The issue on this appeal is whether *677grievance and disciplinary procedures are "other terms and conditions of employment” within the meaning of the public employment relations act (PERA)1 and, if so, whether the provisions of the PERA concerning the duty to bargain collectively prevail over the provisions of the charter of a home-rule city providing for a civilian trial board to review charges of police misconduct.

We hold that grievance and other disciplinary procedures are "other terms and conditions of employment” within the meaning of the PERA and that the duty to bargain collectively on such issues and to perform in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting provisions of the charter of a home-rule city.

I

The Pontiac City Charter provides for a civilian trial board to review charges of police misconduct and, where necessary, impose discipline, including discharge.

The city, invoking the charter provision, refused to bargain with the Pontiac Police Officers Association (the union), the representative of the policemen, regarding grievance procedures for disciplined policemen. Similarly, because the city charter contains a requirement that policemen live within or near the city, the city refused to bargain regarding residency.

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC). The MERC concluded that both employee discipline and residency were mandatory *678subjects of collective bargaining and that the city’s refusal to bargain was an unfair labor practice.

The Court of Appeals2 concluded that "the management, operation and control of [a] police department” is "a municipal concern”,3 "a matter of local concern to be resolved locally”,4 and held that where a city charter provides for residency and a civilian trial board, those issues are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

This Court sua sponte vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and, on the authority of Detroit Police Officers Association v Detroit, 391 Mich 44; 214 NW2d 803 (1974), held that residency was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and remanded for reconsideration of the civilian trial board question in light of DPOA v Detroit, supra. Pontiac Police Officers Association v Pontiac, 391 Mich 814 (1974).

On remand, the Court of Appeals, "[fjor the reasons expressed in our prior opinion”, concluded that the question of a civilian trial board is a permissive, not mandatory, subject of collective bargaining.5

*679II

In DPOA v Detroit, supra, this Court declared that under the PERA, as under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),6 there are three categories or subjects of collective bargaining: mandatory, permissive, and illegal.7

Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are those within the scope of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”.8 If either party proposes a mandatory subject, both parties are obligated to bargain about it in good faith.9

Permissive subjects of collective bargaining are those which fall outside the scope of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”, and may be negotiated only if both parties agree.10

Illegal subjects are those which even if negotiated will not be enforced because adoption would be violative of the law or of the policy of the NLRA.11

The union contends that a civilian trial board which has exclusive jurisdiction over discipline of policemen, including discharge, demotion, or temporary suspension, directly affects the "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” of police officers and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.

*680The city contends12 that where the electors of a home-rule city have enacted a city charter providing for a civilian trial board, a "decision to require mandatory bargaining over such subject would * * * abridge the power and authority of the electors” to frame, adopt and amend their charter and would therefore "be in violation of the State Constitution, specifically art 1, § 1, and art 7, § 22”.13

III

Police officers are public employees.

The courts of this state have been guided by Federal precedent when construing the provisions of the PERA.14

Michigan, like the Federal courts, has adopted a broad view of "other terms and conditions of employment”.15 The Federal cases have uniformly held that "grievance procedure and arbitration, layoffs, discharge, workloads, vacations, holidays, *681sickleave, work rules, use of bulletin boards by unions, change of payment from a salary base to an hourly base, definition of bargaining unit work, and performance of bargaining unit work by supervisors” (emphasis supplied)16 fall within "other terms and conditions of employment” and are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

In the private employment sector, arbitration as the final step of a grievance procedure has been held to be a mandatory subject for collective bargaining.17 It has been estimated that 95% of all union contracts negotiated in private industry contain provisions for arbitration of either grievances or of questions concerning interpretation or application of the contract.18

Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement requiring a public employer to submit disputes arising under the contract to final and binding grievance arbitration is enforceable. See Board of Education v Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 NY2d 122; 282 NE2d 109; 331 NYS2d 17 (1972).19

We conclude that disciplinary procedures and a proposal for final and binding grievance arbitration concern "other terms and conditions of employment” and are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.

*682IV

In Rockwell v Crestwood School District Board of Education, 393 Mich 616, 629, 630; 227 NW2d 736 (1975), we said that this Court had "consistently construed the PERA as the dominant law regulating public employee labor relations” and that the "supremacy of the provisions of the PERA is predicated on the Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 48) and the apparent legislative intent that the PERA be the governing law for public employee labor relations”.20

DPOA v Detroit, supra, pp 66-68, is determinative of the city’s argument that inclusion in a city’s charter of "other terms and conditions of employment” abrogates the city’s duty to bargain concerning such terms and conditions.

A civilian review board for discipline of police officers is a permissible charter provision.21 DPOA *683v Detroit, held that a public employer’s collective bargaining obligation prevails over a conflicting "permissible charter provision”.

Courts in other jurisdictions have held that it is not an unlawful delegation of municipal authority to include a provision for compulsory grievance arbitration in a collective bargaining agreement between a union and a municipality.22

V

The PERA does not obligate a public employer to agree to grievance or disciplinary procedures proposed by the union. It simply obligates the public employer to bargain in good faith regarding such procedures.

The city has not shown that the duty to bargain in good faith regarding grievance procedures has frustrated the exercise of its constitutional powers.23

The city makes essentially a policy argument for excluding disciplinary issues from the "mandatory *684subject” category to which they would otherwise belong. The public is directly affected by police officer misconduct. Trial boards allow for consideration of civilian complaints and "give citizens confidence in the propriety of the acts of their police department”. Traditional grievance and arbitration hearings may not accomplish these objectives.

It may, indeed, be desirable, because of the unique "para-military” nature of police departments, to guarantee some degree of civilian control, insulated from the uncertainties of the collective bargaining process.

If the Legislature deems it appropriate to redefine the scope of the collective bargaining obligation of the public employers generally or of particular public employers and the representatives of their employees to include "wages, hours, and some other terms and conditions of employment”, it may do so.

This Court cannot properly decide ad hoc that what has uniformly been regarded a "condition” of employment is not such a condition as applied to a particular public employer although it continues to be such a condition for other employers, public and private. By eschewing redefinition, we underscore the prerogative of the Legislature to give such consideration as it deems warranted to the claims of public employers that the scope of the collective bargaining obligation impinges unduly on their power to govern.

The Court of Appeals is reversed. No costs, a public question.

(concurring). We agree with Justice Levin’s holding that

*685"grievance and other disciplinary procedures are 'other terms and conditions of employment’ within the meaning of the PERA and that the duty to bargain collectively on such issues and to perform in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting provisions of the charter of a home-rule city.”

However, we find the reasoning in support of this holding to be too broad and susceptible of applications to which we would not subscribe.

(concurring). I concur in the narrow issue presented for our determination that a public employer’s collective bargaining obligation, based on PERA, supersedes the home-rule powers of cities relative to the terms and conditions of public employment. I further agree that arbitration is included in the PERA provision of "other terms and conditions of employment” and is therefore a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. I reserve consideration, however, of whether this particular type of arbitration is permissible. See Justice Levin’s and my opinions in Dearborn Fire Fighters v Dearborn, 394 Mich 229; 231 NW2d 226 (1975).