(dissenting). The majority has determined that although no provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969 or apposite case law would afford Brenda Girlish relief from her failure to comply with the legislatively established notice requirements, the defendant may nevertheless not have the benefit of the applicable statute of limitations because it provided Ms. Girlish with sickness and accident benefits for a reported case of the flu.

I dissent.

I

The statutory scheme established in the compensation act1 requires an employee in plaintiff’s situ*385ation, one who has suffered an injury that is not an occupational disease,2 to provide his or her employer with notice of injury within three months of its happening and further to file a claim for compensation with respect to that injury within six months of its occurrence. The statute explicitly provides, inter alia, that the six-month period for filing the compensation claim is tolled during the period beginning with timely notice of the happening of the injury or the employer’s acquisition of knowledge of the happening of the accident and continuing until the employer files the required report of the injury with the bureau.

The appeal board’s finding in the case at bar was that Ms. Girlish was barred by failure to give notice.

The majority concedes that the compensation *386act is silent as to whether voluntary payment of sickness and accident benefits tolls the statutory period during which an employee is bound to provide notice of an injury or accident. I believe it is too plain to dispute that the statute, which explicitly provides for tolling of the claim period under prescribed circumstances, lends no support to the majority’s unprecedented decision.3

II

Moreover, I am convinced that an examination of the relevant case law should provide Ms. Girlish with no more comfort than the plain language of the statute does.

I believe the majority makes a fundamental error in losing the distinction between the notice and claim requirements.4 The obligations to give notice of an injury and to file claim for compensation are two entirely separate duties imposed on an injured employee.- Although compliance with both requirements may be accomplished simulta*387neously, it need not be.5 6The majority glosses over this distinction, obviating the analysis that would reveal that even under generally accepted legal principles outside of the compensation act, such as waiver and estoppel, there is no basis for relieving Ms. Girlish of her failure to give notice of injury.

The underlying rationale for tolling the statute of limitations is discussed by Professor Larson.

"When an employer voluntarily makes compensation payments, the period for filing a claim usually dates from the last payment. In many statutes, this rule is written into the claim period section itself; it may also be arrived at by the route of waiver or estoppel. The general idea is that an employee who has been receiving compensation for eleven months cannot reasonably be expected to have made claim during that period, and should not, upon cessation of voluntary payments at the end of the eleventh month, be allowed only one month in which to file his claim. [Emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted.]” 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 78.43(a), pp 15-111, 15-113.

In other words, the purpose of the "other compensation” provisions as enacted in some statutes and the cases applying waiver or estoppel theory is to both protect employees and prevent employers from relying on the limitations period where the employer’s actions are designed to or could be expected to cause an employee to delay filing a claim.6

This logic does not extend to the requirement that notice of the injury be given.7

*388Since the Michigan notice and claim statute does not provide for tolling where "other compensation” is paid, Ms. Girlish must look to other legal principles. Estoppel and implied waiver have been argued.

The majority apparently declines to find the employer estopped from relying on the notice limitation. See footnote 9 of the majority opinion. Implied waiver is, instead, asserted.

Conduct that will constitute an implied waiver is described in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed), p 1752.

"A waiver is implied where one party has pursued such a course of conduct with reference to the other party as to evidence an intention to waive his rights or the advantage to which he may be entitled, or where the conduct pursued is inconsistent with any other honest intention than an intention of such waiver, provided that the other party concerned has been induced by such conduct to act upon the belief that there has been a waiver, and has incurred trouble or expense thereby.”

Waiver is defined as the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right.

It is apparent that, as in the case of estoppel, waiver may be found where a party acts with some knowledge of the facts. There is no basis on the *389facts in the case at bar for finding a waiver.* *****8 To establish a rule tolling the notice period whenever an employer provides sickness and accident benefits is unsupportable.

The facts as found by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board are that Ms. Girlish simply did not give notice that she had suffered a back injury within the three-month notice period. Indeed, it was found that Ms. Girlish ceased working due to an attack of influenza, that she filed an insurance claim for sickness and accident benefits for her influenza condition and that she did not apprise the defendant of her back condition until after the sickness and accident benefits were terminated. It is absurd to suggest that the defendant waived receipt of notice of a back injury because it provided benefits to Ms. Girlish for her bout with the flu. An employer could not reasonably expect payment of sickness and accident benefits would cause an employee to refrain from filing a claim due to a back injury where it is unaware such a claim exists. The implied waiver theory cannot logically be applied where an employee fails to give notice of the injury for which compensation is claimed.9

It is unfortunate for Ms. Girlish that her claim for compensation is barred (notwithstanding the majority decision) by failure to comply with the notice provision of the compensation act. The apparent harshness of the notice and claim requirements has, however, been alleviated by numerous *390decisions of this Court.10 Ms. Girlish has simply not complied.

The majority is understandably sympathetic to an injured party who may have missed giving notice by a matter of days. The implications of its opinion, however, are quite disturbing. An employee could conceivably receive benefits for some injury or sickness for an extended period of time and, upon recovery from that condition, give notice and claim compensation for an accident far in the past. The possibility for prejudice is great.

The decision of the appeal board should be affirmed.

The question presented is whether plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim is barred by her failure to notify her employer of a compensable injury within the three-month statutory period when her employer’s group health and accident insurance carrier furnished the injured employee alternative medical benefits during the limitation period.

We hold that an employer impliedly waives his right to notice when his group health and accident insurance carrier furnishes alternative medical benefits to an employee who has suffered an otherwise compensable injury. This implied waiver only suspends the running of the statute of limitations for filing the compensation claim from the date alternative benefits are commenced until the payments are terminated or notice is given that payment of the medical benefits has been terminated (whichever occurs later).

I

In February, 1971, plaintiff, Brenda Girlish, sus*376tained a back injury in the course of her employment as a processor for defendant, Acme Precision Products, Inc. Plaintiff testified that she felt a "ripping sensation” in her lower back while pushing a heavy box of die castings to a co-worker. As a processor, plaintiff was routinely required to push such boxes to co-workers.

The exact date of the back injury was disputed. However, plaintiff ceased working for defendant on February 28, 1971, due to an attack of influenza. The hearing referee and the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) eventually determined the date of the back injury also to be February 28.

On March 1, 1971, plaintiff visited her doctor for treatment of her influenza. Additionally, she filed an insurance claim form for health and accident benefits for her influenza condition on March 8, 1971.

Plaintiff first received treatment for her back injury from her doctor on March 10, 1971. (The WCAB subsequently found, upon remand, that the three-month statutory notice requirement began to run from March 10. MCL 418.381; MSA 17.237[381]. See fn 3, infra.)

On April 5, 1971, defendant employer’s health and accident insurance carrier received a supplemental notice from the attending physician concerning plaintiff’s back injury. Since this was the first notice given to the insurance carrier of plaintiff’s back injury, the carrier apparently ordered an investigation to determine the nature of the injury.

In a letter dated April 23, 1971, the insurance carrier informed plaintiff, "In connection with your weekly indemnity claim, we have arranged to have you examined by Dr. Charles Zinn”.1 That *377examination occurred April 30, 1971.

On May 27, 1971, employer’s insurance carrier contacted plaintiff by telephone and indicated that she was no longer entitled to weekly benefits. Evidently, Dr. Zinn concluded that she was not disabled for purposes of health and accident beneñts. This telephone conversation was confirmed by a letter to plaintiff dated May 28, 1971.

Plaintiffs’ benefits were terminated as of April 30, 1971. She had received health and accident benefits during the months of March and April, 1971.

On June 8, plaintiff’s doctor notified the insurance carrier that he had seen plaintiff several times concerning her disability and diagnosed it as 'Tumbo sacral instability”. He recommended no work. On June 21, in a letter to plaintiff, the insurance carrier acknowledged the doctor’s letter, and stated: "After a review of all available medical information in this file it has been determined that no additional weekly indemnity benefits can be paid.”* 2

In his decision of September 11, 1972, the hearing referee found that plaintiff’s back injury arose out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment with defendant. MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301). However, he denied benefits because plaintiff had failed to give defendant notice of injury within three months as required by MCL 418.381; MSA 17.237(381).

Thereafter, an appeal was taken to the WCAB. On March 21, 1974, the board affirmed the hearing *378referee. The board apparently agreed that a compensable injury occurred but also denied benefits because the notice period had run. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 20, 1974. On August 19, 1975, this Court remanded the case to the board for reconsideration in light of Lewis v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 360; 230 NW2d 538 (1975). 394 Mich 836 (1975).

The board again affirmed the decision of the hearing referee that plaintiffs claim must fail for lack of timely notice.3 The Court of Appeals again denied leave to appeal. We granted leave to appeal. 400 Mich 803 (1977).

II

The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969 is silent as to whether a plaintiffs compensation claim is barred by her failure to notify her employer of an otherwise compensable injury within three months when the employer’s group health and accident carrier furnishes the injured employee alternative benefits during the limitation period. MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq.

The applicable notice requirement, as embodied in MCL 418.381; MSA 17.237(381), merely states that:

*379"No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury has been given to the employer within 3 months after the happening thereof and unless the claim for compensation with respect to the injury, which claim may be either oral or in writing, had been made within 6 months after the occurrence of the same.”

This Michigan notice statute, enacted and reenacted4 before fringe benefits such as health and accident insurance were provided for industrial workers, does not instruct the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau how to proceed in cases where alternative benefits, in lieu of compensation, are voluntarily paid to an employee who has suffered a compensable injury.

In many states, the notice statute specifically provides that the payment of any voluntary compensation by the employer during the notice period suspends or tolls the running of the statute until such payments cease. Cf. 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 78.43(a), and the cases cited therein.5

In other states, where there is no explicit statu*380tory provision, the same result is often arrived at by the application of a waiver theory. Specifically, in many jurisdictions, it has been held that the employer waives his right to notice during the period within which he makes other voluntary compensation payments. See generally Anno: May notice of injury or claim contemplated by Workmen’s Compensation Act be waived, 78 ALR 1306, and the cases cited therein.6

"The general idea is that an employee who has been receiving compensation * * * cannot reasonably be expected to have made claim during that period, and should not, upon cessation of voluntary payments * * * , be allowed [a shorter time period] in which to file his claim.” 3 Larson, supra, p 15-113.

*381Many controversies have arisen as to what constitutes a voluntary compensation payment which suspends the running of the notice period. However, most jurisdictions have held that the payment of medical benefits by a private employer-employee insurance plan (such as the one involved in this case) constitutes the voluntary payment of compensation and thus suspends or tolls the notice statute. See generally Anno: Payments, or furnishing medical or hospital services, or burial, by employer or his insurer, to employee after injury, as affecting time for fling claim under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 144 ALR 606, and the cases cited therein.7

It would be an ironic and inequitable rule of law if this Court were to deny an employee, who has suffered an otherwise compensable injury, compensation benefits because an employer or his sickness and accident carrier voluntarily paid alternative benefits during the three-month notice period. This is especially true because the unsophisticated employee, possibly on the advice of the employer or union representative, is usually operating on the justifiable belief that the alternative benefits received are the correct benefits. The employee, who is receiving benefits, has no reason to believe there is any further need to act to preserve his right to compensation.

Furthermore, it should not go unnoticed in the case at bar that it took the sickness and accident carrier, presumably more knowledgeable than the plaintiff in such matters, 2 months and 18 days to determine that she was not ill but had suffered a work-related injury. We cannot agree that the *382plaintiff should be denied compensation for an otherwise work-related compensable injury because the employer did not learn for 3 months and 12 days (only 24 days after the insurance carrier reached the same conclusion) that plaintiff had been injured and was not ill.

We also believe that it is idle to suggest that the employer in this case was unduly prejudiced by the 12-day delay in the receipt of notice. During the period in which the plaintiff was receiving sickness and accident benefits, she was receiving regular medical treatments. The record of those treatments was readily available had the employer wished to contest the compensability of the plaintiff’s injury.

Based upon the equitable considerations8 discussed, supra, and in the absence of a legislative mandate to the contrary, we hold that an employer impliedly waives his right to notice during that period of time when his insurance carrier voluntarily furnishes alternative medical benefits to an employee who has suffered an otherwise compensable injury. This implied waiver, however, only suspends the running of the notice statute for *383filing the compensation claim from the date alternative benefits are commenced until the payments are terminated or notice is given that payment of the medical benefits has been terminated (whichever occurs later).

We must emphasize, however, the narrowness of today’s holding. An implied waiver situation will only arise:

(1) when the notice period is running because an employee has the requisite knowledge of a possible work-related disability, Lewis, supra; and

(2) when an employer or his insurance carrier voluntarily furnishes during the notice period alternative medical benefits to an employee who has suffered an otherwise compensable injury; and

(3) when the referee and (or) the WCAB do not find any attempted fraud on the part of the employer or the employee in either the furnishing or the acceptance of the alternative benefits.9

Ill

In the instant case, the aforementioned holding means that the WCAB should determine the date upon which alternative benefits were commenced *384and the date upon which notice was given that benefits were to be terminated (since that appears to be the later date). The board should then subtract this period of time from the three-month notice period. If it appears, as it certainly does in this case, that notice was then given within the applicable notice period, compensation benefits are to be awarded.

The order of Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board is vacated. This case is remanded to the board for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs; a public question.