These cases involve the question whether this Court’s decision in Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), interpreting the name and retain provision of the dramshop act, is to be given retroactive application.

In Burns, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 26, 1981, alleging that plaintiff’s decedent died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile collision with Richard Piornack, II. Plaintiff also alleged that appellees Vincent Carver and Brian Chase, owners of Jock’s Pub, were liable for serving intoxicating beverages to Piornack in violation of the dramshop act, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993. On May 21, 1982, plaintiff executed a "Release and Settlement of Claim” with Piornack. The agreement provided that in exchange for $20,000 Piornack was to be "retained” in the action, but released from all liability. Following this Court’s decision in Putney, appellees moved for and were granted summary judgment. On February 18, 1983, we granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 887 (1983).

In Tebo, plaintiff filed her complaint on January 17, 1977. She alleged that she suffered injuries as a result of a collision with an automobile driven by Edward Havlik. An amended complaint was filed, naming as defendants Steven Brimmer and Gerald Forbes, owners of the Long Branch Bar, and Fred Denter, owner of the Oakley Liquor Bar, predicating their liability on the provisions of the dramshop act. On August 4, 1977, plaintiff and Havlik entered into a "Covenant Not to Levy Execution on Judgment in Pending Action”, under which Havlik was released of all liability in excess of $50,000, but he was expressly "retained” in the action. Denter’s motion for summary judgment on *359the grounds that plaintiff had failed to retain Havlik as required by the dramshop act was denied on December 7, 1978. Denter subsequently brought a motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from submitting evidence of any damages for which plaintiff received compensation under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. The trial court granted this motion and was reversed on interlocutory appeal. 109 Mich App 413; 311 NW2d 372 (1981). Putney was decided while Denter’s application for leave to appeal was pending. Denter moved for summary judgment in this Court pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7). We granted leave to appeal to consider both the motion for summary judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals. 417 Mich 887 (1983).

In Putney v Haskins, supra, p 188, this Court construed the "name and retain” provision of the dramshop act. We found in the statutory language a legislative mandate that the allegedly intoxicated person be "retained as an interested party defendant until the litigation [is] concluded”. Only by requiring the allegedly intoxicated person to remain at risk could the name and retain provision’s purpose of preventing fraud and collusion be completely fulfilled. As we stated:

"One of the ways the 'name and retain’ provision prevents fraud and collusion is by ensuring that the defendant will have a direct financial stake in personally testifying, examining witnesses, and arguing that he did not act in a negligent manner. Once the defendant’s liability is fixed and limited, he has no incentive to produce witnesses or testimony tending to prove that he was not 'visibly intoxicated’ on the date in question. The dramshop defendant may have much more difficulty in identifying, locating, and obtaining favorable testimony from the defendant’s friends or acquaintances who observed him at relevant times.”

*360The agreements in the present cases obviously do not retain the allegedly intoxicated persons within the meaning of the dramshop act. Liability has been'fixed. If Putney is deemed to be retroactive, plaintiffs’ actions must be dismissed.

Although it has often been stated that the general rule is one of complete retroactivity, this Court has adopted a flexible approach.1

" 'It is evident that there is no single rule of thumb which can be used to accomplish the maximum of justice in each varying set of circumstances. The involvement of vested property rights, the magnitude of the impact of decision on public bodies taken without warning or a showing of substantial reliance on the old rule may influence the result.’ Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961) (opinion of Justice Edwards in which Justices Talbot Smith, T. M. Kavanagh and Souris concurred).

"The benefit of flexibility in opinion application is evident. If a court were absolutely bound by the traditional rule of retroactive application, it would be severely hampered in its ability to make needed changes in the law because of the chaos that could result in regard to prior enforcement under that law.” Placek v City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 665; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).

Appreciation of the effect a change in settled law can have has led this Court to favor only limited retroactivity when overruling prior law. Thus, when the doctrine of imputed negligence was overruled in Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), the decision was applied only to the case before the Court and to pending and future cases. When the doctrine of charitable im*361munity was overruled in Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), the retroactive effect of the decision was limited to the parties before the Court. Even where statutory construction has been involved, this Court has limited the retroactivity of a decision when justice so required. See Gusler v Fairview Tubular Products, 412 Mich 270; 315 NW2d 388 (1981); Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590; 274 NW2d 392 (1979).

The question before us is whether our interpretation of a statute should be applied retroactively to the statute’s effective date. In Putney, we found the clear import of the statute to be to require the plaintiff to name and retain the allegedly intoxicated person at risk. Were Putney a case of first impression in the Michigan courts, we would hold that the statutory language gave plaintiffs no reason to believe that the settlements entered into would comply with the "retain” portion of the statute. Putney, however, was not a case of first impression in the Michigan courts.

In Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507; 245 NW2d 111 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 827 (1977), the plaintiff was struck by an automobile and brought suit against the driver and the bar owners who allegedly served the driver while he was visibly impaired. Four days prior to trial, the plaintiff entered into an "Indemnification Agreement”, under which the driver’s liability was limited to $19,000. The driver was expressly "retained” in the action. In analyzing the effect of this agreement on the plaintiff’s action against the bar owners, the court looked to the purpose of the name and retain provision as stated by the Court of Appeals in Salas v Clements, 57 Mich App 367; 226 NW2d 101 (1975), rev’d 399 Mich 103; 247 *362NW2d 889 (1976), to avoid collusion and perjury. Extrapolating from that purpose, the Court stated:

"Balanced against this purpose is the policy of the law to encourage settlement of litigation. The statute is not intended to prohibit settlement between a plaintiff and his intoxicated tortfeasor except where claims against tavern owners are first or simultaneously settled. On the contrary, the language of the statute indicates only an intention to require the intoxicated tortfeasor to be retained as a defendant. In enacting this 'special interest legislation’ the Legislature has manifested an intention to prohibit a plaintiff from going to a jury with only a claim versus a tavern. The plaintiff must not only name but must retain the tortfeasor in the lawsuit. But that is all the statute requires. To prohibit a plaintiff from a 'hold harmless’ type settlement, as was used here, would impede the prompt disposition of litigation and force trials of cases that would otherwise be settled.” Buxton, supra, p 511.

Of course, Buxton was implicitly overruled by Putney. Until Putney was decided by this Court, however, Buxton remained as the uncontradicted interpretation of the name and retain provision. Nonetheless, it is argued that any reliance by plaintiffs on Buxton was misplaced because it was a decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than one of this Court. This argument fails to take into account the structure of the Michigan appellate system.

A decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals is a decision of the Court. GCR 1963, 800.4. A decision by any panel of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, controlling statewide until contradicted by another panel of the Court of Appeals or reversed or overruled by this Court. See In the Matter of Hague, 412 Mich 532; 315 NW2d 524 (1982); Hackett v Ferndale City Clerk, 1 Mich App 6; 133 NW2d 221 (1965). While the possibility of reversal or contradiction may lessen a claim of *363reliance, it does not preclude it.2 And, although the possibility of the contradiction of Buxton by another panel of the Court of Appeals existed, that did not happen. Subsequent expressions by panels of the Court of Appeals on the same issue did nothing to lessen the authority of Buxton. See Cussans v Harris, 118 Mich App 567; 325 NW2d 793 (1982); Putney v Gibson, 94 Mich App 466; 289 NW2d 837 (1979), rev’d sub nom Putney v Haskins, supra; Rowan v Southland Corp, 90 Mich App 61; 282 NW2d 243 (1979); Denham v Bedford, 82 Mich App 107; 266 NW2d 682 (1978), aff'd 407 Mich 517; 287 NW2d 168 (1980). In light of the unquestioned status of Buxton at the time Putney was decided by this Court,3 it would be unjust to apply Putney retroactively to persons other than those before the Court in that case.4

*364In contrast to the harsh effect which the full retroactivity of Putney would have on injured plaintiffs, prospective application will have little effect on dramshop defendants in those pending cases where settlement agreements have been made, even though the defense of Putney will be unavailable. For them, the law will simply remain as it was from 1976 to 1982. We hold that Putney v Haskins is applicable to all cases where settlement agreements are entered into with the allegedly intoxicated person after the date of decision in Putney.

In granting leave to appeal to defendant Denter, we directed that the following question be briefed: "[Wjhether the no-fault insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., alters the common-law collateral-source rule”. We answer that narrow question in the negative.

Section 3135(2) of the no-fault act provides:

"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101(3) and (4) was in effect is abolished except as to:

"(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations con*365tained in those sections. The party liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his or her liability by the amount of taxes "that would have been payable on account of income the injured person would have received if he or she had not been injured.” MCL 500.3135(2); MSA 24.13135(2).

In the trial court, Denter moved to exclude all testimony regarding plaintiffs economic losses on the grounds that the above provision barred tort damages to the extent plaintiff had received compensation under the no-fault insurance act. The trial court granted the motion, and on interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536; 309 NW2d 174 (1981), rev’g 96 Mich App 763; 294 NW2d 224 (1980).

In Tuttle, the motorist plaintiff brought suit for damages sustained when he collided with the defendant’s negligently kept cow. This Court held that because the cause of action against the defendant arose out of negligent cow-keeping, the plaintiffs action was not barred by § 3135(2) of the act. We stated:

"Only persons who own, maintain or use motor vehicles can be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a .motor vehicle [under the no-fault act]. The non-motorist tortfeasor cannot be subject to tort liability for injuries or damage caused by the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. The abolition of tort liability for injuries or damage caused by (arising from) the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, therefore, does not abolish the tort liability of the non-motorist tortfeasor.” 411 Mich 545-546.

In the present case, Denter did not own, maintain, or use the motor vehicle that caused plain*366tiffs injuries. His liability, instead, arises out of his alleged sale of intoxicating liquors to a visibly intoxicated person. Just as the tort liability bar of § 3135 is inapplicable, so too is the remainder of the act inapplicable.

Notwithstanding that the language of the no-fault insurance act does not apply to the present case, Denter contends that the act manifests a legislative intent to prohibit recovery of damages in all tort actions where the plaintiff has been compensated by insurance. In short, Denter requests abolition of the collateral-source rule. We find no reason in the no-fault insurance act to comply with that request.

The common-law collateral-source rule provides that the recovery of damages from a tortfeasor is not reduced by the plaintiffs receipt of money in compensation for his injuries from other sources. Motts v Michigan Cab Co, 274 Mich 437; 264 NW 855 (1936); Perrott v Shearer, 17 Mich 48 (1868). In the context of insurance, the rationale for the rule is that the plaintiff has given up consideration and is entitled to the contractual benefits. The plaintiffs foresight and financial sacrifice should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor, who has contributed nothing to the plaintiffs insurance coverage. Similarly, gratuitous compensation should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiffs injuries.

The no-fault insurance act was a radical restructuring of the rights and liabilities of motorists. Through comprehensive action, the Legislature sought to accomplish the goal of providing an equitable and prompt method of redressing injuries in a way which made the mandatory insurance coverage affordable to all motorists. See Shav*367ers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), cert den 442 US 934 (1979). It is in light of that goal that the setoff provisions of the no-fault insurance act must be viewed.

The obvious purpose of the setoff provisions of the act is to eliminate duplicate benefits. The act "reduces the amount that the insurance companies must pay out, making it possible for them to reduce the amount that they must charge, and it does so only in those situations where benefits are redundant”. O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 546; 273 NW2d 829 (1979). In effect, the Legislature made a trade-off. Those who were required to participate in the no-fault scheme gave up the possibility of redundant recoveries, but they were intended to receive the benefit of lower insurance rates.

Analysis of the setoff provisions in the no-fault act reveals a careful legislative effort to limit duplicative recovery only where the limitation would benefit a no-fault insurer, thus providing an incentive for lower insurance rates. Section 3116 of the act requires that personal injury protection no-fault benefits be reduced to the extent the insured has received equivalent compensation from tort judgments arising from accidents outside of the state, from accidents with uninsured motorists, and from intentionally caused harm. This reduction of benefits payable inures to the benefit of the injured party’s no-fault insurer in situations where the tortfeasor would normally not be within the coverage of the no-fault act. Similarly, § 3109 of the act provides that personal injury protection no-fault benefits are to be reduced by the amount of governmental benefits provided or required by law to be provided to the injured insured. Again, when the additional compensation to the insured *368has come from a source outside the scope of the no-fault act, the no-fault insurer benefits by having to pay less compensation to the insured.

Finally, § 3135 of the act provides that tort judgments against persons arising from their ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle within the scope of the no-fault act are allowable only to the extent they exceed personal injury protection no-fault benefits received by the injured party under §§ 3107 to 3110 of the act. Although under §3135 it is the liability insurer of the tortfeasor who benefits, it is still, normally, a no-fault insurer.

As relevant to the present action, the dramshop defendant Denter has not participated in the no-fault scheme. Denter asks us to turn around the policy of the no-fault act to benefit a tortfeasor rather than a no-fault insurer. This would not only be an unwarranted extension of the no-fault act, but it would be contrary to its intent. Abolition of the collateral-source rule as to him would do nothing to fulfill the legislative goal of lower no-fault insurance rates. The careful structure of the no-fault act’s setoff provisions evinces no legislative intent to benefit dramshop defendants and their insurers.

In Burns, the summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.

In Tebo, pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7), the motion for summary judgment is denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for trial.

I concur with my brother Brickley except that I agree with my brother Levin as *369to the meaning of denial of application for leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.

(concurring). One of the functions of an appellate court is to authoritatively declare the meaning of the language of legislative enactments. One, but only one, of the purposes of that function is to enable practicing lawyers to advise their clients with a reasonable degree of certainty and predictability as to action which may be taken by those clients in their daily personal and economic affairs. In the course of construing and interpreting countless statutes, this state’s appellate courts have repeatedly held that legislative language does not always mean what it seems plainly to say. Every judge and practicing lawyer of any experience knows that our courts have often told the bench and bar that the language of a legislative enactment means what the appellate courts say it means and not necessarily what the words used in the statute seem to mean.

Practicing law in such a jurisprudence involves very real risks. An appellate court may never be called upon to interpret a particular statute or, if asked, may receive the request only after years of "unauthoritative” interpretation and application by thousands of practicing lawyers who have been required to advise clients whether and how to proceed without the guidance of judicial interpretation of the statute in question. If the appellate court, when a request for construction of a statute is presented to it, construes the enactment in a way which is at odds with the reading theretofore given it by practicing lawyers, the latecoming judicial construction is nevertheless ordinarily accepted by all, including those who have "misperceived” the correct meaning of the statute, as the correct interpretation ab initio. The general rule is *370one of retroactivity. Such corrective judicial hindsight is understood and accepted by bench and bar as an ordinary risk indigenous to a profession in which service to a client rests largely upon the vicissitudes of analysis, scholarship, judgment, and prediction — the essence of the practice of law. Practicing lawyers live every day with the understanding that they may be reading a statute in a way with which an appellate court will subsequently disagree. They accept that risk.

However, when a Michigan appellate court does construe a statute and unequivocally declares what it means, the bench and bar are entitled, indeed obligated, to accept that construction as authoritative, and lawyers can be expected to render professional advice consistent with that interpretation in the confidence that the risk of misinterpretation of the statutory language has been lifted from their shoulders.1 While risk is ever present that a higher appellate court may disagree with an intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of the meaning of a statute, a lawyer and his client should not be expected to assume that that will happen. When it does happen, it is the higher court’s duty to determine whether the decisional error of the lower court, considered in the light of traditional doctrines of appellate review and notions of fundamental fairness, requires that the higher court decision be given retroactive, limited retroactive, or even only prospective effect. When, as in Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507; 245 NW2d 111 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 827 (1977), the Supreme Court, upon being asked to review the Court of Appeals construction of the statute, de*371dines the opportunity for corrective review, the bench and bar should be free to accept and act upon the intermediate court’s interpretation, no matter how aberrant, in the confidence that the rules of the game will not be later rewritten retroactively.

While nice scholarly distinctions may be made and unimpeachably sound jurisprudential hairsplitting undertaken in defense and application of the canons that intermediate appellate court decisions are always subject to modification and reversal by higher authority, and that Supreme Court denial of leave to appeal is nonprecedential and does not amount to affirmation of the lower court decision, the fact is that practicing lawyers must give advice here and now to real clients about real claims of pain and suffering and related damages, involving real dollars. For them and their clients, the truism that nothing an intermediate appellate court ever says is set in jurisprudential concrete is no help.

In Buxton, supra, the intermediate appellate level of Michigan’s one court of justice erroneously concluded that the name and retain provision of MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993 did not mean what it plainly and unequivocally said. Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982). In so holding, it misadvised and misled bench and bar. While this Codrt’s subsequent order denying the defendant’s interlocutory application for leave to appeal should not, in any sense, have been taken as an approval of the Court of Appeals decision,2 the only common-sense inference a practicing lawyer *372could have drawn was that Buxton was surely the law. The logic of that inference was repeatedly fortified when at least four other panels of the Court of Appeals3 followed Buxton’s patently erroneous holding, despite the fact that it was obviously at odds with the plain language of the statute. The result is that for six years, until this Court’s decision in Putney, supra, the clear, direct, and unequivocal mandate of the Legislature that the actually intoxicated person was to be "retained in the action” was disregarded. There is simply no way of knowing how many litigants, acting upon the understandable advice of judicially guided counsel, followed the rule of Buxton and its progeny, or how many millions of dollars in damages have been paid in partial settlement of dramshop cases, followed by litigation of the remaining claims, in disregard of MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993 and subsequently decided Putney.

The question now is whether to give Putney the retroactive effect traditional rules of appellate review dictate, or only the prospective application plaintiffs in these cases contend fairness requires. If we give Putney merely prospective effect, we compound the mischief done in Buxton by effectively suspending for six years an otherwise valid statute, and retroactively penalizing the litigants and their counsel who followed the letter of MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993, declining the opportunity to settle claims against the actually intoxicated person separately, often going to trial with its inherently uncertain and sometimes unjust results.4

*373If we give Putney retroactive effect, we vindicate the judgment of those attorneys and their clients who, despite judicial construction to the contrary, followed the letter of the statute, ignored the Court of Appeals decision in Buxton and its progeny and resisted the pressure to settle a portion of multiple dramshop claims separately. In following that course, however, we would unfairly penalize those who accepted the invitation of five panels of the Court of Appeals to ignore the plain language of the statute and settled a portion of a dramshop claim with the implied assurance that the balance of the claim could be safely litigated later. Included in that category are those countless lawyers and litigants who faced and succumbed to the "settlement juggernaut” to which my brother Levin refers, and which is indeed a part of the real-world practice of law in many circuits in this state. It is obvious, therefore, that the appellate judicial error of Buxton has created a dilemma from which there can be no extrication assuring absolute fairness to all.

Arguments abound for and against taking either course. The error which requires that we make a choice is judicially induced and on balance seems to call for whatever resolution minimizes the resultant injustice. It is enough that lawyers and their clients must run the risk and pay the price of erroneously anticipating judicial decisions interpreting the meaning of statutory language. They should not, at least in these cases, be penalized for following such decisions.

For those reasons, and those reasons only, I concur in the Court’s judgment for limited prospectivity of MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993.

I likewise concur in the Court’s disposition of the collateral-source rule issue.

(concurring in Burns, and partially dissenting in Tebo). We agree that this Court’s decision in Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), should be applied prospectively, and therefore concur in Burns and to that extent in Tebo. We would not suggest, however, that a decision of this Court disapproving or overruling an "unquestioned” or "uncontradicted interpretation”1 by the Court of Appeals should invariably be given prospective effect.

We also write separately because Robert and Dorothy Tebo should not be permitted to recover damages from the defendant taverns for wage loss and medical expense for which they have already been reimbursed, pursuant to the no-fault automobile liability act,2 through the payment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. We would not extend the concept of the common-law doctrine known as the collateral-source rule3 to include PIP benefits even where, as here, the PIP benefits are paid to the owner of an automobile by the no-fault insurer of that automobile.

The no-fault act substitutes one automobile insurer, who may be the no-fault/liability insurer of the injured person’s vehicle or of some other vehicle,4 for another, the liability insurer of a negligently operated vehicle, as the source of reparations for wage/work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense. Before the enactment of the no-fault act, amounts paid by a liability insurer of *375a negligently operated vehicle for such elements of damage would, to avoid compensating an injured person in an amount greater than his loss, have been subtracted from damages payable by a non-motorist tortfeasor,5 e.g., an automobile or parts manufacturer. We would not ascribe to the Legislature, in changing the automobile insurer that reimburses for wage/work loss and medical expense, an intent to bring about, through extension of common-law doctrine (the collateral-source rule), double recovery of work loss and medical expense and a parallel enlargement of the liability of non-motorist tortfeasors.

Damages and reparations required to be paid by the common and statutory law of this state — damages in a tort action, PIP benefits pursuant to the no-fault act — are not generated from independent, separate, or collateral sources, but rather from the same source, namely the public policy of this state. Damages and reparations are payable now, as before the enactment of the no-fault act, out of a pool of money funded with premiums paid by owners and drivers of motor vehicles to discharge the liability imposed on them by the law of this state. It is not consistent with the policy of the common law, or with the purpose of the no-fault act to provide a more cost-effective reparations system, to read the no-fault act to permit duplicative recovery of benefits, at common law collectible but once, required to be paid by the law of this state.

The rationale of the collateral-source rule, judicially promulgated before the no-fault act was enacted, does not inexorably require extension of the rule to include PIP benefits; it should not be so extended absent evidence of a legislative purpose *376to provide, as part of the legislative program embodied in the no-fault act, for such double recovery and increase in the exposure of non-motorist tortfeasors.

I

This Court generally has decided the retroactivity-prospectivity question ad hoc. Sometimes the Court has stated its reasoning with regard to the conflicting considerations and, in other cases, it has stated little or no more than its conclusion.

The question has been resolved in particular cases by a process of reasoning and intuition. No rule of decision or principle for deciding the question has evolved. Perhaps the question must, as the lead opinion indicates, unavoidably be decided on the basis of the Court’s somewhat generalized perception of what "justice” requires.6

In the instant case, we are, with our colleagues, impressed that after this Court denied leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Buxton v Alexander, 69 Mich App 507; 245 NW2d 111 (1976),7 there was widespread reliance by bench and bar on that decision. And, as stated in the lead opinion, subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals did nothing to lessen the authority of Buxton.8

There is considerable institutional pressure to settle cases. Pretrial and settlement conferences and mediation exert pressure to settle. Settlement is the norm, trial the exception. In that climate, it would be difficult, although not impossible, for a lawyer to maintain, against the tide of professional *377and judicial opinion, that because Buxton might be overruled he could not safely advise his clients to settle a lawsuit on the authority of that decision.

In this context, therefore, we agree that the clients of lawyers who accommodated the institutional juggernaut and accepted Buxton — a decision that made it possible to settle one part of a three-cornered dispute without the consent of all the parties — as the governing rule, should not be penalized by a retroactive application of Putney and that it should be given prospective elfect only.9

We would not suggest, as does the lead opinion, that an "unquestioned” or "uncontradicted interpretation”10 by the Court of Appeals may invariably be relied on. That rationale is inconsistent with the concept that a denial of leave to appeal does not intimate anything regarding this Court’s view on the merits of a decision of the Court of Appeals.11 Adoption of that rationale would encroach considerably on the Court’s discretion whether to grant leave to appeal. In many cases *378that rationale would not achieve a just balancing of the rights of litigants advocating competing views of what the substantive rule should be.

This Court frequently declines to grant leave to appeal although a majority of the justices may be troubled by, or have doubts regarding, the reasoning or conclusion of the Court of Appeals. The Court may deny leave to appeal because it concludes that the decision of the Court of Appeals, although possibly erroneous, is not "clearly erroneous”, or that it will not "cause material injustice”.12 There is, by hypothesis, no conflict "with decisions of the Supreme Court or other Court of Appeals decisions”. The Court, which must yearly consider some 2,500 applications for leave to appeal and requests for review (the latter from indigent persons convicted of an offense),13 may not on the first presentation of a question perceive that the "subject matter of the appeal involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State”.14

Some may urge that there is a need for a rule one way or the other, and that this Court should speak clearly on the question whether a decision *379of the Court of Appeals may be relied on by bench and bar. We do not think that it is possible for the Court to commit itself so absolutely. Nevertheless, and recognizing that ordinarily we should not go beyond what is necessary to decide the question before us, we believe it is appropriate to summarize our understanding of the pertinent principles:

(a) decisions of the Court of Appeals are binding precedent which must be followed by the trial courts unless and until there is a conflicting decision of the Court of Appeals15 or a disapproving or overruling decision by this Court;

(b) denial of leave to appeal by this Court does not constitute an expression of opinion regarding the analysis or conclusion of the Court of Appeals;16

(c) a decision of the Court of Appeals (except possibly a decision en banc) is not a rule of law within the doctrine of stare decisis, since it binds neither other panels of the Court of Appeals17 nor *380the Supreme Court;18

(d) a subsequent decision by this Court disap*381proving or overruling a Court of Appeals decision does not constitute a "declaration of a new rule” or the "overruling of established precedent”; and

(e) a decision of this Court is generally retroactive unless it overrules established precedent or otherwise declares a new rule, in which case the Court may limit the retroactivity of the new rule.19

II

Dorothy Tebo was injured in a collision between an automobile she was driving and an automobile being driven by Edward S. Havlik. The no-fault automobile insurer of the vehicle Dorothy Tebo was driving,20 Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, paid PIP benefits in excess of $35,000 to Robert and Dorothy Tebo for lost wages and medical expense.21

*382The Tebos commenced this action against Havlik and the owners of two taverns, the Long Branch Bar and the Oakley Liquor Bar. They alleged that Havlik was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that the taverns were subject to liability under the dramshop act.22 The Tebos settled with Havlik for $50,000.

Fred Denter, doing business as the Oakley Liquor Bar, filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of lost wages and medical expense for which the Tebos had been reimbursed through the payment of PIP benefits by the no-fault insurer of the Tebo automobile. The motion was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed.23 It invoked the "collateral-source rule”, which declares that money received from a source, e.g, automobile insurance, other than a tortfeasor does not generally "operate to lessen damages recoverable from the wrongdoer”,24 and held that Dorothy Tebo could recover her wage loss and medical expense from the taverns although she had been reimbursed for those elements of damage by the no-fault insurer of her automobile.25 We would reverse the judgment of *383the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court’s decision granting the motion to exclude evidence of lost wages and medical expense for which the Tebos were fully reimbursed through the payment of PIP benefits.

Ill

The no-fault automobile liability act provides that an action cannot be maintained against an owner or driver of a motor vehicle for noneco*384nomic loss unless the injuries meet the statutory threshold of "death, serious impairment of body function or serious disfigurement”.26 An action can be maintained against an owner or driver for economic loss in excess of the PIP benefits prescribed by the no-fault act (excess economic loss) without regard to the statutory threshold.27 The no-fault act does not limit the tort liability of non-motorist tortfeasors (e.g., an automobile or parts manufacturer or tavern) who may have caused or contributed to an automobile accident.28

Thus, if Mrs. Tebo’s physical injury was of a severity that met the statutory threshold, the Tebos could properly maintain this action against Havlik, the driver of the other vehicle, for noneconomic loss and, without regard to the statutory threshold, for excess economic loss. Also without regard to the statutory threshold, they may maintain this action for all29 their economic and noneconomic damages against the taverns that allegedly sold Havlik liquor while he was visibly intoxicated.

Damages are awarded in a personal injury ac*385tion to compensate a person for his injury and loss.30 Where more than one tortfeasor contributes to a person’s injury and loss, he may recover all his damages from any tortfeasor who contributed to his loss31 but he may not recover from them a sum aggregating more than the amount required to compensate him in full for his loss.32 Accordingly, an amount recovered from one tortfeasor as the result of a settlement or upon a judgment is *386required, by a rule of common law, to be subtracted from any. verdict or judgment rendered against- another tortfeasor.33 As between themselves, the tortfeasors may have rights of contribution or indemnification.34

The common-law rules subjecting a tortfeasor to liability for all the damages suffered by an injured person, but limiting the injured person to a single recovery however many tortfeasors contributed to the loss, establish that the question whether one can seek to recover for his loss from two or more sources and the question whether a full recovery can be obtained from each of several sources are separate questions. Although the Tebos may, consistent with the no-fault act, maintain an action against the taverns under the dramshop act for all35 their damages, economic and noneconomic, it does not follow that a verdict for wage loss and medical expense damages against a tavern should not be reduced by whatever is recovered for work loss and medical expense through the payment of PIP benefits, as such a verdict clearly would be reduced if the work loss and medical expense had been recovered as damages from another tortfeasor.36 The question whether the amount of the PIP benefits for work loss and medical expense received by the Tebos should be subtracted from any verdict against the taverns for those elements of damage for which the Tebos have already been reimbursed through the payment of PIP benefits is a separate question from whether the no-fault act limits the tort liability of non-motorist tortfeasors, *387the question already decided by this Court adversely to non-motorist tortfeasors.

The common-law rule requiring that the amount of an earlier recovery from one tortfeasor be subtracted from a subsequent verdict against another tortfeasor continues, after the enactment of the no-fault act, to apply to recoveries from the owner or driver of an automobile for noneconomic and excess economic loss. Thus, if the defendants remaining in the instant action were not taverns but were owners or drivers of other automobiles involved in the collision, the $50,000 settlement obtained from Havlik for noneconomic or excess economic loss would be subtracted from any verdict against them. The rule also continues to apply where the tortfeasor is a non-motorist such as an automobile or parts manufacturer or the owner of a cow37 or (see Part VI) a tavern — the $50,000 settlement would be subtracted from any recovery from such a defendant for economic or noneconomic loss. Thus, however this case is decided, amounts recovered from an owner or driver for noneconomic or excess economic loss, or from a non-motorist tortfeasor for economic or noneconomic loss, will continue to be subtracted from a verdict for like elements of damage against another owner or driver or a non-motorist tortfeasor.

The question here is whether an injured person, who may recover for noneconomic or excess economic loss but once, however many owners, drivers, manufacturers, cows, or taverns may have contributed to his loss, may recover a second time *388from a non-motorist tortfeasor for economic loss fully recompensed by PIP benefits paid pursuant to the no-fault act.

IV

This is a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident. In 1972, the Legislature enacted the no-fault automobile liability act38 and in separate legislation (see Part VI) amended the dramshop act.39 Both enactments. were legislative responses to perceived deficiencies in the tort system, common law and statutory law.

Insurance proceeds have been the principal source of recovery for injury suffered in an automobile accident, whether of a severity above or below the statutory threshold, both before and after the enactment of the no-fault act. Before the enactment of the no-fault act, a person injured in an automobile accident who recovered from a tortfeasor for wage loss or medical expense ordinarily received payment from the liability insurer of the tortfeasor. If more than one tortfeasor was liable for the loss, whatever was recovered from the insurer of one tortfeasor (or the tortfeasor himself) was, under the common-law rule requiring the setoff of a recovery from another tortfeasor, subtracted from any verdict or judgment against a tortfeasor who also contributed to the loss.

The no-fault act changes the automobile insurer from which reparations may be recovered for wage/work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense. An automobile insurer, often but not necessarily the no-fault insurer of an automo*389bile owned by the injured person40 rather than the automobile liability insurer of the owner or driver of another vehicle found to have been at fault, pays for lost wages or other economic loss within the statutory limits and medical expense.41

Under another common-law rule, recoveries from a "collateral source” are not subtracted from a verdict or judgment awarding damages in tort.42 Damages, whether paid by the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s insurer, are not deemed to have been received from a collateral source and are so subtracted.43 The proceeds of insurance payable to the holder or beneficiary of a policy of insurance, as distinguished from insurance proceeds paid in dis*390charge of the liability, of a tortfeasor, are generally regarded as received from a collateral source and, thus, are not subtracted from a damage award against a tortfeasor who contributed to the injured person’s loss. An injured person may, therefore, retain the proceeds of insurance paid to him as a policyholder or beneficiary and recover a second time from a tortfeasor.44

The Tebos contend that because wage/work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense are no longer payable by an owner or driver of a motor vehicle or his liability insurer to the injured person as damages and the person now responsible for the payment of those losses is often a no-fault insurer of a vehicle owned by the injured person, amounts paid for work loss and medical expense by a no-fault insurer as PIP benefits are received from a collateral source and may not be subtracted from a verdict for those elements of damage against a non-motorist, tortfeasor.

A

A number of rationales have been advanced in justification of the collateral-source rule. The rationales have been questioned by commentators, who are generally critical of the collateral-source rule and of its heedless expansion.45

*392The lead opinion in the instant case states:

"In the context of insurance, the rationale for the [collateral-source] rule is that the plaintiff has given up consideration and is entitled to the contractual benefits. The plaintiff’s foresight and financial sacrifice should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor, who has contributed nothing to the plaintiff’s insurance coverage. Similarly, gratuitous compensation should not inure to the benefit of the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor has contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiffs injuries.”46

The arguments that the Tebos exercised "foresight”, made a "financial sacrifice”, and gave "up consideration and are entitled to the contractual benefits”, ignore that many persons who recover PIP benefits have not paid no-fault insurance premiums because they do not own an automobile and that the financial sacrifice of those who have paid no-fault insurance premiums is governmentally mandated, an exaction like a tax or assessment on owning a motor vehicle. Payment of premiums to a no-fault insurer is not made in the exercise of foresight, but in compliance with the obligation, under the no-fault act, to furnish security for the *393payment of PIP benefits. A different question would be presented if PIP benefits were purchased as are, say, disability or major medical expense insurance benefits — in the exercise of the personal initiative of the recipient, unconstrained by the mandate of statute — to provide the recipient with benefits not provided by law or to supplement those that are provided by law.

To be sure, an owner of an automobile who receives no-fault benefits from the no-fault insurer of that automobile may be said to have "given up consideration”, and no-fault benefits may be said to be "contractual benefits”, but such characterizations, again, ignore that the "consideration” is a governmentally mandated exaction and that the scope and amount of no-fault benefits are specified by statute.47

The arguments that the tortfeasor should not benefit from the payment of PIP benefits because he "contributed nothing, except the activity which caused the plaintiff’s injury” and "contributed nothing to the plaintiff’s insurance coverage” ignore that a tortfeasor who obtains the benefit of a subtraction from a verdict against him of the amount of a recovery from another tortfeasor also could be said to have contributed nothing to the recovery from the other tortfeasor or to the cost of the tortfeasor’s insurance other than his activity which, in combination with the activity of the other tortfeasor, gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury.48

*394The payment of PIP benefits by a no-fault insurer is not "gratuitous compensation”; the cost of providing such benefits is paid by a multitude of owners and drivers of motor vehicles in compliance with their obligation, under the no-fault act, to furnish security for the payment of such benefits.

B

The Court of Appeals said that although the no-fault act requires owners of motor vehicles to carry no-fault insurance49 and the Tebos thus did not voluntarily contract for no-fault insurance, "[nevertheless, premiums were paid for the coverage and the insurance benefits were still obtained from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the defendants. We will not sidestep the collateral source rule on the ground that the insurance was mandatory.”50 (Emphasis supplied.)

The decision of the Court of Appeals allowing a double recovery of wage loss and medical expense rests on (i) the generalization that insurance proceeds are a collateral source, (ii) the change brought about by the no-fault act in the insurer *395who is responsible to pay for wage/work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense from the automobile liability insurer of an owner or driver at fault to an automobile no-fault insurer, and (iii) the circumstance that in the instant case the no-fault insurer required to reimburse Dorothy Tebo is the insurer of her own automobile.

The collateral-source doctrine developed in respect to fire and life51 insurance, and was extended to other forms of insurance and other benefits and payments.52 Those insurance programs, whether *397the premiums were paid by the insured, the decedent, a member of his family, or his employer,53 were not a statutorily mandated substitute form of reparations54 for loss which, if compensated at all, *398was theretofore compensated mainly through liability insurance. Parenthetically, a property owner no longer may retain the proceeds of fire insurance and seek a duplicative recovery against a tortfeasor assertedly responsible for the fire loss; the standard fire insurance policy subrogates the insurer to any right of action of the insured.55 This rule seems to apply generally to property insurance.56

When the collateral-source doctrine developed, life, disability, health, accident, and medical insurance all were seen by the courts as ancillary or alternative sources to the then primary source of recovery in an action against a tortfeasor and collection from the tortfeasor or his liability insurer. Since the enactment of the no-fault act, however, the primary source of recovery of wage/ work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense resulting from an automobile accident is PIP benefits. Because an owner or driver is only subject to tort liability for excess economic loss and because most automobile accidents do not involve non-motorist tortfeasors, an injured person will not ordinarily have a tort source of recovery for wage/work loss and medical expense now paid as PIP benefits under the no-fault act.

Insurance policies, including medical expense insurance,57 purchased voluntarily and not under the constraint of governmental mandate,58 remain *399collateral sources of recovery to the primary PIP benefits source of recovery. An action against a non-motorist tortfeasor (an automobile or parts manufacturer or the owner of a cow or a tavern) has now become the collateral source. To speak of the primary source of recovery as an independent, separate, collateral source of recovery is to ignore that PIP benefits payable by a no-fault insurer ordinarily are the only source of recovery for wage/work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense arising out of an automobile accident.

C

The effect of the "insurance proceeds-collateral source” rationale is to ascribe to the Legislature an intent to create two classes of PIP benefit recipients:

1) those who recover PIP benefits from a no-fault insurer to whom the recipiént paid no-fault insurance premiums, who, on the rationale that PIP benefits are the proceeds of insurance and thus deemed received from a collateral source, can recover for the same loss a second time from a non-motorist tortfeasor, and

2) those who do not own an automobile and who recover PIP benefits from, say, a self-insured owner of a motor vehicle, who, because the PIP benefits are not the proceeds of insurance and thus not deemed received from a collateral source, cannot recover for the same loss a second time from a non-motorist tortfeasor.

Absent a basis for ascribing to the Legislature an intent to create two classes of PIP benefits recipients, the no-fault act should be construed to allow all recipients of PIP benefits who have a cause of action against a non-motorist tortfeasor to *400collect a second time or to disallow any PIP benefit recipient a duplicative recovery. The "insurance proceeds-collateral source” rationale does not justify today’s decision.

V

The argument that PIP benefits, at least where paid by the no-fault insurer of a vehicle owned by the injured person, are received from a collateral source rests in large part on the change brought about by the no-fault act in the automobile insurer responsible to pay reparations for wage loss and medical expense. The question presented thus primarily depends on legislative intent and only secondarily on the scope of the common-law collateral-source doctrine.

The true question is not whether PIP benefits are or are not the proceeds of insurance within the meaning of the collateral-source rule but whether the Legislature intended to provide for or bring about double recovery by PIP benefit recipients who have a cause of action against a non-motorist tortfeasor.

The Legislature did not specifically provide whether PIP benefits paid for work loss or medical expense should be deemed received from a collateral source and on that basis not subtracted from a tort recovery reimbursing for the same wage loss or medical expense, with the result that a person injured in an automobile accident can recover both PIP benefits from a no-fault insurer and damages from a non-motorist tortfeasor to compensate for the same loss.59 We must, accordingly, determine

*402from the history and structure of the no-fault act the construction of that act on the issue presented that is most consonant with its purpose.

A

The lead opinion rests today’s decision on the policy of the no-fault act as well as on the collateral-source rule. The opinion refers to a section of the no-fault act providing for a setoif from PIP benefits of benefits provided or required to be provided by federal or state law (e.g., social security survivors’ benefits and workers’ compensation benefits)60 and to a section authorizing a no-fault *403insurer to recoup PIP benefits from a tort recovery for wage loss or medical expense obtained from a motorist who is not relieved of tort liability,61 and observes that such setoff or recoupment reduces the cost of providing PIP benefits.62 The opinion concludes that the policy of the no-fault act is "to limit duplicative recovery only where the limitation would benefit a no-fault insurer, thus providing an incentive for lower insurance rates”.63 The opinion continues that the taverns had not "participated in the no-fault scheme”, states that the act "evinces no legislative intent to benefit dramshop defendants and their insurers”, and concludes that it would be contrary to the intent of the no-fault act "to benefit a tortfeasor rather than a no-fault insurer” because to do so would "do nothing to fulfill the legislative goal of lower no-fault insurance rates”.64

First, the analysis of the lead opinion assumes that the cost of automobile insurance would not be reduced if duplicative recovery of wage/work loss and medical expense was eliminated. The cost would, however, be reduced if a no-fault insurer can obtain reimbursement in respect to PIP benefits paid by it from a non-motorist tortfeasor such as a tavern. Although the reimbursement question is not presented and therefore should not be decided, explicitly or by implication, a substantial argument could be made that a no-fault insurer should be able to claim reimbursement from a non-motorist tortfeasor.65

*404Second, the analysis of the lead opinion reflects misunderstandings of the operative effect of the no-fault act and of the consequence of today’s decision. The statement in the opinion that "[i]n effect, the Legislature made a trade-off. Those who were required to participate in the no-fault scheme gave up the possibility of redundant recoveries, but they were intended to receive the benefit of lower insurance rates”,66 is based on an incorrect predicate. "Those [owners and drivers] required to participate in the no-fault scheme” did not have the possibility of redundant recoveries to "give up”. Before the enactment of the no-fault act, an owner or driver injured in an automobile accident could collect but once,67 and then only if he was not at fault and the driver of the other vehicle or other tortfeasor was both at fault and collectible.

Third, a tortfeasor "participates”, to the extent participation is required, by being subject to liability to the injured person for the same loss. While the persons under such a common burden of liability generally, at least today, have rights of contribution between themselves (see Part VI, fns 82, 83), the policy of avoiding duplicative recoveries *405has not depended on evidence that each person subject to liability in fact participated in contributing to reimbursement of the loss. It is not a precondition to the common-law rule precluding duplicative recovery that the judgment shall have been rendered against a tortfeasor who has participated in an insurance program for the benefit of injured persons. An uninsured motorist would be entitled to the benefit of the common-law rule if there had been a settlement with another tortfeasor who, together with the uninsured motorist, is subject to liability to the injured person for the same loss.

Fourth, a decision that PIP benefits are not received from a collateral source would not confer a benefit on taverns. Such a decision would rather maintain the status quo, namely the rule that precludes duplicative recovery by requiring that reparations obtained from another source be subtracted from a verdict against a non-motorist tortfeasor.

Fifth, it does not follow from the truism that reducing the aggregate amount paid or payable by a no-fault insurer for PIP benefits by amounts received by the PIP benefit recipient or recouped by the no-fault insurer from certain other sources reduces the cost of providing PIP benefits and thus should result in lower insurance rates, that the no-fault act reflects a policy of barring duplicative recovery only where a no-fault policyholder may benefit through lower rates. Stated conversely, it does not follow that the no-fault act reflects a policy to allow duplicative recovery unless the avoidance of double recovery reduces the cost of no-fault insurance.

The provisions of the no-fault act relied on in the lead opinion (requiring a setoff of benefits *406provided or required to be provided under state or federal laws and allowing for recoupment of duplicative benefits obtained from a motorist not relieved of tort liability) reflect a legislative policy parallel to the policy of the common law of allowing an injured person to be reimbursed for his loss but once. The necessary consequence of these cost-saving common-law and statutory law policies is to confer a benefit on whoever is required by the common and statutory law of this state to provide or contribute to the cost of providing reparations to injured persons. The inference drawn by the majority from this consequence, that the no-fault act reflects a separate legislative policy to benefit no-fault insurers and their insureds to the exclusion of non-motorist tortfeasors and their insureds, is a non sequitur.

The no-fault act does not, as this Court observed in Citizens Ins Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536, 547; 309 NW2d 174 (1981), address the tort liability of non-motorists. Thus the no-fault act does not reflect any separate legislative policy respecting non-motorists. That the no-fault act reflects a policy to bar redundancy in PIP benefits, and thus to reduce the cost to motorists of providing such benefits, does not imply a separate legislative policy to provide for redundancy with the attendant increase in cost where the reparations are required to be provided by non-motorists.

Allowing double recovery may not, as the lead opinion notes, increase automobile insurance rates, but it will increase insurance rates to automobile and parts manufacturers, taverns, owners of cows, and other non-motorists. Since any increase in the exposure of non-motorist tortfeasors will result in increased insurance and other costs for those subject to such increased exposure, which in turn *407must be passed on to the consumer, the increased cost of double recovery will unavoidably be reflected in the cost of automobiles, parts, alcoholic beverages, and milk, and thus will ultimately be paid by the same persons who pay for automobile insurance. In the last analysis, the consumer pays for all the costs of the tort and no-fault systems and thus for all redundancy in those systems.

This Court should not ascribe to the Legislature the narrow purpose of saving the consumer the cost of redundancy only when that cost, is passed on to him in the form of automobile insurance premiums, and of intending to bring about both redundancy and the attendant passing on of the cost of that redundancy to consumers in the form of increased cost of automobiles, parts, alcoholic beverages, and milk.

B

Although reparations for wage/work loss and medical expense now are generally paid as PIP benefits by an automobile insurer who may, as here, be the automobile insurer of a vehicle owned by the injured person, rather than as "damages” by the automobile insurer of the offending vehicle, the source of the funding remains the same under the no-fault act as before its enactment — a pool of money funded with premiums paid by owners and drivers of motor vehicles to discharge the liability imposed on them by the law of this state.

Judgments against individuals and business concerns — before and after the enactment of the no-fault act — generally are not collectible apart from insurance. But for the pool of money funded with insurance premiums, few judgments could be collected, and the flood of litigation that gave rise to the no-fault act would hot have occurred. Before the no-fault act — and now after its enactment— *408owners and drivers paid premiums to insurance companies and thereby provided a pool of money from which judgments and settlements (and, now, PIP benefits) are paid.

Before the no-fault act, a person injured in an automobile accident who recovered from a tortfeasor for wage loss or medical expense ordinarily received payment from the public liability automobile insurer of the tortfeasor. Although the source of the recovery was an insurer rather than the tortfeasor, the law did not regard the payment of insurance proceeds by a tortfeasor’s liability insurer as a collateral source. Whatever was recovered from the automobile insurer of one tortfeasor was, under the general rule of the common law previously discussed, subtracted from any verdict or judgment against other tortfeasors.68

C

It may be argued that in making payment to the injured person, an automobile liability insurer was substituting for the tortfeasor (and payment by a tortfeasor or his liability insurer of damages is not money received from a collateral source), but that here the recipient of PIP benefits who recovers from the no-fault insurer who insured the recipient’s automobile paid for the PIP benefits in much the same way as one pays for benefits payable pursuant to life or medical expense insurance, the proceeds of which are deemed received from a collateral source.69

*409The effort to analogize PIP benefits mandated by law to the proceeds of insurance policies not mandated by governmental policy overlooks the fundamental difference between a payment mandated by governmental policy and one that the insurer and policyholder contract for apart from governmental mandate.

No-fault insurance and PIP benefits, on the one hand, and life and medical expense insurance and benefits, on the other, are distinguishable in a number of particulars. Life and medical expense insurance generally cover loss arising from multiple perils, not a single peril such as an automobile accident. PIP benefits are payable only for loss arising in respect to automobiles. Life and medical expense insurance generally will not fully compensate for the financial loss. Medical expense PIP benefits compensate for the full amount of the loss, and work-loss PIP benefits will compensate most persons70 for the full amount of their loss, and an action for excess economic loss may be maintained against an owner or driver at fault.71

Although the injured person need not now prove fault, and payment is assured, the elements of loss for which PIP benefits are paid are the same as those that were compensable in a tort action against another owner or driver before no-fault. The substitute PIP benefits "damages” or reparations are sometimes, as here, payable pursuant to *410a statutory "contract” of insurance, but they are payable independently of contract. It is not open to the insurer and policyholder to agree on benefit terms other than those prescribed by statute. PIP benefits, as distinguished from benefits payable under a life or medical expense policy, are required to be paid, under the priority system of the no-fault act, without regard to whether the injured person has an insured-insurer relationship with any insurer.72

The money paid by a recipient of PIP benefits to the no-fault insurer of his automobile, is, in contrast with premiums paid to a life or medical expense insurer, a governmentally mandated exaction to finance a social welfare entitlement program, administered through insurance companies and self-insured enterprises, requiring the payment of reparations for the benefit of all persons injured in automobile accidents without regard to whether they own automobiles73 or contribute to the cost of financing or funding the pool of money from which PIP benefits are paid.

PIP benefits are closely akin to, and function as, statutorily mandated automobile accident damages or reparations for wage loss and medical expense. Damages — reparations required to be paid by law —are, all would agree, not a collateral source. PIP benefits are reparations required to be paid by law. They are payable by an automobile insurer — now as before enactment of the no-fault act — out of the pool of money funded with premiums paid by owners and drivers of motor vehicles to discharge the liability imposed and arising by operation of the law of this state, formerly the law of torts, now the no-fault act.

*411While the no-fault insurer is not a tortfeasor, it substitutes for the liability insurer of the loss formerly payable by a motorist tortfeasor. Although a no-fault insurer pays without regard to fault, so too may an automobile or parts manufacturer (or its insurer), which is subject to liability for a defective product however carefully it may have sought to produce the product.

The source of the liability of a no-fault insurer (and of a self-insured owner of a vehicle), a tavern, an automobile or parts manufacturer, and an owner of a cow, are fundamentally the same: governmental policy, either a statute (the no-fault or dramshop acts) or a rule of law (the tort law of negligence and of product liability) of this state. Payments in discharge of a liability to pay PIP benefits and in discharge of a liability to pay a tort judgment are not generated from independent, separate, collateral sources, but from the same source: the law of this state, which causes persons to provide the funds (generally by the purchase of insurance) to pay the reparations required by the law.

D

There is nothing in the language, history, or purpose of the no-fault act suggesting that the Legislature intended, through the extension of the common-law collateral-source rule, that a person who is injured in an automobile accident and recovers PIP benefits from a no-fault insurer to whom insurance premiums were paid should be permitted to recover a second time for the same wage/work loss and medical expense from a tortfeasor.

The effect of extending the collateral-source rule to include the proceeds of a no-fault policy paid in the form of PIP benefits is to ascribe to the Legis*412lature a purpose, by enacting the no-fault act, not only to substitute the no-fault insurer for the other driver and his insurer as the source of payment for wage/work loss and medical expense, but also to reward some (or, depending on how one reads the lead opinion, all) injured persons who have a cause of action against a non-motorist tortfeasor with double recovery and to deprive non-motorist tortfeasors of the reduction of the amount of their liability that had theretofore resulted from the subtraction of reparations obtained from others the law subjects to liability for the same loss.

Treating no-fault benefits as received from a collateral source is not consistent with the purpose and structure of the no-fault act. The policy of the common-law rule requiring the subtraction of duplicative benefits is also reflected, as noted in the lead opinion, in provisions of the no-fault act.74 Fundamentally the same common-law and statutory policy — avoidance of duplicative recovery— that requires subtraction of the $50,000 paid by Havlik from any recovery from a motorist or non-motorist tortfeasor for noneconomic and excess economic loss, also requires subtraction of the $35,000 paid as PIP benefits to the Tebos from any recovery, duplicative of the statutory PIP benefits, from a non-motorist tortfeasor.

In enacting the no-fault act, the Legislature sought to provide a more efficient and cost-effective automobile accident reparations system. It is not consistent with that purpose to hold in effect that, *413by changing the source of the recovery from the owner or driver of the other automobile or his liability insurer to an automobile no-fault insurer (who sometimes is the insurer of the vehicle owned by the recipient of the PIP benefits), the Legislature also intended to enable injured persons to recover for the same injury a second time from a non-motorist tortfeasor, at least in those cases where the no-fault insurer of the vehicle owned by the recipient rather than, say, a self-insured owner pays the PIP benefits. Such a construction

—increases the exposure of non-motorist tortfeasors and their insurers, who before the enactment of the no-fault system could offset against a judgment all payments by a motorist tortfeasor or his automobile liability insurer;

—provides double recovery for wage loss and medical expense theretofore recoverable but once; and

—is inconsistent with the apparent purpose of the Legislature to replace certain aspects of the tort recovery system with the payment of PIP benefits under the no-fault act.

We conclude that the PIP benefits paid to the Tebos under the no-fault act should be subtracted from a tort recovery for wage loss and medical expense from a non-motorist tortfeasor.

VI

The rule requiring the subtraction from a verdict of all amounts obtained from other sources that are required to provide reparations for the same loss by the law of this state, applicable where the verdict is against an automobile or parts manufacturer or the owner of a cow, applies as well where the verdict is against a tavern. *414There is no reason to suppose that the Legislature, which in 1972 enacted both the no-fault act and amendments to the dramshop act, intended that the enactment of the no-fault act would increase the exposure of taverns. The 1972 amendments to the dramshop act indicate just the opposite. In adding "visibly” before "intoxicated”, eliminating exemplary damages, and adding the "name and retain” requirement,75 the Legislature clearly sought to reduce the cost to taverns of providing reparations pursuant to the dramshop act.

It has been argued that subtracting amounts received from other sources subject to liability for the same loss may result in a tavern paying nothing if the amount received from other sources is greater than a verdict the jury may award. That is, however, true whenever there is a subtraction.76

Where there is more than one tavern, the plaintiff may settle with one tavern and proceed to trial with the others. The rule nevertheless is that whatever is recovered from one tavern in settlement is to be subtracted from any verdict against other taverns.77 This too could result in no actual recovery against taverns that do not settle.

After Putney v Haskins, the intoxicated person must be retained in the action and there cannot be a settlement, unless the tavern agrees. If there had been a verdict against the taverns for $50,000 or another amount and against Havlik for the $50,-000 paid in settlement of the claim against him, there would have been but one recovery. The $50,000 would have been subtracted by the judge78 *415from any verdict against the taverns79 unless a different rule should apply where the non-motorist tortfeasor is a tavern than where it is an automobile or parts manufacturer or the owner of a cow.

It is urged that a purpose of the tort law and of the dramshop act is to encourage potential tortfeasors to act with due care and that eliminating duplicative recovery does not serve that purpose. First, there are significant areas of tort liability where a tortfeasor is subject to liability even if he has exercised due care. Second, most tort liability is funded by insurance; the impact of a tort recovery on a particular tortfeasor and the likely effect on his future behavior are often marginal. Third, subtracting PIP benefits from a tort recovery would not result in the tortfeasor or his insurer escaping all liability; they would remain liable or potentially liable for noneconomic loss (frequently the greater exposure) and excess economic loss. That potential liability should encourage those who would not otherwise exercise due care, who can be so constrained, to do so. Fourth, the argument ignores that the common-law rule requires the subtraction of a recovery from another tortfeasor subject to liability for the same loss; if this argument for not requiring subtraction of a duplicative recovery is thought to be sound, then the general rule requiring subtraction of recoveries of reparations from other tortfeasors should be abolished and an injured person should be permitted to recover his damages in full as many times as *416there are collectible tortfeasors who contributed to his loss.

Although the instant case concerns setoff and not contribution, arguments have been made80 based on an extension of a concept expressed in Virgilio v Hartfield, 4 Mich App 582; 145 NW2d 367 (1966), where the Court of Appeals held that taverns sued under the dramshop act could not maintain an action for contribution against the intoxicated driver.81 Virgilio was decided before *417Moyses v Spartan Asphalt Paving Co, 383 Mich 314; 174 NW2d 797 (1970),82 and before the adoption of the revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.83 It is now clear that contribution *418can be enforced although tortfeasors are separate and concurrent rather than "joint” wrongdoers, although there is not a common theory of liability, and although the liability of one tortfeasor may be based on fault while the liability of the other is based on a statute or rule of the common law allowing recovery without regard to fault. All that is now necessary to enforce contribution is that there be a common burden of liability.84

*419A no-fault insurer, albeit npt a tortfeasor, is under a common burden of liability with a tavern for the payment of wage/work loss within the statutory limit and medical expense to a person injured in an automobile accident. Although an action against a tavern is statutory and liability does not depend on proof of wrongdoing, the basis *420of liability does not differ substantially from the basis of liability of an automobile or parts manufacturer for product liability, which also may arise without proof of wrongdoing.

It also has been asserted that the dramshop act is penal and that a different rule should therefore apply. Although the dramshop act contains penal as well as remedial provisions, punitive damages have not been recoverable under the dramshop act.85 The Legislature amended the statute in 1972 *421to eliminate the recovery of exemplary damages.86 It is now clear that only compensatory damages are recoverable.87

We conclude that the rule requiring the subtraction from verdicts against tortfeasors of amounts received from other sources that are required to provide reparations for the same loss by the law of this state should apply to a verdict against a tavern as well as a verdict against an automobile or parts manufacturer or the owner of a cow.

VII

The Oakley Liquor Bar moved to exclude evi*422dence of wage loss and medical expense. Arguably, such evidence should be admitted, and the amount paid as PIP benefits then subtracted by the judge88 from any judgment against the tavern. The elements of damage for which PIP benefits are payable are not, however, recoverable in an action against the allegedly intoxicated driver,89 who must be named and retained under the amended dramshop act as construed in Putney v Haskins. It seems, therefore, that it would simplify the trial to exclude the evidence with such advice to the jury in that regard, if any, as may be thought appropriate.

We concur in Burns, and in Tebo would remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.