively said Acts Nos 207 and 101. Referring to said Act No 353 the attorney general says:

*667“To say that such amendment implies the absence of authority previous to the amendment is erroneous. The amendment merely spells out the law and is explanatory of the common law duties of the attorney general.”

The amendments of 1965 were, of course, enacted after Mrs. Reeder’s death and certification to circuit of this contest. The final question, then, is whether they have supplied, with effectiveness pen-dente, the power of veto we have said, above, was lacking. For this appeal we hold they have not. One by its titular and sectional terms does not apply and the other declares a controlling qualifier which is known to our rules of statutory construction as an express exception.

Consider PA 1917, No 207, and amendatory act PA 1965, No 11: The original and unamended title of Act No 207, and original and 1965-amended section 1 thereof, apply the act only to a will or testament containing a gift, grant, bequest, or devise to religious, educational, charitable, or benevolent uses, that does not name any person or corporation as donee. The act did not apply here and now does not apply, the underscored condition considered. See the appendix hereto, that part headed “1961 Will.”

Consider next PA 1961, No 101, and amendatory act PA 1965, No 353. It need only be pointed out that original and present section 11 of said Act No 101 provides that which immunizes new (by Act No 353) section 4(b) from constitutional attack.6 *668Said section 11 originally provided, and now provides :

“Nothing in this act shall impair or restrict the jurisdiction of any court with respect to any of the matters covered by it.”

In such precise manner the legislature has safeguarded the presently pertinent jurisdiction of equity. It follows that the provisions of new section 4(b) of amendatory Act No 353 are statutorily nugatory whenever, as here, they collide with that jurisdiction.

To Conclude: The attorney general would have judicial sanction of his intent to bet approximately one and a half million dollars worth of charitable and benevolent assets, belonging by the agreement approved below to beneficiaries represented by him, that he will succeed with contest of the 1961 testament, and then will successfully defeat contest by Mrs. Reeder’s heirs of the 1958 testament, and that he thereby will bring to such beneficiaries the whole of this two million dollar estate. As against that sanguinary prospect the chancellor was required to consider that the attorney general might fail with his present contest or fail as proponent in the other, and hence lose everything for such beneficiaries. The chancellor, withal, can hardly be chided for being chary of acceptance of a part of the responsibility for possible failure of such an odds-against litigatory gamble.

To sustain the attorney general’s refusal to approve this seemingly advantageous compromise, nothing has been submitted tending to persuade that his judgment should override that of the court whose judgment he reviews. Nothing brought forth in the mentioned discovery proceedings is advanced as the beginning of that kind of proof which, upon presen-

*669tation of the usual proponent’s motion for an instructed verdict (of 1961 testacy in this instance), must meet such a motion. And the attorney general’s complaint that the chancellor took no testimony (see in such regard In Re Marxhausen’s Estate, 247 Mich 192, 199) is met by the fact that, throughout the extended arguments of counsel — before and with the chancellor- — the attorney general made no demand for the taking of proof and no proffer of proof tending prima facie to show that he, as contestant, could support the affirmative burden every contestant bears when the proponent has proved the testament in question, has it received in evidence, and then has rested. In these circumstances no meritorious reason appears for overturning the. chancellor’s determination of approval.

Affirmed and remanded. On remand, if deemed necessary, the chancellor may enter a supplemental order approving the agreement for and on behalf-of the objecting attorney general. No costs.

*670 APPENDIX

(Column by column summary comparison of 1958 and 1961 testaments of Pansy Lee Reeder, deceased.)

1958 Will

Specific Bequests as follows:

Louis Reeder, a Nephew, if he survives: $5,000-.00

Flint Board of Education to be used for the Flint College Cultural Center: $25,000.00

Trinity Evangelical and Reform Church, New Bloomfield, Pennsylvania: $5,000.00

Mercersburg Academy, Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, to establish a scholarship loan fund for medical students: $5,000.00

Rest, residue and remainder to Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Company, Flint, Michigan, in trust under language which in effect directs the payment of net income to the following ten charities so long as they are qualified tax exempt charities and their purposes are attainable ;

1961 Will

Specific Bequests as follows :

First Presbyterian Church, Flint, Michigan: $10,000.00

Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons, State of Michigan, to be used exclusively for benefit of Michigan Masonic Home and Hospital, Alma, Michigan: $10,000.00

Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, a Corporation, to be used exclusively for Shrin-ers Hospital for Crippled Children, Chicago, Hlinois: $10,000.00

American Cancer Society to be used exclusively so far as legally possible by the Genesee County, Michigan Unit: $5,000.00

Young "Women’s Christian Association, Flint, Michigan: $1,000.00

Young Men’s Christian Association, Flint, Michigan: $1,000,00

*671 1958 Will

1. Young Women’s Christian Association, Flint, Michigan

2. Young Men’s Christian Association, Flint, Michigan

3. American Cancer Society for use as far as possible of G-enesee County, Michigan Unit

4. National Foundation, for use as far as possible of Genesee County, Michigan Chapter

5. Tall Pine Council, Boy Scouts, Flint, Michigan

6. Fair Winds Girl Scouts Council, Flint, Michigan

7. Bed Feather, Flint and Genesee County, Michigan

8. First Presbyterian Church, Flint, Michigan

9. Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, to he used exclusively for Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children, Chicago Unit

10. Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons, State of Michigan, to he used exclusively for benefit of Michigan Masonic Home and Hospital, Alma, Michigan

1961 Will

Flint Board of Education, to be used for the Flint College and Cultural Center: $25,000-.00

Personal effects, et cet-era, to: Esther Melin

Best, residue and remainder to: Esther Melin

(dissenting). The principal issue in this appeal is whether a will c'ontest can be “settled” in this State by agreement of less than all parties whose beneficial interests are affected by the proposed settlement. For reasons to be stated,' I believe the chancellor erred in approving the proposed settlement of the contest over Mrs. Reeder’s 1961 will, absent agreement by the attorney general and the prosecuting attorney in behalf of the uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of the charitable trust provisions of the 1958 will.

At the outset it should be noted that I do not dispute the appellees’ generalization that equity has jurisdiction over trust estates. Furthermore, had the will contest gone to judgment on the merits, the circuit judge’s statutory1 power to render judgment thereon would not be conditioned upon the attorney general’s and the prosecutor’s agreement, nor upon any other litigant’s agreement. But that is not the factual posture of this matter. The contest has not been heard by the circuit judge. No judgment on the merits of the contest has been rendered. Indeed, it is sought by some of the litigants, over the objections of others, represented by the attorney general and prosecutor, to abort the contest; to call off the litigation; to “settle” all of the controversies between the contending parties, but, unfortunately, without the agreement of all parties whose interests would be affected by such a settlement. Conceding the statutory jurisdiction of a circuit judge to hear and determine will contests and equity’s common-law jurisdiction over trusts, I do not believe that the common law or statutory law2 of this State allows some, but.not all, of the bene*673ficially interested parties3 to a will contest to “settle” such, litigation over tbe objections of nonparticipating parties whose beneficial interests may be affected, even with the approval of a circuit judge sitting as a chancellor. That, as I view this record, is what the chancellor was asked, and undertook, to do here.

There are two wills involved in this appeal. The proposed settlement agreement provides that the will of 1961 be denied admission to probate and that the will of 1958 be admitted to probate. It is under the provisions of the 1958 will that the attorney general and prosecutor claim the right, properly in my view, to represent the interests of uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of the trust provided in that will.

Appellees do not summarize accurately, in a chart inserted in their brief, the provisions of the 1958 will. Their chart describes the 1958 will’s trust provision as “in effect” directing the payment of net income to 10 named charities. If it did that, there would be merit in their claim that there are no uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries the attorney general and prosecutor could represent.

The fact is, however, that the 1958 will’s trust provisions clearly empower the trustees to exercise discretionary authority not only in determining how much each of the 10 named charities shall receive annually, but also whether they shall receive anything and whether and to what extent other unnamed charities possessing stated qualifications should participate in the testatrix’s beneficence. The *674pertinent provisions of the 1958 will are set forth in the margin.4

*675Because there are uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of the 1958 will’s trust, the attorney general and prosecuting attorney, in behalf of such beneficiaries, filed their appearance in the proceedings to probate the 1958 will and filed objections to the petition for admission to probate of the 1961 will. Those steps were taken in January and March of 1964. At that time, the prosecuting attorney’s right and duty to act in behalf of the uncertain and *676indefinite beneficiaries of the 1958 will’s charitable trust were contained in PA 1915, No 280 (CL 1948, § 554.351 et seq. [Stat Ann 1953 Rev § 26.1191 et seq.])5 and the attorney general’s were contained in PA 1961, No 101 (CLS 1961, § 14.251 et seq. [Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 26.1200(1) et seq.]).6

*677My conclusion in this case is supported by this Court’s decision in Rose v. Southern Michigan National Banli (1931), 255 Midi 275. That case involved a will contest compromise agreement entered into pursuant to tbe predecessor of our currently applicable Dodge act.7 Tbe Court beld that it was not necessary to tbe jurisdiction of tbe chancery court to which the agreement was presented for approval that tbe testamentary trustee have signed the agreement, since be bad only a legal title to tbe trust estate and no beneficial interest therein. Had be a beneficial interest, however, bis signature on tbe agreement in advance of its submission to tbe court would have been essential under tbe statute:

“It must be signed by all those whose interests may be limited or diminished by tbe agreement if consummated. It may be conceded that unless tbe agreement is so signed tbe court has no jurisdiction to approve it or to authorize its execution by others. But an executor or trustee has no such interest in tbe estate as will or may be limited or diminished by tbe agreement if consummated. Therefore, under our statute, their signatures are not required in advance of its submission to tbe court.” 255 Mich 275, 278.

In this case of Reeder, tbe uncertain and indefinite beneficiaries of tbe charitable trust, represented by tbe attorney general and tbe prosecuting attorney, have beneficial interests which may be affected by tbe settlement agreement proposed. Without tbe approval of their statutory representatives, tbe attorney general and prosecuting attorney, tbe chan*678cellor bad no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for approval of tbe compromise agreement proposed by tbe other beneficially interested parties.

I would reverse tbe chancellor’s order of approval. Appellants should be allowed to tax their costs.